From 486806373238c25c31d8eab2f61b8e621101eb9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: P4T12ICK Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 08:51:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] minified json api --- .../adapter/json_writer.py | 2 +- dist/api/baselines.json | 2406 +- dist/api/deployments.json | 104 +- dist/api/detections.json | 114443 +-------------- dist/api/lookups.json | 354 +- dist/api/macros.json | 693 +- dist/api/response_tasks.json | 1945 +- dist/api/stories.json | 26515 +--- 8 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 146454 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py index 500db4b01b..726ca794fc 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/adapter/json_writer.py @@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ class JsonWriter(): def writeJsonObject(file_path : str, obj) -> None: with open(file_path, 'w') as outfile: - json.dump(obj, outfile, ensure_ascii=False, indent=4) \ No newline at end of file + json.dump(obj, outfile, ensure_ascii=False) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/baselines.json b/dist/api/baselines.json index 34004814c9..9684fe0b13 100644 --- a/dist/api/baselines.json +++ b/dist/api/baselines.json @@ -1,2405 +1 @@ -{ - "baselines": [ - { - "name": "Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", - "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", - "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "action", - "src_ip", - "dest_ip" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", - "id": "1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", - "search": "| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", - "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" - ], - "detections": [ - "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.status" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "id": "a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-25", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", - "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" - ], - "detections": [ - "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.object_category" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "id": "b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-14", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", - "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" - ], - "detections": [ - "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.object_category" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", - "id": "67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.", - "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", - "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback" - ], - "detections": [ - "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.object_category" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", - "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-05-08", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", - "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", - "id": "c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-05-08", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.query", - "DNS.record_type" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", - "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", - "id": "841b102c-8866-494b-a704-87b674fe9b09", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-07-17", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", - "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-17", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-05-08", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Ransomware" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Processes launching netsh", - "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Count of assets by category", - "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.", - "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Asset Tracking" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Identity_Management.All_Assets", - "category" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports", - "id": "9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-13", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "Command and Control" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", - "id": "08ef80f5-6555-474b-bb2d-22e2aa4206a4", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-12-03", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "errorCode", - "userName" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", - "id": "251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.", - "search": "| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Prohibited Software On Endpoint" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", - "id": "4b5119c3-5369-4040-9430-b63b1a314229", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventType", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", - "id": "fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-11-14", - "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "src_user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", - "id": "b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-11-14", - "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "src_user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", - "id": "02add098-efa3-428d-b2e2-4ed0831c92f4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect new API calls from user roles" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventType", - "errorCode", - "userIdentity.type", - "userName", - "eventName" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", - "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", - "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", - "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "sourceIPAddress" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", - "id": "bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", - "id": "b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.instanceType" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", - "id": "6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-15", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.instanceType" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", - "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-30", - "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "Detect new user AWS Console Login" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.arn", - "src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", - "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-30", - "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "Detect new user AWS Console Login" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.arn", - "src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Discover DNS records", - "id": "c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-02-14", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup", - "search": "| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, \"\\*\", \"\")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated with the domains owned by your corporation", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Hijacking" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "DNS record changed" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.record_type", - "DNS.answer", - "DNS.query" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", - "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-10-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", - "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brand Monitoring", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", - "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", - "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", - "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", - "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", - "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-04-01", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Remote Desktop Network Traffic" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Successful Backups", - "id": "b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", - "search": "`netbackup` \"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor Backup Solution" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", - "id": "b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", - "search": "`netbackup` \"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor Backup Solution" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity", - "id": "1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-04", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.accountId", - "resources{}.accountId" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", - "id": "82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-15", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.vendor_account", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src", - "Authentication.user_role" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", - "id": "dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-15", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.vendor_account", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src", - "Authentication.user_role" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen AWS Regions", - "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-01-08", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days", - "search": "`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "awsRegion" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", - "id": "69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-03", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.user_type", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.command" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", - "id": "c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-03", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.user_type", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.command" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", - "id": "dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-15", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Hourly Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.object_category", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", - "id": "6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-15", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"-90d@d\") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.object_category", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", - "id": "7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", - "id": "6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", - "id": "3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-9-03", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", - "id": "7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-9-03", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", - "id": "f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-29", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 c=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.change_type", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", - "id": "534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-29", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.change_type", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", - "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-19", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.src", - "All_Changes.status" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", - "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-20", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", - "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.src", - "All_Changes.status" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", - "id": "b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-02", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.vendor_region" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", - "id": "512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-02", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.vendor_region" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously seen command line arguments", - "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-03-01", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "IcedID" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "First time seen command line argument" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User", - "id": "4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-05", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.arn", - "errorCode" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", - "id": "64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", - "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", - "id": "2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`\") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", - "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Hourly Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "First Time Seen Running Windows Service" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", - "id": "54c40c6a-9a5b-4a79-9291-85977f713961", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is \"200\"", - "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect S3 access from a new IP" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_status", - "bucket_name", - "remote_ip" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", - "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-28", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", - "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-28", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "Detect AWS Console Login by New User" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", - "id": "60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "deployments": [ - "90 Day Baseline" - ], - "detections": [ - "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", - "id": "80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`\") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Hourly Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch", - "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-01-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path=\"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\QualityCompat*\") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_category", - "All_Changes.object_path", - "All_Changes.dest", - "All_Changes.command", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.object" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Updates Install Failures", - "id": "6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-14", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor for Updates" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "No Windows Updates in a time frame" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Updates.vendor_product", - "Updates.status" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - }, - { - "name": "Windows Updates Install Successes", - "id": "6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-14", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=installed by _time span=1d", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor for Updates" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "No Windows Updates in a time frame" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Updates.vendor_product", - "Updates.status" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - } - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"baselines": [{"name": "Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3782fd63", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "action", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "id": "1da5d5ea-4382-447d-98a9-87c358c95fcb", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", "search": "| tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "deployments": ["Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback"], "detections": ["Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.status"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "id": "a2f701f8-5296-4d74-829c-0b7eb346d549", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback"], "detections": ["Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "id": "b01bd274-f661-4f9c-bd9f-cf23ff6ae0bc", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-14", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by \"HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true", "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "deployments": ["Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback"], "detections": ["Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "id": "67b84d51-8329-4909-849f-8d38ce54260a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.", "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by \"user,HourOfDay,isWeekend\" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true", "how_to_implement": "You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "deployments": ["Weekly Model Rebuild 90 Day Lookback"], "detections": ["Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "id": "d2a4d85b-fc6a-47a0-82f6-bc1ec2ebc459", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Unusual Processes"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd.exe", "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "id": "c914844c-0ff5-4efc-8d44-c063443129ba", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query", "DNS.record_type"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-4810-9f1f-63da3783fd63", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.arn"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "id": "841b102c-8866-494b-a704-87b674fe9b09", "version": 1, "date": "2018-07-17", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.arn"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "id": "fc0edd96-ff2b-48b0-9f1f-63da3783fd63", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-17", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Spike in Security Group Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.arn"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "id": "df98763b-0b08-4281-8ef9-08db7ac572a9", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=10m, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | fit DensityFunction count by \"HourOfDay,DayOfWeek\" into smb_pdfmodel", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding \"src\" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Ransomware"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Processes launching netsh", "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Count of assets by category", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff9", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.", "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Identity_Management.All_Assets", "category"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports", "id": "9f3bae5a-9fe3-49df-8c84-5edc51d84b7f", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "id": "08ef80f5-6555-474b-bb2d-22e2aa4206a4", "version": 2, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.", "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "errorCode", "userName"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", "id": "251930a5-1451-4428-bb13-eed5775be0ce", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.", "search": "| inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count", "how_to_implement": "This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "SamSam Ransomware"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Prohibited Software On Endpoint"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "id": "4b5119c3-5369-4040-9430-b63b1a314229", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect Spike in AWS API Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventType", "userIdentity.arn"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "id": "fa5634df-fb05-4b4b-aba0-6115138bb1ba", "version": 1, "date": "2019-11-14", "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "src_user"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "id": "b28ed6de-e4ba-40f7-ae0a-93a088c774ab", "version": 1, "date": "2019-11-14", "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\\\nIn addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\\\nMore information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "src_user"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "id": "02add098-efa3-428d-b2e2-4ed0831c92f4", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect new API calls from user roles"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventType", "errorCode", "userIdentity.type", "userName", "eventName"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources", "id": "ac88e6a0-4fba-4dfd-b7b9-8964df7d1aee", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "id": "bb1bd99d-1e93-45f1-9571-cfed42d372b9", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "id": "b8f029f2-65a6-4d76-be98-dad1c9d59c45", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "requestParameters.instanceType"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "id": "6c767ac0-0906-4355-9a83-927f5ee7bdad", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-15", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "requestParameters.instanceType"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd03", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-30", "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect new user AWS Console Login"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn", "src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "id": "06c036e6-d6d7-4daa-bd76-411c3d356031", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-30", "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE \"\",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE \"\",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect new user AWS Console Login"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn", "src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Discover DNS records", "id": "c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd8c72b7c3", "version": 1, "date": "2019-02-14", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup", "search": "| inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, \"\\*\", \"\")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated with the domains owned by your corporation", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["DNS record changed"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.record_type", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "DNSTwist Domain Names", "id": "19f7d2ec-6028-4d01-bcdb-bda9a034c17f", "version": 2, "date": "2018-10-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.", "search": "| dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse=\"true\" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\\_SA\\_CIM**.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", "id": "5cdda34f-4caf-4128-a713-0837fc48b67a", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Remote Desktop Network Traffic"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", "id": "baaeea15-fe8a-4090-92c2-5b60943bb608", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | sort - count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Remote Desktop Network Traffic"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "id": "063dfe9f-b1d7-4254-a16d-1e2e7eadd6a8", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"*mstsc.exe*\" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Remote Desktop Network Traffic"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Monitor Successful Backups", "id": "b4d0dfb2-2195-4f6e-93a3-48468ed9734e", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", "search": "`netbackup` \"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Unsuccessful Netbackup backups"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "id": "b2178fed-592f-492b-b851-74161678aa56", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.", "search": "`netbackup` \"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Unsuccessful Netbackup backups"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity", "id": "1cc22b09-c867-416e-a511-cb36ac44aee2", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.accountId", "resources{}.accountId"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "id": "82af2ed9-8f4b-4785-a152-ba61e6a23bbf", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-15", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.vendor_account", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src", "Authentication.user_role"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "id": "dd6fb3a9-4906-48cb-8626-c88a25a056c3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-15", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.vendor_account", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src", "Authentication.user_role"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen AWS Regions", "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63", "version": 1, "date": "2018-01-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days", "search": "`cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "awsRegion"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "id": "69d75f4b-b794-4a66-a777-730357b886b4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.command"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "id": "c4b760a0-6a97-47e9-b089-8ae9e57f210e", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.command"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "id": "dd4ced8a-15a9-4285-94ac-7e4134673bf8", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-15", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Hourly Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "id": "6bf75d69-7766-47bc-8097-e41696807a6f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-15", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"-90d@d\") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "id": "7744597f-d07a-4cea-94a7-e0f8aaebc410", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "id": "6f1ca5dc-e445-401c-9845-a96d2b6ba184", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "id": "3c78025c-1ffe-4976-a640-75ef604842be", "version": 1, "date": "2020-9-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "id": "7b7ef9ab-acb9-4e07-af76-4cf1e722885c", "version": 1, "date": "2020-9-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes.Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "id": "f36dc403-739d-42f3-83a3-49237d8654c5", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-29", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 c=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.change_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "id": "534b7d30-7b0c-4510-8f55-65439850d58d", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-29", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.change_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "id": "4ce865fc-f43e-4521-a8ed-ab8af99052d7", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-19", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.status"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "id": "9830abb9-be80-4563-b232-09bf1f628cf3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.status"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "id": "b5e232db-dec6-4db8-aaa1-dd5474521e40", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.vendor_region"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "id": "512f928a-a461-41b4-8984-db4dd2c472e4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-14d@d\"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.vendor_region"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously seen command line arguments", "id": "56059acf-50fe-4f60-98d1-b75b51b5c2f3", "version": 2, "date": "2019-03-01", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "IcedID"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["First time seen command line argument"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User", "id": "4d69091b-d975-4267-85df-888bd41034eb", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.", "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.arn", "errorCode"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "id": "64ce0ade-cb01-4678-bddd-d31c0b175394", "version": 3, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Service Abuse", "NOBELIUM Group"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["First Time Seen Running Windows Service"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "id": "2e3bdd68-1863-46ee-81f8-87273eee7f1c", "version": 3, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`\") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Service Abuse", "NOBELIUM Group"], "deployments": ["Hourly Cache Updates"], "detections": ["First Time Seen Running Windows Service"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "id": "54c40c6a-9a5b-4a79-9291-85977f713961", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is \"200\"", "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect S3 access from a new IP"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_status", "bucket_name", "remote_ip"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "id": "0a87ecf9-dc6a-43af-861a-205e75a09bf5", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect AWS Console Login by New User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect AWS Console Login by New User"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "id": "60b9c00f-a9d6-4e51-803c-5d63ea21b95b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "deployments": ["90 Day Baseline"], "detections": ["First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "id": "80aea7fd-5da2-4533-b3c2-560533bfbaee", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`\") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "deployments": ["Hourly Cache Updates"], "detections": ["First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch", "id": "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd61", "version": 1, "date": "2018-01-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path=\"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\QualityCompat*\") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`", "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.object_path", "All_Changes.dest", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Windows Updates Install Failures", "id": "6a4dbd1b-4502-4a11-943a-82b5ae7a42d7", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["No Windows Updates in a time frame"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Updates.vendor_product", "Updates.status"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}, {"name": "Windows Updates Install Successes", "id": "6a80535c-86a6-4b54-894c-4b446d0c701d", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" AND Updates.status=installed by _time span=1d", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["No Windows Updates in a time frame"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Updates.vendor_product", "Updates.status"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/deployments.json b/dist/api/deployments.json index 80e4369ba8..381a7203d8 100644 --- a/dist/api/deployments.json +++ b/dist/api/deployments.json @@ -1,103 +1 @@ -{ - "deployments": [ - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", - "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "rba": { - "enabled": "true" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "Anomaly", - "product": "ESCU" - } - }, - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", - "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "Baseline" - } - }, - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Correlation", - "id": "36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. These correlations will generate Notable Events.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "notable": { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%", - "nes_fields": [] - }, - "tags": { - "type": "Correlation", - "product": "ESCU" - } - }, - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", - "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "Hunting", - "product": "ESCU" - } - }, - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", - "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "notable": { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%", - "nes_fields": [] - }, - "rba": { - "enabled": "true" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "TTP" - } - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"deployments": [{"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Anomaly", "id": "a9e210c6-9f50-4f8b-b60e-71bb26e4f216", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "rba": {"enabled": "true"}, "tags": {"type": "Anomaly", "product": "ESCU"}}, {"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"type": "Baseline"}}, {"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Correlation", "id": "36ba498c-46e8-4b62-8bde-67e984a40fb4", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type Correlation. These correlations will generate Notable Events.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "notable": {"rule_description": "%description%", "rule_title": "%name%", "nes_fields": []}, "tags": {"type": "Correlation", "product": "ESCU"}}, {"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Hunting", "id": "cc5895e8-3420-4ab7-af38-cf87a28f9c3b", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"type": "Hunting", "product": "ESCU"}}, {"name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "notable": {"rule_description": "%description%", "rule_title": "%name%", "nes_fields": []}, "rba": {"enabled": "true"}, "tags": {"type": "TTP"}}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/detections.json b/dist/api/detections.json index 4fb08c4bd3..e512b6a952 100644 --- a/dist/api/detections.json +++ b/dist/api/detections.json @@ -1,114442 +1 @@ -{ - "detections": [ - { - "name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", - "id": "fc246e56-953b-40c1-8634-868f9e474cbd", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-24", - "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "On March 24th, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a possible Denial of Service stemming from the lack of validation in a specific key-value field in the Splunk-to-Splunk (S2S) protocol. This detection will alert on attempted exploitation in patched versions of Splunk.", - "search": "`splunkd` log_level=ERROR component=TcpInputProc thread_name=FwdDataReceiverThread | table host, src | `splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This detection does not require you to ingest any new data. The detection does require the ability to search the _internal index. This detection will only find attempted exploitation on versions of Splunk already patched for CVE-2021-3422.", - "known_false_positives": "None.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0301.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1498/splunk_indexer_dos/splunkd.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An attempt to exploit CVE-2021-3422 was detected from $src$ against $host$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1498" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "host", - "src", - "log_level", - "component", - "thread_name" - ], - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-3422" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "splunkd", - "definition": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - {} - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/application/splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", - "id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user.", - "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.command", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.status" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", - "id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.", - "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:Inbound", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.command", - "All_Changes.object_category", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-02-22", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", - "references": [ - "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.userName" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-03", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", - "references": [ - "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.003", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.userName" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_createaccesskey_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-19", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.", - "references": [ - "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.003", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.userName" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_createloginprofile_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", - "id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-28", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.", - "search": "| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"),\"New Cross Account Activity\",\"Previously Seen\") | where status = \"New Cross Account Activity\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time.", - "nist": [ - "PR.AC", - "PR.DS", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "requestingAccountId", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "requestedAccountId", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.vendor_account", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.user_role", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", - "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", - "id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-11", - "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", - "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware Cloud" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userIdentity.principalId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "eventSource", - "eventID", - "awsRegion", - "requestParameters.policy", - "userIdentity.principalId" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", - "id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-11", - "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", - "known_false_positives": "bucket with S3 encryption", - "references": [ - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", - "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware Cloud" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_file", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption", - "requestParameters.bucketName", - "requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source", - "requestParameters.key", - "userAgent", - "region" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", - "id": "62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-17", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", - "awsRegion", - "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", - "requestParameters.repositoryName", - "user", - "userName", - "src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", - "id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-17", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (LOW, INFORMATIONAL, UNKNWON) | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repositoryName | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repositoryName, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", - "awsRegion", - "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", - "requestParameters.repositoryName", - "user", - "userName", - "src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 7, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", - "id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-17", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", - "awsRegion", - "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", - "requestParameters.repositoryName", - "user", - "userName", - "src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", - "id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-19", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 NOT (date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday) | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "awsRegion", - "requestParameters.imageTag", - "requestParameters.registryId", - "requestParameters.repositoryName", - "user", - "userName", - "src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", - "id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-19", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "awsRegion", - "requestParameters.imageTag", - "requestParameters.registryId", - "requestParameters.repositoryName", - "user", - "userName", - "src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_ecr_users", - "definition": "userName IN (user)", - "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR." - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", - "id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-13", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:Inbound", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "src", - "userAgent", - "user", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", - "id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-permission-errors/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Blocked", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json" - ], - "impact": 20, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1580" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "userIdentity.arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "eventSource", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "userIdentity.type" - ], - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", - "id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.", - "references": [ - "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/", - "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:Inbound", - "Stage:Credential Access", - "Other:Policy Violation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1580", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.policyName" - ], - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", - "id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Execution", - "Other:Policy Violation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json" - ], - "impact": 20, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1098" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.policyArn" - ], - "risk_score": 10, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_iam_delete_policy_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", - "id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", - "references": [ - "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1098" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "group_name", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.groupName" - ], - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-31", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", - "references": [ - "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069.003", - "T1098", - "T1069" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "group_deleted", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.groupName" - ], - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", - "id": "211b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-24", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=lambda.amazonaws.com eventName=UpdateFunctionCode* errorCode = success user_type=IAMUser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.functionName) as function_updated by src_ip user_arn user_agent user_type eventName aws_account_id |`aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Cloudtrail logs in your AWS Environment.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin or an autorized IAM user has updated the lambda fuction code legitimately.", - "references": [ - "http://detectioninthe.cloud/execution/modify_lambda_function_code/", - "https://sysdig.com/blog/exploit-mitigate-aws-lambdas-mitre/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to update the lambda function code of $function_updated$ from this IP $src_ip$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "cloud", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-11", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.007", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "userName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "requestParameters.ruleAction", - "requestParameters.egress", - "requestParameters.aclProtocol", - "requestParameters.portRange.to", - "requestParameters.portRange.from", - "requestParameters.cidrBlock", - "userName", - "userIdentity.principalId", - "userAgent" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.007", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "requestParameters.egress", - "userName", - "userIdentity.principalId", - "src", - "userAgent" - ], - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", - "id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", - "known_false_positives": "Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.", - "references": [ - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", - "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Credential Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "sourceIPAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "recipientAccountId", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim", - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "requestParameters.principalArn", - "requestParameters.roleArn", - "requestParameters.roleSessionName", - "recipientAccountId", - "responseElements.issuer", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userAgent" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", - "id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.", - "references": [ - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", - "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "sourceIPAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "userIdentity.principalId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim", - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "eventType", - "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn", - "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.accessKeyId", - "userIdentity.principalId" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-02", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", - "references": [ - "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Credential Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.userName", - "eventSource" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-03", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", - "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", - "references": [ - "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.003", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userAgent", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.userName" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_updateloginprofile_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", - "id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-02", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline.", - "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "CircleCI", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1554" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_times" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "circleci", - "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", - "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", - "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", - "id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline.", - "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "CircleCI", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1554" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_times" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "circleci", - "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", - "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", - "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", - "id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-04", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for new commands from each user role.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", - "known_false_positives": ".", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Recon", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.user_type", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.command", - "All_Changes.object" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", - "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", - "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", - "id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-13", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User\" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Recon", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.vendor_region" - ], - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", - "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", - "id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-02", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.vendor_region", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", - "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", - "id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs.", - "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen.", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", - "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", - "id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen.", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", - "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", - "id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-29", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search \"Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update\" should be enabled for this detection to properly work.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.command", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.change_type", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", - "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", - "id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-09", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.src", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.object", - "All_Changes.command" - ], - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" - }, - { - "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", - "id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-09", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.src", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.object", - "All_Changes.command" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-16", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object_id", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.src", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.command" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" - }, - { - "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", - "id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-16", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "object", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.src", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.object", - "All_Changes.command" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" - }, - { - "name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", - "id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-06", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Correlation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score", - "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "signals", - "definition": "index=signals", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", - "id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-06", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Correlation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search correlations detections by user and risk_score", - "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Correlation by User and Risk", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.003", - "T1204" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "signals", - "definition": "index=signals", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-28", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", - "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-07-19", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk.", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1530" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "bucketName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "requestParameters.bucketName", - "user_arn", - "userIdentity.principalId", - "userAgent", - "uri", - "permission" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", - "id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-19", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1530" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "userIdentity.userName", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "bucketName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventSource", - "eventName", - "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp", - "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write", - "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp", - "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control", - "requestParameters.bucketName", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.principalId", - "userAgent", - "bucketName" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-20", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", - "references": [ - "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1537" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user_arn", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "user_arn", - "src_ip", - "requestParameters.attributeType", - "aws_account_id", - "vendor_region", - "user_agent" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals", - "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", - "known_false_positives": "None", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Security Hub Alerts" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Resources{}.Type", - "Title", - "Types{}", - "vendor_account", - "vendor_region", - "severity", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", - "id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", - "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity=\"low\" | eval phase=\"code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", - "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to master branch", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1199" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "commit.commit.author.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "github", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "github_commit_changes_in_master_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Github Commit In Develop", - "id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", - "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", - "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to develop branch", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Github Commit In Develop", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1199" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "commit.commit.author.email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "github", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "github_commit_in_develop_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", - "id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs.", - "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1195.001", - "T1195" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "alert.id", - "repository.full_name", - "repository.html_url", - "action", - "alert.affected_package_name", - "alert.affected_range", - "alert.created_at", - "alert.external_identifier", - "alert.external_reference", - "alert.fixed_in", - "alert.severity" - ], - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "github", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "github_dependabot_alert_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", - "id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user.", - "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GitHub", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1195.001", - "T1195" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "repository", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "alert.id", - "repository.full_name", - "repository.html_url", - "action", - "alert.affected_package_name", - "alert.affected_range", - "alert.created_at", - "alert.external_identifier", - "alert.external_reference", - "alert.fixed_in", - "alert.severity" - ], - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "github", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "github_known_users", - "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", - "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", - "id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-16", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1567.002", - "T1567" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parameters.owner", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "parameters.doc_title", - "src_domain", - "dest_domain", - "email", - "parameters.visibility", - "parameters.owner", - "parameters.doc_type" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Turla", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_drive", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", - "id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-16", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566.001", - "T1566" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "attachment{}.file_extension_type", - "attachment{}.sha256", - "destination{}.service", - "num_message_attachments", - "payload_size", - "subject", - "destination{}.address", - "source.address" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gsuite_gmail", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", - "id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", - "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566.001", - "T1566" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gsuite_gmail", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", - "id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", - "known_false_positives": "normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/22/malware-increasingly-targets-discord-for-abuse/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566.001", - "T1566" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gsuite_gmail", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", - "id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.", - "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003", - "T1048" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source.address", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "destination{}.address", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gsuite_gmail", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", - "id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", - "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566.001", - "T1566" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "parameters.owner", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "email", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "parameters.doc_title", - "src_domain", - "dest_domain", - "email", - "parameters.visibility", - "parameters.owner", - "parameters.doc_type" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_drive", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", - "id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-20", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.", - "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", - "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1212" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "raw" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", - "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", - "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", - "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", - "id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.", - "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", - "https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/remote-file-inclusion-vulnerability/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1212" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "raw" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", - "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", - "id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.", - "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dev Sec Ops" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "object.message", - "source.host", - "object.involvedObject.name", - "object.involvedObject.namespace", - "object.involvedObject.kind", - "object.message", - "object.reason" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "kube_objects_events", - "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", - "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.003", - "T1136" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ActorIpAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Actor.ID", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Workload", - "Operation", - "Actor{}.ID", - "Actor{}.Type", - "ActorIpAddress", - "dest", - "ResultStatus" - ], - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", - "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-03", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", - "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Added Service Principal", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.003", - "T1136" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ActorIpAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Target.ID", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Workload", - "signature", - "Actor{}.ID", - "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", - "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", - "Target{}.ID", - "ActorIpAddress" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", - "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-03", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.", - "references": [ - "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.007", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ip_addresses_new_added", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user_id", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "signature", - "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", - "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", - "ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue", - "user", - "vendor_account", - "status", - "user_id", - "action" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Disable MFA", - "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-03", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Disable MFA", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1556" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Operation", - "UserType", - "user", - "status", - "signature", - "dest", - "ResultStatus" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_disable_mfa_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", - "id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Workload", - "UserAuthenticationMethod", - "status", - "UserAgent", - "src_ip", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", - "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", - "references": [ - "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1556" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ActorIpAddress", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Workload", - "LogonError", - "ActorIpAddress", - "UserAgent", - "UserId" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", - "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", - "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", - "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", - "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.003", - "T1136" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "OrganizationName", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "UserId", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Workload", - "Operation", - "Parameters{}.Value", - "ObjectId", - "OrganizationName", - "OriginatingServer", - "UserId", - "UserKey" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 PST export alert", - "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-16", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 PST export alert", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Source", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Category", - "Name", - "Source", - "Severity", - "AlertEntityId", - "Operation" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", - "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Outcome:Allowed", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114.003", - "T1114" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Operation", - "Parameters" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", - "id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-15", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "Service Accounts", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Exfiltration", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114.002", - "T1114" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Operation", - "Parameters" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", - "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Cloud Data", - "Scope:External", - "Stage:Exfiltration", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114.003", - "T1114" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", - "type": "Email Address", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Operation", - "Parameters" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "userName" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", - "id": "dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "src_user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", - "id": "8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\")| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "userName" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", - "id": "1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_terminated)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "src_user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", - "id": "344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "sourceIPAddress" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", - "id": "ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "sourceIPAddress" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "id": "42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "sourceIPAddress" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", - "id": "7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "sourceIPAddress" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", - "id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\\\nThis search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Hijacking", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Host Redirection", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 9", - "CIS 12", - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.dest", - "DNS.message_type", - "DNS.src" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", - "id": "021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-08", - "author": "Peter Gael, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.arn", - "errorMessage", - "errorCode", - "userAgent", - "src", - "userName", - "arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", - "id": "4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-17", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.arn", - "userIdentity.type", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "aws_service_accounts", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", - "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called \"Create a list of approved AWS service accounts\": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC", - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "errorCode", - "userName", - "eventName", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "aws_service_accounts", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", - "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", - "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename \"Web.*\" as * | rex field=site \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\n", - "known_false_positives": "If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", - "analytic_story": [ - "Common Phishing Frameworks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS", - "PR.IP", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.answer", - "DNS.dest", - "DNS.src", - "DNS.query", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN6", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", - "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", - "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", - "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", - "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", - "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", - "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", - "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console" - }, - { - "name": "detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", - "id": "05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as \"Source IP\", dest as \"Destination IP\", answer as \"DNS Answer\" anslen as \"Answer Length\" record_type as \"DNS Record Type\" firstTime as \"First Time\" lastTime as \"Last Time\" count as Count | table \"Source IP\" \"Destination IP\" \"DNS Answer\" \"DNS Record Type\" \"Answer Length\" Count \"First Time\" \"Last Time\" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12", - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.message_type", - "DNS.record_type", - "DNS.src", - "DNS.dest", - "DNS.answer" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", - "id": "98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-27", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message \"Enabled Privileges:\\s+(?\\w+)\\s+Disabled Privileges:\" | where privs=\"SeDebugPrivilege\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as \"Enabled Privilege\" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is \"Administrators\" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.", - "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "signature_id", - "Process_Name", - "Message", - "dest", - "Process_ID" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", - "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail\" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventType", - "errorCode", - "userIdentity.type", - "userName", - "eventName" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", - "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\",\"Previously Seen User\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus =\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run \"Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", - "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventType", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", - "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", - "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", - "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" - }, - { - "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", - "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", - "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", - "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", - "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.007" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "network_acl_events", - "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", - "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs" - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", - "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" - }, - { - "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", - "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-18", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", - "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "serIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_group_api_calls", - "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", - "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups" - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", - "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", - "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" - }, - { - "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", - "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", - "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect USB device insertion", - "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-11-27", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Change_Analysis" - ], - "description": "The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result=\"Removable Storage device\" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect USB device insertion", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Protection" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.result", - "All_Changes.result_id", - "All_Changes.src_priority", - "All_Changes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_usb_device_insertion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", - "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\\\nThis search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", - "analytic_story": [ - "Dynamic DNS" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP", - "DE.DP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.url", - "Web.status", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", - "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", - "description": "This is a description" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", - "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-15", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \\\nNOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.query\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.query\" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.answer\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.answer\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.answer\" as message | eval message=if(message==\"unknown\",\"\", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Protection", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.query", - "DNS.message_type", - "DNS.src_category", - "DNS.src" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", - "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Hijacking", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Host Redirection", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS", - "PR.IP", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.dest_category", - "DNS.src_category", - "DNS.src", - "DNS.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "DNS record changed", - "id": "44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.", - "search": "| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search \"Discover DNS record\". \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"DNS Hijack Enrichment\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\n", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS record changed", - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Hijacking" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS", - "PR.IP", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.record_type", - "DNS.answer", - "DNS.src", - "DNS.message_type", - "DNS.query" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dns_record_changed_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "discovered_dns_records", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", - "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", - "id": "21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", - "search": "`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "OriginalFileName", - "process_name", - "EventID", - "CommandLine", - "Computer", - "parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", - "id": "56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "errorCode", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", - "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", - "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances" - }, - { - "name": "ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", - "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", - "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", - "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", - "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-02-23", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started", - "search": "`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),\"-1d@d\"), \"Instance Started in a New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus=\"Instance Started in a New Region\" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen AWS Regions\" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1535" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "awsRegion" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", - "id": "347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 AMIs\" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.", - "known_false_positives": "After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", - "id": "65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-02-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types\" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "requestParameters.instanceType" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", - "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", - "id": "ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-11-19", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* .*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", - "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.", - "search": "`netbackup` MESSAGE=\"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor Backup Solution" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "MESSAGE", - "COMPUTERNAME" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "netbackup", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "First time seen command line argument", - "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "First time seen command line argument", - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Hidden Cobra Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.001", - "T1059.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", - "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", - "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", - "id": "27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-09", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", - "known_false_positives": "Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", - "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role", - "data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", - "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", - "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource", - "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role", - "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", - "id": "2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-09", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", - "known_false_positives": "High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", - "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", - "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", - "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", - "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", - "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}", - "data.resource.labels.project_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", - "id": "a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-01", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", - "known_false_positives": "GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs.", - "references": [ - "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1", - "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", - "id": "4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path.", - "search": "|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Storage\")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", - "analytic_story": [ - "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GCR Container", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1525" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", - "id": "db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-15", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 \"data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision\"=forbid \"data.protoPayload.status.message\"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=\"system:anonymous\" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", - "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Identify New User Accounts", - "id": "475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week.", - "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, \"Accounts created in last week\") | search empStatus=\"Accounts created in last week\"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework.", - "known_false_positives": "If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Identify New User Accounts", - "analytic_story": [ - "Account Monitoring and Controls" - ], - "asset_type": "Domain Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "Chimera", - "Indrik Spider", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "identify_new_user_accounts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", - "id": "5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", - "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", - "id": "de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", - "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", - "id": "7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", - "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", - "id": "b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", - "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", - "id": "a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", - "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace", - "id": "55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", - "id": "47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", - "id": "1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", - "id": "f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", - "id": "019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", - "id": "4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", - "id": "86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", - "id": "c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-19", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure", - "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", - "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", - "id": "99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-11", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", - "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", - "id": "7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-10", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", - "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", - "id": "bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-11", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", - "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", - "id": "a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-11", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs.", - "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. ", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", - "id": "7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", - "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", - "id": "a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-11", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs.", - "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", - "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-23", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", - "known_false_positives": "None at this time", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", - "analytic_story": [ - "Brand Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "brand_abuse_dns", - "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", - "id": "d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-19", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.", - "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to=\"/%09/*\" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "No extra steps needed to implement this search.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 4", - "CIS 18" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.RA", - "RS.MI", - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2016-4859" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2016-4859", - "cvss": 5.8, - "summary": "Open redirect vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise 6.4.x prior to 6.4.3, Splunk Enterprise 6.3.x prior to 6.3.6, Splunk Enterprise 6.2.x prior to 6.2.10, Splunk Enterprise 6.1.x prior to 6.1.11, Splunk Enterprise 6.0.x prior to 6.0.12, Splunk Enterprise 5.0.x prior to 5.0.16 and Splunk Light prior to 6.4.3 allows to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", - "id": "a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-01-29", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.", - "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model", - "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", - "analytic_story": [ - "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 4", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.PT" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Processes created by netsh", - "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-11-23", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude \"C:\\Program Files\\rempl\\sedlauncher.exe\" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Processes created by netsh", - "analytic_story": [ - "Netsh Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.004" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "processes_created_by_netsh_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", - "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-10-11", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as \"prohibited\" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as \"prohibited\", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_times" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_softwares", - "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", - "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", - "id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-27", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "None at the moment", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1564.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Lazarus Group", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", - "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-03-02", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"\\\\\\\\*\" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.", - "known_false_positives": "This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_registry_key_modifications_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", - "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= \"*create*\" OR Processes.process= \"*delete*\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "No known false positives", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", - "id": "354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-01-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Vulnerabilities" - ], - "description": "The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5753\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5715\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5754\" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 4" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.RA", - "RS.MI", - "PR.IP", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2017-5753" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2017-5753", - "cvss": 4.7, - "summary": "Systems with microprocessors utilizing speculative execution and branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", - "id": "f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-14", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.", - "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path=\"*raw/services/server/info/server-info\" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", - "analytic_story": [ - "Splunk Vulnerabilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Splunk Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 4", - "CIS 18" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.RA", - "RS.MI", - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2018-11409" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2018-11409", - "cvss": 5.0, - "summary": "Splunk through 7.0.1 allows information disclosure by appending __raw/services/server/info/server-info?output_mode=json to a query, as demonstrated by discovering a license key." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", - "id": "1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Registry\")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.", - "known_false_positives": "There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", - "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "UEBA" - ], - "description": "This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel\" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel.\" Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious File Write", - "id": "57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8", - "version": 3, - "date": "2019-04-25", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious File Write", - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_writes", - "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", - "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_file_write_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", - "id": "2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-01-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", - "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", - "version": 4, - "date": "2022-02-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1036", - "T1218.011", - "T1036.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", - "id": "cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process.", - "search": "(`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\\ Volume\\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", - "id": "29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "uncommon_processes", - "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", - "id": "56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-06", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", - "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed.", - "search": "`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE=\"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor Backup Solution" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 10" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "netbackup", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", - "id": "bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-08", - "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=\"/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/\" | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | search Username=* | rex field=Username \"@(?.*)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream.", - "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.", - "references": [ - "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", - "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", - "analytic_story": [ - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "asset_type": "Account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM", - "DE.DP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_content_type", - "uri", - "cookie" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", - "id": "31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-08", - "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", - "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", - "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", - "analytic_story": [ - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "asset_type": "account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_content_type", - "cookie" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", - "id": "31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-08", - "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[password\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", - "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", - "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", - "analytic_story": [ - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "asset_type": "account", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_content_type", - "uri" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", - "id": "c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-11-06", - "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process=\"*C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "Windows hosts file modification", - "id": "06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-11-02", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\System32\\\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", - "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows hosts file modification", - "analytic_story": [ - "Host Redirection" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Unknown" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.IP", - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "field", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Unknown" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_hosts_file_modification_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml", - "source": "deprecated" - }, - { - "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", - "id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1560.001", - "T1560" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", - "id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-12-06", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "TargetImage", - "CallTrace", - "Computer", - "TargetProcessId", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", - "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", - "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", - "references": [ - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Account Discovery With Net App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", - "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.014", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", - "id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1552.002", - "T1552" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", - "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", - "id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" Message = \"*objectcategory=user*\" Message = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", - "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", - "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", - "id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-06-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", - "references": [ - "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.007", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_netsh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", - "id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Profile=Public|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|LPort=*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.001", - "T1021" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 3, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", - "id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*firewall*\" Message = \"*Inbound*\" Message = \"*Allow*\" Message = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", - "known_false_positives": "administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.001", - "T1021" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 3, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", - "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-06-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", - "references": [ - "https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.007", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_netsh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", - "id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/no/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.MRDEC.MRA/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", - "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1560.001", - "T1560" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", - "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", - "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Ingress Tool Transfer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", - "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-11-04", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", - "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "XMRig", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036.005", - "T1036", - "T1003", - "T1595" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "attacker_tools", - "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", - "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", - "id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", - "version": 7, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", - "analytic_story": [ - "Disabling Security Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1553.004", - "T1553" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_certutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", - "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", - "analytic_story": [ - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Trickbot", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 20, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "security_services_lookup", - "description": "A list of services that deal with security", - "filename": "security_services.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", - "min_matches": 1 - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_reg", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", - "id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1552.002", - "T1552" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Batch File Write to System32", - "id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string \"system32\", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Batch File Write to System32", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204", - "T1204.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "batch_file_write_to_system32_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", - "id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", - "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-21", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "BITS Job Persistence", - "id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "BITS Job Persistence", - "analytic_story": [ - "BITS Jobs", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1197" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_bitsadmin", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "bits_job_persistence_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", - "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "BITSAdmin Download File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "BITS Jobs", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1197", - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_bitsadmin", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", - "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-02-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", - "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Command And Control" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_certutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", - "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-02-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", - "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", - "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Command And Control" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_certutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", - "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", - "id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-23", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", - "analytic_story": [ - "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1140" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Leviathan", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_certutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "certutil_with_decode_argument_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Change Default File Association", - "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Change Default File Association", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.001", - "T1546" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "change_default_file_association_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", - "id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", - "analytic_story": [ - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CHCP Command Execution", - "id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others", - "references": [ - "https://ss64.com/nt/chcp.html", - "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1419941156633329665?s=20" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CHCP Command Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_name", - "process", - "parent_process_name", - "parent_process", - "process_id", - "parent_process_id", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "chcp_command_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", - "id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-15", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", - "id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "administrator may execute this app to manage disk", - "references": [ - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/", - "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070.004", - "T1070" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", - "id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is \"runrun\", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is \"temp.dat\", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "clop_common_exec_parameter_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", - "id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "cmdline", - "_time", - "parent_process_name", - "process_name", - "OriginalFileName", - "process_path" - ], - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", - "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-01-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "IcedID", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "WhisperGate", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.003", - "T1059" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", - "id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-20", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", - "https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.003", - "T1543.003", - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", - "id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.007" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", - "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "ImageLoaded", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Signed", - "ProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", - "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", - "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", - "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike", - "Trickbot", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "PipeName", - "Computer", - "process_name", - "process_path", - "process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", - "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-11-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_extensions", - "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", - "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", - "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-11-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Common Ransomware Notes", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_notes", - "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", - "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", - "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-02", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", - "references": [ - "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", - "id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-40444", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", - "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-08", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe .", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.001", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", - "id": "743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c", - "version": 6, - "date": "2020-09-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070", - "T1070.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", - "id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "SourceImage", - "TargetImage", - "TargetProcessId", - "SourceProcessId", - "StartAddress", - "EventCode", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", - "id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-06", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "TargetImage", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "TargetImage", - "TargetProcessId", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", - "id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \\AppData\\Local\\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetFilename", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "process_name", - "TargetFilename", - "Computer", - "object_category" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", - "id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-10", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.003", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", - "id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.003", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", - "id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.003", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", - "id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.003", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", - "id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/", - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/06/maicious-macro-that-compile-c-code-as.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1027.004", - "T1027" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_csc", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", - "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-10", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", - "references": [ - "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", - "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", - "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", - "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", - "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", - "id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Deleting Of Net Users", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1531" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "deleting_of_net_users_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", - "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-11-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 10" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", - "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-10-15", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1550", - "T1550.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "EventCode", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Logon_Type", - "Logon_Process", - "WorkstationName", - "user", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Night Dragon" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "id": "26f02e96-c300-11eb-b611-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", - "https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1069.001", - "T1482", - "T1087.001", - "T1087", - "T1069.002", - "T1069" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "id": "1c34549e-c31b-11eb-996b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", - "analytic_story": [ - "Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1069.001", - "T1482", - "T1087.001", - "T1087", - "T1069.002", - "T1069" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "file_path", - "dest", - "file_name", - "process_id", - "file_create_time" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", - "id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-21", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND Message IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.", - "references": [ - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", - "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", - "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-36934" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-36934", - "cvss": 4.6, - "summary": "Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", - "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", - "version": 3, - "date": "2019-12-03", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "source_image", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "TargetImage", - "GrantedAccess", - "Computer", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId", - "TargetImage", - "TargetProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-09", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Message=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/", - "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", - "id": "c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-11-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\n", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Account Monitoring and Controls" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.user", - "nodename", - "All_Changes.result", - "All_Changes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "Chimera", - "Indrik Spider", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", - "id": "95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", - "analytic_story": [ - "Account Monitoring and Controls" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $nodename$ and $result$ related to $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "result", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.result", - "nodename", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN10", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", - "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-10-05", - "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", - "references": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", - "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", - "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", - "analytic_story": [ - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1505", - "T1505.003", - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.file_hash", - "Filesystem.user" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", - "id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_hh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_html_help_renamed_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", - "id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-11", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", - "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", - "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", - "id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", - "https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", - "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", - "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_hh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", - "id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", - "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", - "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", - "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_hh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", - "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-03", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Image", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "ImageLoaded", - "ProcessId", - "Computer", - "Image" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-09", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", - "id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies \"mshta.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"mshta.exe\" and its parent process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_mshta", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect mshta renamed", - "id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect mshta renamed", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_mshta", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_mshta_renamed_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", - "id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_mshta", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", - "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", - "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect New Local Admin account", - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.001", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Group_Name", - "member_id", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", - "id": "cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-03", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1574.009", - "T1574" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", - "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-11-10", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", - "known_false_positives": "It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1016" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", - "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", - "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", - "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", - "version": 6, - "date": "2020-11-10", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", - "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", - "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", - "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", - "version": 4, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_psexec", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", - "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-11-29", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1020" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.original_file_name" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rclone", - "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", - "id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.009" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", - "id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.009" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "dest_ip", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "user", - "src_ip", - "dest_host", - "dest_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", - "id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.009" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_regasm", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", - "id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.009" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", - "id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.009" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "dest_ip", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "user", - "src_ip", - "dest_host" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "Endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", - "id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.009" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_regsvcs", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", - "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-28", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.010" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", - "id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1560.001", - "T1560" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_renamed_7_zip_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", - "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1569", - "T1569.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_psexec", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", - "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Renamed RClone", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1020" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", - "id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1560.001", - "T1560" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 27, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_renamed_winrar_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", - "id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-02-04", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/", - "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", - "id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-02-04", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", - "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", - "id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-02-04", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/", - "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", - "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-20", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", - "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Discovery Techniques", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1069.001", - "T1482", - "T1087.001", - "T1087", - "T1069.002", - "T1069" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-27", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", - "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", - "analytic_story": [ - "Discovery Techniques", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1069.001", - "T1482", - "T1087.001", - "T1087", - "T1069.002", - "T1069" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "file_path", - "dest", - "file_name", - "process_id", - "file_create_time" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-27", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", - "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", - "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "Discovery Techniques", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1069.001", - "T1482", - "T1087.001", - "T1087", - "T1069.002", - "T1069" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_sharphound_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", - "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", - "id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", - "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", - "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", - "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.003", - "T1546" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Destination", - "Computer", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "Leviathan", - "Mustang Panda", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", - "id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/", - "https://gist.github.com/rxwx/8955e5abf18dc258fd6b43a3a7f4dbf9" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_amsi_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", - "id": "aa4f695a-3024-11ec-9987-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableAntiVirus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", - "id": "2dd719ac-3021-11ec-97b4-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", - "id": "dc65678c-301f-11ec-8e30-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "user may choose to disable windows defender AV", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", - "id": "cc391750-3024-11ec-955a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", - "id": "898debf4-3021-11ec-ba7c-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", - "id": "73922ff8-3022-11ec-bf5e-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis..", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", - "id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disable ETW Through Registry", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_etw_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", - "id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", - "references": [ - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070", - "T1070.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Registry Tool", - "id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Registry Tool", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_registry_tool_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Schedule Task", - "id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable problematic schedule task", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Schedule Task", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_schedule_task_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", - "id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1564.001", - "T1562.001", - "T1564", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_nam" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Lazarus Group", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_show_hidden_files_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", - "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", - "id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", - "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", - "id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"Off\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_nam" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", - "id": "114c6bfe-9406-11ec-bcce-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Message=\"*4194304*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled for legitimate purposes.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", - "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", - "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558", - "T1558.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", - "id": "b0b34e2c-90de-11ec-baeb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" AND Message=\"*PreauthNotRequired*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", - "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", - "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558", - "T1558.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling CMD Application", - "id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling CMD Application", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_cmd_application_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", - "id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling ControlPanel", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_controlpanel_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Defender Services", - "id": "911eacdc-317f-11ec-ad30-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\*\" AND (Registry.registry_path IN(\"*WdBoot*\", \"*WdFilter*\", \"*WdNisDrv*\", \"*WdNisSvc*\",\"*WinDefend*\", \"*SecurityHealthService*\")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disabling_defender_services_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling Defender Services", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_defender_services_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", - "id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-31", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.htm" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_netsh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", - "id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Net User Account", - "id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling Net User Account", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1531" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_net_user_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", - "id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/pum-optional-norun/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_norun_windows_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", - "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-11-18", - "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", - "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Remcos", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.action" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", - "id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Task Manager", - "id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/threat-roundup-0424-0501.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling Task Manager", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "disabling_task_manager_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_image", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "process_name", - "process_id", - "parent_process_name", - "dest_port", - "process_path" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", - "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-15", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", - "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Data Exfiltration", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", - "id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", - "id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/playbook-domain-dominance", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", - "id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", - "id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-30", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", - "id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 18, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", - "id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", - "id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", - "id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", - "id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Download Files Using Telegram", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Image", - "process_id", - "TargetFilename", - "Hash" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "download_files_using_telegram_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", - "id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-30", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as \"license.dat\" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Drop IcedID License dat", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204", - "T1204.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "drop_icedid_license_dat_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", - "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-31", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", - "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Domain Trust Discovery", - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1482" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", - "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-02-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", - "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", - "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_procdump", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", - "id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", - "id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND Message IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroupMember/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", - "id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", - "id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.mvps.net/docs/how-to-secure-remote-desktop-rdp/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", - "id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", - "id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID Security_ID Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4798" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "ComputerName", - "EventCode", - "Process_Name", - "Process_ID", - "Account_Name", - "Account_Domain", - "Logon_ID", - "Security_ID", - "Message" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", - "id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-18", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_esentutl", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "esentutl_sam_copy_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", - "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "ETW Registry Disabled", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.006", - "T1127", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", - "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", - "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", - "id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excel_spawning_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", - "id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_name", - "process_id", - "parent_process_name", - "dest", - "user", - "parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", - "id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1489" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", - "id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-28", - "author": "Michael Hart, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\\Temp.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", - "analytic_story": [ - "Meterpreter" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_windows" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/742" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", - "id": "b5baa09a-7a05-11ec-8da4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image ProcessID Computer |where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "deleted_files", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "TargetFilename", - "Computer", - "user", - "Image", - "ProcessID" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", - "id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-25", - "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/sc-create", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", - "id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-07", - "author": "Michael Hart", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", - "analytic_story": [ - "Meterpreter" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_windows" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/742" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", - "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1489" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", - "id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-07", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", - "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Scope:Local", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1531" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", - "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", - "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Data Exfiltration", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Scope:Local", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "process_name", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Scope:Local", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1569", - "T1569.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "process_name", - "process" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", - "id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", - "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-11-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", - "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", - "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Trickbot", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Share_Name", - "Relative_Target_Name", - "Object_Type", - "Access_Mask", - "user", - "src_port", - "Source_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", - "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Double Zero Destructor", - "Data Destruction", - "XMRig", - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Other", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", - "id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", - "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-11-18", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1036.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", - "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-09", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_reg", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "File with Samsam Extension", - "id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-14", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "File with Samsam Extension", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "message": "File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Other", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "file_with_samsam_extension_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", - "id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allowedprogram*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.004", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", - "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", - "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112", - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", - "id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-11", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", - "id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", - "id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-aduser*\" Message = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", - "id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, MAuricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", - "id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", - "id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", - "references": [ - "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 40, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1482" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.", - "references": [ - "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 40, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1482" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "Path", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", - "id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", - "id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-02", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", - "references": [ - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 40, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1482" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-02", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES", - "references": [ - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 40, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1482" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "Path", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", - "id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \\ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Message = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", - "id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-07", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", - "id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", - "id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" AND Message = \"*GetCurrent()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.principal.windowsidentity.getcurrent?view=net-5.0" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Path", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", - "id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-07", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-02", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainComputer/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", - "id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-07", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-02", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", - "id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", - "id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087", - "T1087.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087", - "T1087.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", - "id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1049" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-10", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1049" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", - "id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-07", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 21, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_computer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", - "id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-25", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_group*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", - "id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-wmiobject*\" Message = \"*ds_user*\" Message = \"*-namespace*\" Message = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/describing-the-ldap-namespace" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", - "id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087", - "T1087.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-23", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND Message=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087", - "T1087.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Command And Control" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "connection_to_CNC", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventID", - "process_name", - "process_id", - "parent_process_name", - "dest_port", - "process_path" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", - "id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "registry_value_name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", - "id": "6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222", - "T1222.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker", - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", - "id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-16", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", - "known_false_positives": "this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", - "analytic_story": [ - "Information Sabotage" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1537" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Share_Name", - "Relative_Target_Name", - "Object_Type", - "Access_Mask", - "user", - "src_port", - "Source_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", - "id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-16", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "High Process Termination Frequency", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "proc_terminated", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "Image", - "Computer", - "_time", - "ProcessID" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "high_process_termination_frequency_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", - "id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \\\nThe first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \\\njndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the \"base\" score used later. \\\njndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \\\nall_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \\\nenv works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \\\nuri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \\\nkeywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \\\nlookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \\\nScoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \\\nFinally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against.", - "known_false_positives": "It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.", - "references": [ - "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72", - "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b#gistcomment-3994449", - "https://regex101.com/r/OSrm0q/1/", - "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/expl_log4j_cve_2021_44228.yar", - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/12/log4shell-hell-anatomy-of-an-exploit-outbreak/", - "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/1899b8554f38c8692a9fb0ceba60b44c", - "https://twitter.com/sasi2103/status/1469764719850442760?s=20" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Scope:Network" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_method", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.http_method", - "Web.url", - "Web.url_length", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest", - "Web.http_user_agent", - "_raw" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "hunting_for_log4shell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Icacls Deny Command", - "id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-29", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/deny*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Icacls Deny Command", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "icacls_deny_command_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", - "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "ICACLS Grant Command", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "icacls_grant_command_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", - "id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-30", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1560.001", - "T1560" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "TargetFilename", - "EventCode", - "process_id", - "process_name", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-18", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", - "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", - "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.002", - "T1021.003", - "T1047", - "T1543.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", - "id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enter-pssession?view=powershell-7.2" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.006" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", - "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", - "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", - "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Scope:Network" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_user_agent", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "http_method", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.http_method", - "Web.url", - "Web.url_length", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest", - "Web.http_user_agent" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", - "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.007" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", - "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", - "version": 4, - "date": "2022-02-09", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", - "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558", - "T1558.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Ticket_Options", - "Ticket_Encryption_Type", - "dest", - "service", - "service_id" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", - "id": "0cb847ee-9423-11ec-b2df-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*\" | table EventCode, Account_Name, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", - "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", - "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558", - "T1558.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Account_Name", - "Security_ID", - "MSADChangedAttributes" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", - "id": "59b51620-94c9-11ec-b3d5-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-23", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", - "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Set-ADAccountControl*\" AND Message=\"*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", - "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", - "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558", - "T1558.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", - "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", - "references": [ - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Message", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "dest", - "Type" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", - "id": "023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/detecting-cronrat-malware-on-linux-instantly/", - "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-do-i-add-jobs-to-cron-under-linux-or-unix-oses/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.003", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Add User Account", - "id": "51fbcaf2-6259-11ec-b0f3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://linuxize.com/post/how-to-create-users-in-linux-using-the-useradd-command/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Add User Account", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.001", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_add_user_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", - "id": "977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute \"at\" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute \"at\" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.003", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux At Application Execution", - "id": "bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/", - "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux At Application Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.001", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_at_application_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", - "id": "c1400ea2-6257-11ec-ad49-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/101073/how-to-change-permissions-from-root-user-to-all-users", - "https://askubuntu.com/questions/617850/changing-from-user-to-superuser" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222.002", - "T1222" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", - "id": "66ab15c0-63d0-11ec-9e70-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/", - "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules#L285-L297", - "https://github.com/bfuzzy1/auditd-attack/blob/master/auditd-attack/auditd-attack.rules#L269-L270", - "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/privilege_escalation/T1548.001_ElevationControl_CommonProcesses.xml" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.001", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", - "id": "9b6aae5e-8d85-11ec-b2ae-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"dd\" AND Processes.process = \"*of=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/dd/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", - "id": "f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-05", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", - "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", - "id": "d5a62490-6e09-11ec-884e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-05", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", - "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_doas_tool_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", - "id": "0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.003", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", - "id": "b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", - "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", - "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.006", - "T1547" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", - "id": "97d9cfb2-61ad-11ec-bb2d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1037.004", - "T1037" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", - "id": "46ba0082-61af-11ec-9826-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/", - "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.004", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", - "id": "18b5a1a0-6326-11ec-943a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", - "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", - "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.006", - "T1547" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", - "id": "387b278a-6326-11ec-aa2c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", - "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", - "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.006", - "T1547" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", - "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", - "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", - "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "linux_shells", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", - "id": "ab1e0d52-624a-11ec-8e0b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands", - "https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Sudoers" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", - "id": "03e22c1c-8086-11ec-ac2e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-28", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(^.{1}$)\" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to \"null\" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process=\"(^.{0}$)\"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/", - "https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/", - "https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-4034" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-4034", - "cvss": 7.2, - "summary": "A local privilege escalation vulnerability was found on polkit's pkexec utility. The pkexec application is a setuid tool designed to allow unprivileged users to run commands as privileged users according predefined policies. The current version of pkexec doesn't handle the calling parameters count correctly and ends trying to execute environment variables as commands. An attacker can leverage this by crafting environment variables in such a way it'll induce pkexec to execute arbitrary code. When successfully executed the attack can cause a local privilege escalation given unprivileged users administrative rights on the target machine." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", - "id": "7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-11", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1098.004", - "T1098" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", - "id": "16107e0e-71fc-11ec-b862-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. \"etc/passwd\" store user information within linux OS while \"etc/shadow\" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://askubuntu.com/questions/445361/what-is-difference-between-etc-shadow-and-etc-passwd", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.008", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", - "id": "4479539c-71fc-11ec-b2e2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. \"/etc/sudoers\" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", - "id": "7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.001", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", - "id": "9c94732a-61af-11ec-91e3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/129143/what-is-the-purpose-of-bashrc-and-how-does-it-work", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.004", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", - "id": "b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/", - "https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability", - "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.003", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", - "id": "dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 20, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.003", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 6, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", - "id": "c04ef40c-72da-11ec-8eac-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-11", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1098.004", - "T1098" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", - "id": "cbe2ca30-631e-11ec-8670-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://compilepeace.medium.com/memory-malware-part-0x2-writing-userland-rootkits-via-ld-preload-30121c8343d5" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1574.006", - "T1574" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", - "id": "c7495048-61b6-11ec-9a37-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/", - "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/", - "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.006", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service Restarted", - "id": "084275ba-61b8-11ec-8d64-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Service Restarted", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.006", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_service_restarted_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", - "id": "e0428212-61b7-11ec-88a3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.006", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", - "id": "bf0304b6-6250-11ec-9d7c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.001", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", - "id": "9d96022e-6250-11ec-9a19-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.001", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", - "id": "4b00f134-6d6a-11ec-a90c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The \"sudo\" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", - "id": "be254a5c-63e7-11ec-89da-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://forum.ubuntuusers.de/topic/sudo-visudo-gibt-etc-sudoers-tmp/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", - "id": "535cb214-8b47-11ec-a2c7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-11", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"arp\", \"ifconfig\", \"ip\", \"netstat\", \"firewall-cmd\", \"ufw\", \"iptables\", \"ss\", \"route\") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016/T1016.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux System Network Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Network Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1016" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_system_network_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", - "id": "08c41040-624c-11ec-a71f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "Linux Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 40, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.003", - "T1548" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", - "id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", - "references": [ - "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", - "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", - "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", - "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", - "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055", - "T1055.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "ImageLoaded", - "OriginalFileName", - "Product", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Signed", - "ProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", - "id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087", - "T1087.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "local_account_discovery_with_net_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", - "id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087", - "T1087.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", - "id": "9be30d80-3a39-4df9-9102-64a467b24eac", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "Correlation", - "datamodel": [ - "Risk" - ], - "description": "This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic source | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | stats values(risk_object) as affected_systems values(source) as detection_name values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as tactics values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime dc(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as distinct_tactics | where distinct_tactics >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\"` should contain events.", - "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation.", - "references": [ - "https://research.splunk.com/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228/", - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/simulating-detecting-and-responding-to-log4shell-with-splunk.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105", - "T1190", - "T1059" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "affected_systems", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Risk.analyticstories", - "All_Risk.risk_object_type", - "All_Risk.risk_object", - "All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic", - "source" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", - "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1037", - "T1037.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Cobalt Group" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MacOS LOLbin", - "id": "58d270fb-5b39-418e-a855-4b8ac046805e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-04", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Detect multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries in a short period of time.", - "search": "`osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN (\"find*\", \"crontab*\", \"screencapture*\", \"openssl*\", \"curl*\", \"wget*\", \"killall*\", \"funzip*\") | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MacOS LOLbin", - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/macos_lolbin/osquery.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Multiplle LOLbin are executed on host $host$ by user $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.004", - "T1059" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "columns.cmdline", - "columns.pid", - "columns.parent", - "columns.path", - "columns.signing_id", - "columns.username", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "osquery", - "definition": "sourcetype=osquery:results", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "macos_lolbin_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/macos_lolbin.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", - "id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-mailsniper-a-tool-for-searching-every-users-email-for-sensitive-data/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114", - "T1114.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", - "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-05", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", - "references": [ - "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", - "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", - "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.010", - "T1112" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "process_name", - "registry_path", - "registry_key_name", - "registry_value_name", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", - "id": "8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-07", - "author": "Ryan Becwar", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_Service_File_Name=lower(Service_File_Name) | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"powershell[.\\s]|powershell_ise[.\\s]|pwsh[.\\s]|psexec[.\\s]\" | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"-nop[rofile\\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\\s]+\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf", - "http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/", - "https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious Powershell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1569", - "T1569.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "Service_File_Name", - "Service_Type", - "_time", - "Service_Name", - "Service_Start_Type", - "Service_Account", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", - "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", - "version": 7, - "date": "2022-01-18", - "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", - "references": [ - "https://regexr.com/662ov", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", - "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", - "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1027" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", - "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", - "id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", - "version": 5, - "date": "2021-01-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", - "id": "13bbd574-83ac-11ec-99d4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*sekurlsa::tickets /export*\" OR Processes.process = \"*kerberos::ptt*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1550", - "T1550.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-23", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", - "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", - "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-02", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", - "references": [ - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware", - "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1491" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Image", - "TargetObject", - "Details", - "Computer", - "process_guid", - "process_id", - "user_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", - "id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-03-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*/G*\" AND (Processes.process = \"* everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* SYSTEM:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* S-1-1-0:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 32, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", - "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-01-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", - "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.010", - "T1547" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.action", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", - "id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.007" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "EventCode", - "process_name", - "ProcessId", - "ProcessGuid", - "Computer", - "ImageLoaded" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", - "id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.007" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "EventCode", - "process_name", - "ProcessId", - "ProcessGuid", - "Computer", - "ImageLoaded" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", - "id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1127.001", - "T1127" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_msbuild", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", - "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", - "references": [ - "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", - "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-09", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "ImageLoaded", - "process_name", - "OriginalFileName", - "process_id", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-40444", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", - "id": "ccb98a66-5851-11ec-b91c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \\\n1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \\\n1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \\\n1. Inducing an error state. \\\n1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \\\nIn addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\msi.dll\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attackerkb.com/topics/7LstI2clmF/cve-2021-41379/rapid7-analysis", - "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", - "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/msi.dll%20Hijack%20(Methodology).ioc" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1574.002", - "T1574" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "ImageLoaded", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "ProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-41379" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-41379", - "cvss": 4.6, - "summary": "Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", - "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-05", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", - "references": [ - "https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1574.002", - "T1574" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", - "id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-15", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Source_Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "action", - "Logon_Account", - "Source_Workstation" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", - "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-08", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Client_Address", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Result_Code", - "Account_Name", - "Client_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", - "id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Source_Workstation", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "action", - "Logon_Account", - "Source_Workstation" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", - "id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Logon_Type", - "Caller_Process_Name", - "Security_ID", - "Account_Name", - "ComputerName" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", - "id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Logon_Type", - "Security_ID", - "Account_Name", - "ComputerName", - "Source_Network_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", - "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Windows Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", - "id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.", - "references": [ - "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Inbound" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", - "id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-10", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1049" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", - "id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-10", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1049" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", - "id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-10", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1049" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", - "id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1016", - "T1016.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_route", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", - "id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", - "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", - "analytic_story": [ - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Command And Control" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", - "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-25", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", - "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", - "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", - "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Domain Trust Discovery", - "IcedID", - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1482" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", - "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-15", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", - "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1555", - "T1555.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Object_Name", - "Object_Type", - "process_name", - "Access_Mask", - "Accesses", - "process_id", - "EventCode", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", - "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-15", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", - "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1555", - "T1555.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Object_Name", - "Object_Type", - "process_name", - "Access_Mask", - "Accesses", - "process_id", - "EventCode", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", - "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-28", - "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", - "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.003", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 50, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", - "id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "office macro for automation may do this behavior", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Application Drop Executable", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "TargetFilename", - "ProcessGuid", - "dest", - "user_id" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_application_drop_executable_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", - "id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-30", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", - "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", - "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", - "id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "ImageLoaded", - "AllImageLoaded", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Image", - "process_name", - "ProcessId", - "ProcessGuid", - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", - "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", - "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", - "references": [ - "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Trickbot", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "ImageLoaded", - "AllImageLoaded", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Image", - "process_name", - "ProcessId", - "ProcessGuid", - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", - "id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Default browser not in the filter list.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/#" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", - "id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.", - "references": [ - "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", - "id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-26", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_bitsadmin", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", - "id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-26", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_certutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_spawning_certutil_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", - "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-26", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_mshta", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", - "id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/395471/0/html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/cef4b8ba-023c-4b3b-b2ef-6486a44f6ed9/", - "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", - "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "FIN7" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", - "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-10", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", - "references": [ - "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "process_name", - "process", - "file_create_time", - "file_name", - "file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-40444", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Office Spawning Control", - "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", - "references": [ - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office Spawning Control", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "office_spawning_control_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-40444", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", - "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", - "references": [ - "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", - "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_guid", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Ports.process_guid", - "Ports.dest", - "Ports.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", - "id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546", - "T1546.008" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_path", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Deep Panda", - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", - "id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1201" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", - "id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.", - "references": [ - "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1222" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", - "id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-31", - "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access\". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \\\nTo enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \\\nIt is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` Account_Name=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/", - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5145", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", - "analytic_story": [ - "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1187" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Security_ID", - "Share_Name", - "Source_Address", - "Accesses", - "Message" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-36942" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1187", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkHydrus", - "Dragonfly 2.0" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-36942", - "cvss": 5.0, - "summary": "Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", - "id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-31", - "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!=\"::1\" Certificate_Thumbprint!=\"\" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.", - "references": [ - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768", - "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", - "analytic_story": [ - "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Account_Name", - "Client_Address", - "action", - "Message" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-36942" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-36942", - "cvss": 5.0, - "summary": "Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", - "id": "ce058d6c-79f2-11ec-b476-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = \"*ping*\" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.parent_process=\"*>*\") OR (Processes.process = \"*ping*\" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.process=\"*>*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", - "analytic_story": [ - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1497", - "T1497.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_ping", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "ping_sleep_batch_command_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", - "id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the \"/stext\" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed", - "references": [ - "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 40, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1555.003", - "T1555" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 16, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-29", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.003", - "T1021.006", - "T1047", - "T1053.005", - "T1543.003", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", - "id": "9c53c446-757e-11ec-871d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-14", - "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as \"streamreader\" and \"webclient\", threading capabilties such as \"mutex\" locks, programmatic constructs like \"function\" and \"catch\", and cryptographic operations like \"computehash\". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=\"Endpoint.Processes\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model.", - "known_false_positives": "This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 20, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", - "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", - "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", - "id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-18", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(Message, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(Message), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(Message), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(Message), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),\"iex\"), \"2\", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),\"http\") OR match(lower(Message),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"socket\") OR match(lower(Message),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(Message),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(Message),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. May filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/inodee/threathunting-spl/blob/master/hunt-queries/powershell_qualifiers.md", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell", - "https://github.com/marcurdy/dfir-toolset/blob/master/Powershell%20Blueteam.txt", - "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging?view=powershell-5.1", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", - "https://hurricanelabs.com/splunk-tutorials/how-to-use-powershell-transcription-logs-in-splunk/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_4104_hunting_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", - "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", - "version": 8, - "date": "2022-01-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", - "references": [ - "https://regexr.com/663rr", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", - "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", - "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", - "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "HAFNIUM Group", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Command And Control" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.001", - "T1059" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", - "id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.", - "references": [ - "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Some+Powershell+Malicious+Code/22988/", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1027", - "T1027.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", - "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-05", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", - "id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_domain_enumeration_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", - "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", - "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1027", - "T1027.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", - "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", - "references": [ - "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 10, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.015", - "T1546" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 5, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", - "id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \\\nIn use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1055", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", - "id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \\\nCommand example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1027", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", - "id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", - "id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", - "id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR Message = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR Message = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to process compressed data.", - "references": [ - "https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "Score" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", - "id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "SourceImage", - "process_name", - "SourceProcessId", - "SourceProcessGuid", - "TargetImage", - "TargetProcessId", - "NewThreadId", - "StartAddress", - "Computer", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", - "id": "adf47620-79fa-11ec-b248-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*rmdir *\" AND Message = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", - "id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-29", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell \"version\" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.", - "references": [ - "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", - "analytic_story": [ - "BITS Jobs" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1197" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", - "id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.", - "references": [ - "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1140" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Leviathan", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", - "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", - "id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.", - "references": [ - "https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2020/pdf/JSAC2020_1_tamada-yamazaki-nakatsuru_en.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", - "id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - \"Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required.\" \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began.", - "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. This may require filtering.", - "references": [ - "https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421445608476679?s=20", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Inbound" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "OpCode", - "EventCode", - "ComputerName", - "Message" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527", - "CVE-2021-1675" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "printservice", - "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - }, - { - "id": "CVE-2021-1675", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", - "id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - \"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information.\" \\\nThe analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", - "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Inbound" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "OpCode", - "EventCode", - "ComputerName", - "Message" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527", - "CVE-2021-1675" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "printservice", - "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - }, - { - "id": "CVE-2021-1675", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", - "id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", - "version": 5, - "date": "2021-08-26", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\User\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_hash", - "Filesystem.user" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", - "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "Computer", - "user", - "ParentImage", - "ParentCommandLine", - "Image", - "cmdline", - "ProcessID", - "result", - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Process Execution via WMI", - "id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-03-16", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Process Execution via WMI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "process_execution_via_wmi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", - "id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-05-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", - "id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-05", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", - "references": [ - "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", - "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", - "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", - "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", - "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1559.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "process_name", - "process_guid", - "file_name", - "file_path", - "file_create_time user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Processes launching netsh", - "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", - "version": 4, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Processes launching netsh", - "analytic_story": [ - "Netsh Abuse", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.004", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_netsh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", - "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "BlackMatter Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "file_name", - "_time", - "TargetFilename", - "Computer", - "Image", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", - "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1592" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", - "id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-10", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= \"*SELECT*\" OR Message= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (Message= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Recon Using WMI Class", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 75, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1592" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "recon_using_wmi_class_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", - "id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-06-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070.004", - "T1070" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", - "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-11-26", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Service Abuse", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 75, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1574.011", - "T1574" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP", - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.AT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", - "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-01-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.011", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", - "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", - "version": 7, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Ransomware", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "IcedID", - "Remcos", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 95, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.001", - "T1547" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", - "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", - "version": 5, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 95, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.012", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TEMP.Veles" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", - "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "Remcos", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.010" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", - "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", - "https://regexr.com/699e2" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "Remcos", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.010" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", - "id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remcos client registry install entry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_registry/sysmon.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.process_id", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", - "id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1113" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "file_create_time", - "file_name", - "file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 100, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", - "id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-15", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", - "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-15", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR Message=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", - "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", - "id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-16", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.006" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-16", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.006" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", - "id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-11", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.006" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", - "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", - "version": 7, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", - "id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-15", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-15", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Message=\"*-CN*\" AND Message=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Message=\"*-Name create*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*objectclass=computer*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", - "id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-31", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", - "id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-30", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", - "id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", - "id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", - "version": 4, - "date": "2018-12-03", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", - "id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin-resize-shadowstorage" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.process", - "Process.parent_process_name", - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", - "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-06-02", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", - "references": [ - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Revil Registry Entry", - "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Revil Registry Entry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name" - ], - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "revil_registry_entry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", - "id": "cca37478-8377-11ec-b59a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", - "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1550", - "T1550.003", - "T1558", - "T1558.003", - "T1558.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", - "id": "5ed8c50a-8869-11ec-876f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-07", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic.", - "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", - "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1550", - "T1550.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "TargetImage", - "CallTrace", - "Computer", - "TargetProcessId", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", - "id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1134", - "T1134.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_runas", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "runas_execution_in_commandline_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", - "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", - "references": [ - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-40444", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", - "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-40444" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-40444", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", - "id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-29", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "SourceImage", - "TargetImage", - "TargetProcessId", - "SourceProcessId", - "StartAddress", - "EventCode", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", - "id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to \"firefox.exe\" and \"chrome.exe\" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "SourceImage", - "TargetImage", - "TargetProcessId", - "SourceProcessId", - "StartAddress", - "EventCode", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", - "id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "QueryName", - "QueryStatus", - "ProcessId", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_dnsquery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", - "id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "TargetFilename", - "ProcessGuid", - "dest", - "user_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", - "id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-05", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", - "version": 4, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Cobalt Strike", - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", - "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", - "version": 6, - "date": "2022-02-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes", - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", - "id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-11-06", - "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.user" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "ryuk_test_files_detected_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", - "id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\\appdata\\roaming) and in public directories (users\\public\\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited to no known false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/", - "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-006.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", - "id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-23", - "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\\system32\\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", - "known_false_positives": "Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.", - "references": [ - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4663", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4663", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", - "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", - "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Account_Manager" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Object_Name", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_name", - "Object_Name", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-36934" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-36934", - "cvss": 4.6, - "summary": "Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Samsam Test File Write", - "id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-14", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for a file named \"test.txt\" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "No false positives have been identified.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Samsam Test File Write", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 20, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.file_path" - ], - "risk_score": 12, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "samsam_test_file_write_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", - "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Service Abuse", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation" - ], - "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543.003", - "T1543" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP", - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.AT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", - "id": "991eb510-0fc6-11ec-82d3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-07", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SchCache or %systemroot%\\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SchCache\\\\*\" TargetFilename = \"*.sch*\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mmc.exe\")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adsi/adsi-and-uac", - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", - "analytic_story": [ - "blackMatter ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1087.002", - "T1087" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "TargetFilename", - "EventCode", - "process_id", - "process_name", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", - "id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments \"HTTP\" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Task_Name", - "Command", - "Author", - "Enabled", - "Hidden", - "Arguments" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", - "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Trickbot", - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Task_Name", - "Command", - "Author", - "Enabled", - "Hidden", - "Arguments" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", - "id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-11", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/at", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob?redirectedfrom=MSDN" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053", - "T1053.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", - "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", - "version": 6, - "date": "2022-02-22", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces \"Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware\".", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-11", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053", - "T1053.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", - "id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-07", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", - "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", - "version": 5, - "date": "2021-11-11", - "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Processes.dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", - "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-12-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", - "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-27", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", - "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546", - "T1546.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Script Execution via WMI", - "id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-03-16", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Script Execution via WMI", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "script_execution_via_wmi_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", - "id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", - "references": [ - "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", - "https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Inbound" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "sdclt_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", - "id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "user may execute and use this application", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/956f50be-2c13-465a-ac00-6224c14c5f89/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Sdelete Application Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485", - "T1070.004", - "T1070" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_sdelete", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", - "id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_name", - "process_id", - "parent_process_name", - "dest_port", - "process_path" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", - "id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.003", - "T1003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", - "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", - "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", - "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", - "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", - "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", - "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", - "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", - "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", - "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", - "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", - "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery", - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_setspn", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Services Escalate Exe", - "id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-18", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\\Windows\\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\400619a\\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/", - "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-beacon" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Services Escalate Exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 95, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Processes.dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 76, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "services_escalate_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543", - "T1543.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", - "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", - "version": 7, - "date": "2022-02-18", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Credential Dumping", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "registry_path", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Shim Database File Creation", - "id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-12-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Shim Database File Creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.011", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_path", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_hash", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "shim_database_file_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", - "id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-11-23", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.011", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", - "id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-03", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", - "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "ComputerName", - "Account_Name", - "Task_Name", - "Description", - "Command" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "short_lived_scheduled_task_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", - "id": "b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-06", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", - "analytic_story": [ - "Account Monitoring and Controls" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1136.001", - "T1136" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.result_id", - "All_Changes.user", - "All_Changes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "short_lived_windows_accounts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", - "id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.exe*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", - "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", - "id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-12-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1204", - "T1204.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", - "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-13", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", - "references": [ - "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", - "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", - "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", - "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", - "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-13", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", - "references": [ - "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", - "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "DarkSide Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", - "id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Local" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", - "id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Local" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_id", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process", - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "ImageLoaded" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", - "id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Local" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ProcessID", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "SourceImage", - "TargetImage", - "GrantedAccess", - "CallTrace", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", - "id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_path", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", - "id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", - "analytic_story": [ - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Local" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_id", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_path", - "type": "File", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "UserID", - "process_name", - "file_path", - "file_name", - "TargetFilename" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", - "id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-03", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_name", - "TargetFilename", - "EventCode", - "ProcessId", - "Image" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Dust Storm", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", - "id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry", - "references": [ - "https://malware.news/t/threat-analysis-unit-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-snatch-ransomware/36365" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.001", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", - "id": "35a61ed8-61c4-11ec-bc1e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\" | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Old_Account_Name, New_Account_Name | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", - "known_false_positives": "Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios.", - "references": [ - "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", - "analytic_story": [ - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "ComputerName", - "Account_Name", - "Old_Account_Name", - "New_Account_Name" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-42287", - "CVE-2021-42278" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "Chimera", - "Indrik Spider", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-42287", - "cvss": 6.5, - "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42291." - }, - { - "id": "CVE-2021-42278", - "cvss": 6.5, - "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42291." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", - "id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-05", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "every user may do this event but very un-ussual.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036.003", - "T1036" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_copy", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", - "id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_dllhost", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", - "id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-29", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers", - "references": [ - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543.003", - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "ImageLoaded", - "Hashes", - "IMPHASH", - "Signature", - "Signed" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", - "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-17", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", - "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 6" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070", - "T1070.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "PR.IP", - "PR.AC", - "PR.AT", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 9, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", - "id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_gpupdate", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", - "id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.", - "references": [ - "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", - "id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1113" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "file_create_time", - "file_name", - "file_path", - "process_name", - "process_path", - "process" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", - "id": "8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(Service_Name) = lower(mvindex(split(Account_Name,\"@\"),0)+\"$\"),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | table _time, Client_Address, Account_Name, Service_Name, Failure_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/02636893-7a1f-4357-af9a-b672e3e3de13" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", - "analytic_story": [ - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Service_Name", - "Account_Name", - "Client_Address", - "Failure_Code" - ], - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-42287", - "CVE-2021-42278" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "Chimera", - "Indrik Spider", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-42287", - "cvss": 6.5, - "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42291." - }, - { - "id": "CVE-2021-42278", - "cvss": 6.5, - "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42291." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", - "id": "0edd5112-56c9-11ec-b990-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-06", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\\\nThe search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This detection search is based on Splunk add-on for Microsoft Sysmon-Linux.(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6176/). Please install this add-on to parse fields correctly and execute detection search. Consider customizing the time window and threshold values according to your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/", - "https://github.com/IvanGlinkin/AutoSUID", - "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS", - "https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", - "analytic_story": [ - "Linux Post-Exploitation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", - "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-09-20", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1127", - "T1036.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", - "id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.", - "references": [ - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1127" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", - "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", - "references": [ - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious msbuild path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1127", - "T1036.003", - "T1127.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_msbuild", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", - "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", - "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1127", - "T1036.003", - "T1127.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_msbuild", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", - "id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1127", - "T1127.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_msbuild", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", - "id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from \"mshta.exe\". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process \"mshta.exe\" and its child process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious mshta child process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", - "id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-20", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.005" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_mshta", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", - "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-18", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", - "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.005", - "T1059" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "QueryName", - "QueryStatus", - "process_name", - "QueryResults", - "Computer" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", - "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-05", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Process File Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Double Zero Destructor", - "XMRig", - "Remcos", - "WhisperGate", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", - "id": "4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*discord*\") process_path != \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\*\" AND process_path != \"*\\\\Program Files*\" AND process_name != \"discord.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.", - "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", - "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", - "analytic_story": [ - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.005", - "T1059" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "QueryName", - "QueryStatus", - "process_name", - "QueryResults", - "Computer", - "process_path" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", - "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", - "references": [ - "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", - "id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-28", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5", - "https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "Iceid", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.010" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", - "id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-02-09", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", - "https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/", - "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "$Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", - "id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-07-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.", - "references": [ - "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", - "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-02-04", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Cobalt Strike", - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", - "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", - "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "Cobalt Strike", - "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34527" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34527", - "cvss": 9.0, - "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", - "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-01", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", - "id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cobalt Strike" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", - "id": "d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\") OR (EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Account_Name,RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived |`suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", - "analytic_story": [ - "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 100, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A suspicious TGT was requested was requested", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Old_Account_Name", - "New_Account_Name", - "Account_Name", - "ComputerName" - ], - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "Chimera", - "Indrik Spider", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", - "id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Collection" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1113" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "file_create_time", - "file_name", - "file_path", - "process_name", - "process_path", - "process" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", - "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", - "version": 4, - "date": "2021-10-11", - "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 6" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070.001", - "T1070" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "PR.IP", - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.AT", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", - "id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.", - "known_false_positives": "Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 40, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 28, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053", - "T1053.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", - "id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1592" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_dxdiag", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "System Information Discovery Detection", - "id": "8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-09-07", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*wmic* qfe*\" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators debugging servers", - "references": [ - "https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "System Information Discovery Detection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Discovery Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1082" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "system_information_discovery_detection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", - "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", - "version": 6, - "date": "2020-12-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Unusual Processes", - "Ransomware", - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1036.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_hash" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "is_windows_system_file", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "System User Discovery With Query", - "id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "System User Discovery With Query", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "system_user_discovery_with_query_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", - "id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", - "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.003", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", - "id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-26", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. .", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Image", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "user_id", - "EventCode", - "PipeName", - "signature", - "Image", - "process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "trickbot_named_pipe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", - "id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-12", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.", - "references": [ - "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Inbound" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "ImageLoaded", - "Signed", - "ProcessId", - "OriginalFileName", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Company" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", - "id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "ImageLoaded", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Signed", - "ProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", - "id": "f1126df0-7bd5-11eb-988f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-02", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of \"wermgr.exe\" or \"WerFault.exe\" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"umworkerprocess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"UMService.exe\" (Processes.process_name!=\"wermgr.exe\" OR Processes.process_name!=\"werfault.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", - "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-26857" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-26857", - "cvss": 6.8, - "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-27078." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", - "id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-09", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.007", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", - "id": "e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", - "analytic_story": [ - "Disabling Security Tools" - ], - "asset_type": "", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", - "id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-09", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe(\"System.Management.Automation.Amsi\"+\"Utils\")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", - "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", - "id": "eb3e6702-8936-11ec-98fe-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-08", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_services values(Service_Name) as requested_services by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1558", - "T1558.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Client_Address", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Ticket_Options", - "Ticket_Encryption_Type", - "dest", - "Service_Name", - "service_id", - "Client_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", - "id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", - "id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR Message = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1033" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Path", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "USN Journal Deletion", - "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-12-03", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "USN Journal Deletion", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8", - "CIS 10" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM", - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.DP", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", - "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-01", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059.005", - "T1059" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", - "id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-29", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.", - "references": [ - "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", - "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.012", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_verclsid", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "verclsid_clsid_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", - "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", - "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", - "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", - "analytic_story": [ - "HAFNIUM Group", - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1505", - "T1505.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-34473", - "CVE-2021-34523", - "CVE-2021-31207" - ], - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34473", - "cvss": 10.0, - "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-31206." - }, - { - "id": "CVE-2021-34523", - "cvss": 7.5, - "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-34470." - }, - { - "id": "CVE-2021-31207", - "cvss": 6.5, - "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", - "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1490" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", - "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-02", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", - "references": [ - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Revil Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218", - "T1218.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "ImageLoaded", - "process_name", - "Computer", - "EventCode", - "Signed", - "ProcessId", - "Hashes", - "IMPHASH" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", - "id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1590", - "T1590.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_path", - "process_name", - "process_id", - "QueryName", - "QueryStatus", - "QueryResults", - "Computer", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "HAFNIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Andariel", - "HAFNIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", - "id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1027" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Image", - "TargetFilename", - "process_name", - "dest", - "EventCode", - "ProcessId" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", - "id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", - "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Trickbot" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", - "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-11", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", - "references": [ - "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", - "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", - "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", - "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-11-03", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", - "references": [ - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows AdFind Exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Domain Trust Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Windows AdFind Exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1018" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", - "id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-19", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \\\n-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID", - "Ingress Tool Transfer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_curl", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", - "id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-10", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", - "references": [ - "https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", - "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", - "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ingress Tool Transfer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_curl", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", - "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.registry_value_data" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", - "id": "15e70689-f55b-489e-8a80-6d0cd6d8aad2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This analytic is to detect deletion of registry with suspicious process file path. This technique was seen in Double Zero wiper malware where it will delete all the subkey in HKLM, HKCU and HKU registry hive as part of its destructive payload to the targeted hosts. This anomaly detections can catch possible malware or advesaries deleting registry as part of defense evasion or even payload impact but can also catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=deleted by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action] | table _time parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action dest user | `windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "This detection can catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Double Zero Destructor" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/doublezero_wiper/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [], - "message": "registry was deleted by a suspicious $process_name$ with proces path $process_path in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.action", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid", - "Processes.process_path" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", - "id": "0df33e1a-9ef6-11ec-a1ad-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable change password feature of the windows host. This registry modification may disables the Change Password button on the Windows Security dialog box (which appears when you press Ctrl+Alt+Del). As a result, users cannot change their Windows password on demand. This technique was seen in some malware family like ransomware to prevent the user to change the password after ownning the network or a system during attack. This windows feature may implemented by administrator to prevent normal user to change the password of a critical host or server, In this type of scenario filter is needed to minimized false positive.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableChangePassword\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_change_password_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "This windows feature may implemented by administrator to prevent normal user to change the password of a critical host or server, In this type of scenario filter is needed to minimized false positive.", - "references": [ - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom_heartbleed.thdobah" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"DisableChangePassword\" on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_change_password_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_change_password_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", - "id": "c82adbc6-9f00-11ec-a81f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable Lock Computer windows features. This registry modification prevent the user from locking its screen or computer that are being abused by several malware for example ransomware. This technique was used by threat actor to make its payload more impactful to the compromised host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableLockWorkstation\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/", - "https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/fatalrat-targets-telegram/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"DisableLockWorkstation\" on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", - "id": "b2fb6830-9ed1-11ec-9fcb-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable logoff feature in windows host. This registry when enable will prevent users to log off of the system by using any method, including programs run from the command line, such as scripts. It also disables or removes all menu items and buttons that log the user off of the system. This technique was seen abused by ransomware malware to make the compromised host un-useful and hard to remove other registry modification made on the machine that needs restart to take effect. This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"NoLogOff\", \"StartMenuLogOff\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e2d4018fd3bd541c153af98ef7c25b2bf4a66bc3bfb89e437cde89fd08a9dd7b/5b1f4d947ca3e10f22714774", - "https://malwiki.org/index.php?title=DigiPop.xp", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/be/threat-encyclopedia/search/js_noclose.e/2" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"NoLogOff\" on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", - "id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-25", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/performance/memory-dump-file-options" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Ransomware", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", - "id": "1cd983c8-8fd6-11ec-a09d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the windows notification center feature in a windows host machine. This registry modification removes notification and action center from the notification area on the task bar. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"DisableNotificationCenter\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_notification_center_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", - "references": [ - "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/disable_notif_center/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "The Windows notification center was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_nam" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_notification_center_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_notification_center.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", - "id": "55fb2958-9ecd-11ec-a06a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable shutdown button on the logon user. This technique was seen in several malware especially in ransomware family like killdisk malware variant to make the compromised host un-useful and hard to remove other registry modification made on the machine that needs restart to take effect. This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\shutdownwithoutlogon\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoClose\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.msil.screenlocker.a/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"shutdownwithoutlogon\" on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", - "id": "63a449ae-9f04-11ec-945e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable windows features. These techniques are seen in several ransomware malware to impair the compromised host to make it hard for analyst to mitigate or response from the attack. Disabling these known features make the analysis and forensic response more hard. Disabling these feature is not so common but can still be implemented by the administrator for security purposes. In this scenario filters for users that are allowed doing this is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"NoDesktop\", \"NoFind\", \"NoControlPanel\", \"NoFileMenu\", \"NoSetTaskbar\", \"NoTrayContextMenu\", \"TaskbarLockAll\", \"NoThemesTab\",\"NoPropertiesMyDocuments\",\"NoVisualStyleChoice\",\"NoColorChoice\",\"NoPropertiesMyDocuments\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef1c427394c205580576d18ba68d5911089c7da0386f19d1ca126929d3e671ab?environmentId=120&lang=en", - "https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis", - "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification to disable windows features on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", - "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-03-02", - "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path" - ], - "risk_score": 24, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos", - "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-14", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Client_Address", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Result_Code", - "Account_Name", - "Client_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", - "id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", - "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1486" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 35, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", - "id": "58adae9e-8ea3-11ec-90f6-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-15", - "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", - "references": [ - "https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Porcesses.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.original_file_name" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_diskshadow", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", - "id": "8567da9e-47f0-11ec-99a9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-17", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process=\"*/online*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/disable-feature*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Windows-Defender*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/remove*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_dism_remove_defender_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", - "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-19", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1036.003", - "T1218", - "T1218.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "is_net_windows_file", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", - "id": "9c2620a8-94a1-11ec-b40c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message User Sid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Service was disabled on $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "ComputerName", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "User", - "Sid" - ], - "risk_score": 36, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", - "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", - "version": 6, - "date": "2020-07-06", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", - "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Ransomware", - "Clop Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 6" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1070", - "T1070.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "PR.IP", - "PR.AC", - "PR.AT", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", - "id": "c3f85976-94a5-11ec-9a58-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Service was disabled in $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "ComputerName", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "User", - "Sid" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", - "id": "0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like \"System32\\Drivers\" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\drivers\\\\*\") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=\"file_name\" \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this point", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_create_time", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_guid", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", - "id": "cafa4bce-9f06-11ec-a7b2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-08", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to hide common windows notification feature from compromised host. This technique was seen in some ransomware family to add more impact to its payload that are visually seen by user aside from the encrypted files and ransomware notes. Even this a good anomaly detection, administrator may implement this changes for auditing or security reason. In this scenario filter is needed.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"HideClock\", \"HideSCAHealth\", \"HideSCANetwork\", \"HideSCAPower\", \"HideSCAVolume\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.ONALOCKER.A/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification to hide windows notification on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", - "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-16", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*.cmd\", \"*.ini\",\"*.gif\", \"*.jpg\", \"*.jpeg\", \"*.db\", \"*.ps1\", \"*.doc*\", \"*.xls*\", \"*.ppt*\", \"*.bmp\",\"*.zip\", \"*.rar\", \"*.7z\", \"*.chm\", \"*.png\", \"*.log\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.js\", \"*.vhd\", \"*.bak\", \"*.wbcat\", \"*.bkf\" , \"*.backup*\", \"*.dsk\", , \"*.win\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1485" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "deleted_files", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "TargetFilename", - "Computer", - "user", - "Image", - "ProcessID", - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 72, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", - "id": "1c6abb08-73d1-11ec-9ca0-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", - "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "TargetImage", - "GrantedAccess", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId", - "SourceUser", - "TargetUser" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", - "id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://gist.github.com/xorrior/bbac3919ca2aef8d924bdf3b16cce3d0" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.004", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", - "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-19", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Ransomware", - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "WhisperGate", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1036", - "T1036.003", - "T1218", - "T1218.004" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_installutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", - "id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-03-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.004", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Ports.process_guid", - "Ports.dest", - "Ports.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_installutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", - "id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.", - "references": [ - "https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", - "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.004", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_installutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", - "id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-03-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", - "references": [ - "https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", - "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.004", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Ports.process_guid", - "Ports.dest", - "Ports.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_installutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", - "id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md", - "https://gist.github.com/DanielRTeixeira/0fd06ec8f041f34a32bf5623c6dd479d" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", - "analytic_story": [ - "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "Living Off The Land" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1218.004", - "T1218" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_installutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos", - "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-14", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Client_Address", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Result_Code", - "Account_Name", - "Client_Address" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", - "id": "b7548c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-02", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN(\"ShowCompColor\", \"ShowInfoTip\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Hermetic Wiper", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Registry modification in \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTips\" on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1112" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest Registry.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", - "id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-21", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.", - "references": [ - "http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes", - "Ransomware", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 60, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1588.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 60, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "CostaRicto", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", - "id": "5b2f4596-7d4c-11ec-88a7-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert.", - "references": [ - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", - "http://www.nirsoft.net/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", - "analytic_story": [ - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1588.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "CostaRicto", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "is_nirsoft_software", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", - "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", - "id": "b1ce9a72-73cf-11ec-981b-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!=\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", - "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "TargetImage", - "GrantedAccess", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId", - "SourceUser", - "TargetUser" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", - "id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-01-27", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \\\nGrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \\\nCallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \\\ndbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \\\nThe idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", - "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.001", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ImageLoaded", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "SourceImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "TargetImage", - "GrantedAccess", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId", - "SourceUser", - "TargetUser" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", - "id": "e64399d4-94a8-11ec-a9da-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\*\" NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\program files*\")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", - "id": "c9f010da-57ab-11ec-82bd-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-07", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a \"ransomware vaccine\" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Raccine*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", - "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", - "id": "6f42b8be-8e96-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-15", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence", - "https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1", - "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055.001", - "T1218", - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", - "id": "a85aa37e-9647-11ec-90c5-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the \"hermeticwiper\" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", - "analytic_story": [ - "Caddy Wiper", - "Data Destruction", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1561.002", - "T1561" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "Image", - "Device", - "ProcessGuid", - "ProcessId", - "EventDescription", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", - "id": "7b83f666-900c-11ec-a2d9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/technical-analysis-of-whispergate-malware/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Caddy Wiper", - "WhisperGate", - "Hermetic Wiper" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1561.002", - "T1561" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "Image", - "Device", - "ProcessGuid", - "ProcessId", - "EventDescription", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", - "id": "ced50492-8849-11ec-9f68-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-07", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "windows_shells", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", - "id": "41a0e58e-884c-11ec-9976-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-07", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process=\"*/create *\" AND Processes.process=\"*/ru *\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it.", - "references": [ - "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/11/04/persistence-scheduled-tasks/", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 48, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_schtasks", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", - "id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-11-06", - "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY \"Processes.dest\", \"Processes.user\", \"Processes.process\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", - "known_false_positives": "SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", - "analytic_story": [ - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1489" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", - "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", - "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Clop Ransomware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1569", - "T1569.002" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Service_File_Name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Service_Name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "Service_File_Name", - "Service_Type", - "_time", - "Service_Name", - "Service_Start_Type" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", - "id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543", - "T1543.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Service_File_Name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "EventCode", - "Service_File_Name", - "Service_Type", - "_time", - "Service_Name", - "Service_Start_Type" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", - "id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-10", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543", - "T1543.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", - "id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1574.011" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-10", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543", - "T1543.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", - "id": "7ab3c319-a4e7-4211-9e8c-40a049d0dba6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious process terminating Lsass process. Lsass process is known to be a critical process that is responsible for enforcing security policy system. This process was commonly targetted by threat actor or red teamer to gain privilege escalation or persistence in the targeted machine because it handles credentials of the logon users. In this analytic we tried to detect a suspicious process having a granted access PROCESS_TERMINATE to lsass process to modify or delete protected registrys. This technique was seen in doublezero malware that tries to wipe files and registry in compromised hosts. This anomaly detection can be a good pivot of incident response for possible credential dumping or evading security policy in a host or network environment.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess = 0x1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceProcessId, GrantedAccess CallTrace, Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Double Zero Destructor" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/doublezero_wiper/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [], - "message": "a process $SourceImage$ terminates Lsass process in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "TargetImage", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "TargetImage", - "CallTrace", - "Computer", - "TargetProcessId", - "SourceImage", - "SourceProcessId", - "GrantedAccess" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_terminating_lsass_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", - "id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-13", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != \"*$\" Source_Account !=\"-\" Destination_Account !=\"*$\" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Password Spraying" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.003", - "T1110" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Security_ID", - "Account_Name", - "ComputerName" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", - "id": "0661c2de-93de-11ec-9833-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"* process *\" Processes.process = \"* call *\" Processes.process = \"* create *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/2b804d25418004a5f1ba50e9dc637946ab8733c7/atomics/T1047/T1047.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", - "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", - "references": [ - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Command", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Task_Name", - "Description", - "Command" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", - "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", - "references": [ - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", - "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "IcedID", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005", - "T1053" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Command", - "type": "Unknown", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Task_Name", - "Description", - "Command" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", - "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-19", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", - "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", - "analytic_story": [ - "IcedID", - "Windows Persistence Techniques" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "TaskName", - "ActionName", - "EventID", - "dest", - "ProcessID" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", - "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", - "id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-05", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\\windows\\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the \".hlp\" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16541", - "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", - "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Remcos" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", - "id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://app.any.run/tasks/73af0064-a785-4c0a-ab0d-cde593fe16ef/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "winword_spawning_cmd_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", - "id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-04-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/b79fa381-f35c-4b3e-8d02-507e7ee7342f/", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/181ac90b-0898-4631-8701-b778a30610ad/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "winword_spawning_powershell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", - "id": "637e1b5c-9be1-11eb-9c32-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64\\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachment" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "process_name", - "process_id", - "parent_process_name", - "dest", - "user", - "parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 70, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", - "id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-12-08", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", - "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", - "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", - "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Persistence" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1546.003", - "T1546" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "host", - "user", - "Operation", - "EventType", - "Query", - "Consumer", - "Filter" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "Leviathan", - "Mustang Panda", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", - "id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*SELECT*\" AND (Message=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR Message=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", - "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", - "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", - "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", - "analytic_story": [ - "Malicious PowerShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1592" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "User", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "ComputerName", - "User" - ], - "risk_score": 30, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", - "id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \\\nTypically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wmic Group Discovery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Discovery" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1069", - "T1069.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wmic_group_discovery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", - "id": "bff0e7a0-317f-11ec-ab4e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-20", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=\"* product *\" Processes.process=\"*where name*\" Processes.process=\"*call uninstall*\" Processes.process=\"*/nointeractive*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application", - "references": [ - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", - "analytic_story": [ - "IceID" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1562.001", - "T1562" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Target" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", - "id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-11", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1220" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", - "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "Higaisa" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", - "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", - "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Remcos", - "Unusual Processes", - "WhisperGate" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1055", - "T1543", - "T1134.004", - "T1134" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-22", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", - "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021", - "T1021.006" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 54, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", - "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", - "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Living Off The Land", - "Windows Registry Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation", - "Stage:Defense Evasion", - "Scope:Inbound" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1548.002", - "T1548" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name", - "Registry.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", - "id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-29", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited.", - "references": [ - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", - "analytic_story": [ - "XMRig" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543.003", - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Computer", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Computer", - "ImageLoaded", - "Hashes", - "IMPHASH", - "Signature", - "Signed" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "xmrig_driver_loaded_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", - "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-13", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", - "analytic_story": [ - "FIN7", - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1220" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", - "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "Higaisa" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", - "id": "bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d@d\"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as \"router\" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.dest_category", - "Authentication.dest", - "Authentication.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", - "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", - "version": 2, - "date": "2017-09-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Email" - ], - "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", - "known_false_positives": "None at this time", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Email.recipient", - "All_Email.file_name", - "All_Email.src_user", - "All_Email.file_name", - "All_Email.message_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", - "id": "8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114", - "T1114.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.action", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", - "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", - "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "HAFNIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114", - "T1114.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.bytes_out", - "All_Traffic.src_category", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", - "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-01-05", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Email" - ], - "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", - "known_false_positives": "None at this time", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", - "analytic_story": [ - "Brand Monitoring", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Email.recipient", - "All_Email.src_user", - "All_Email.message_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", - "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", - "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", - "min_matches": 1 - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", - "id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address.", - "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", - "known_false_positives": "A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "outcome.reason", - "client.geographicalContext.country", - "client.geographicalContext.state", - "client.geographicalContext.city", - "user", - "src_ip", - "displayMessage" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "okta", - "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", - "id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Updates" - ], - "description": "This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as \"Update Status\" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-60d@d\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as \"Last Update Time\", | table Host, \"Update Status\", Product, \"Last Update Time\" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor for Updates" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 18" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.MA" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Updates.status", - "Updates.vendor_product", - "Updates.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", - "id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Detect Okta user lockout events", - "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"Max sign in attempts exceeded\" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", - "known_false_positives": "None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "displayMessage", - "client.geographicalContext.country", - "client.geographicalContext.state", - "client.geographicalContext.city" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "okta", - "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "okta_account_lockout_events_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", - "id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Detect failed Okta SSO events", - "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User attempted unauthorized access to app\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", - "known_false_positives": "There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "displayMessage", - "app", - "user", - "result", - "src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "okta", - "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", - "id": "7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period.", - "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User login to Okta\" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1", - "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", - "known_false_positives": "Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078", - "T1078.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "displayMessage", - "client.geographicalContext.city", - "client.geographicalContext.state", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "access", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "okta", - "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", - "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Email" - ], - "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 7", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566.001", - "T1566" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Email.file_name", - "All_Email.src_user", - "All_Email.message_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Java Classes", - "id": "6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-06", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=\"(?i)java\\.lang\\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)\" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.", - "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Java Classes", - "analytic_story": [ - "Apache Struts Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_method", - "http_content_length", - "src_ip", - "url", - "status", - "http_user_agent", - "src", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_java_classes_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", - "id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-04-01", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security.", - "known_false_positives": "Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", - "analytic_story": [ - "Apache Struts Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1082" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest_category", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml", - "source": "application" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.object_category", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "Cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-08-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Change" - ], - "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", - "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", - "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078.004", - "T1078" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Changes.object_id", - "All_Changes.action", - "All_Changes.status", - "All_Changes.object_category", - "All_Changes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "Cloud", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", - "id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-15", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "user.username", - "userAgent", - "sourceIPs{}", - "responseStatus.reason", - "source", - "responseStatus.code", - "verb", - "requestURI", - "src_ip", - "user.groups{}" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", - "id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-15", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "user.username", - "verb", - "objectRef.resource", - "requestURI", - "source", - "sourceIPs{}", - "responseStatus.reason", - "responseStatus.code", - "userAgent", - "src_ip", - "user.groups{}" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", - "id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-27", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", - "known_false_positives": "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "aws detect attach to role policy", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "requestParameters.policyArn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", - "id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-27", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", - "known_false_positives": "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "aws detect permanent key creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.type", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userName userIdentity.type", - "userAgent", - "action", - "status", - "responseElements.accessKey.createDate", - "esponseElements.accessKey.status", - "responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "aws detect role creation", - "id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-27", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", - "known_false_positives": "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "aws detect role creation", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "event_name", - "action", - "userIdentity.type", - "requestParameters.description", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.principalId", - "userIdentity.arn", - "action", - "event_name", - "awsRegion", - "http_user_agent", - "mfa_auth", - "msg", - "requestParameters.roleName", - "requestParameters.description", - "responseElements.role.arn", - "responseElements.role.createDate" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_role_creation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", - "id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-27", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", - "known_false_positives": "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "user_type", - "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.arn", - "user_agent", - "user_access_key", - "status", - "action", - "requestParameters.roleName", - "esponseElements.role.roleName", - "esponseElements.role.createDate" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", - "id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-27", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", - "known_false_positives": "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1550" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.type", - "eventName", - "sourceIPAddress", - "eventTime", - "userIdentity.arn", - "userName", - "userAgent", - "user_type", - "status", - "region" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", - "id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-10", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.", - "known_false_positives": "GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13", - "CIS 14" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1530" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "sc_status_", - "cs_object_", - "c_ip_", - "cs_uri_", - "cs_method_" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", - "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", - "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", - "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", - "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", - "id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-05", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).", - "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the \"allUsers\" group.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1530" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "data.resource.type", - "data.protoPayload.methodName", - "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action", - "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", - "data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}", - "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", - "data.protoPayload.resourceName", - "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role", - "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", - "id": "e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.", - "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP\" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names.", - "known_false_positives": "S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13", - "CIS 14" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1530" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_status", - "bucket_name", - "remote_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", - "id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.", - "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", - "known_false_positives": "None", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Security Hub Alerts" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", - "indings{}.Resources{}.Id", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", - "id": "d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", - "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", - "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS Instance", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "action", - "src_ip", - "dest_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", - "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" - }, - { - "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", - "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", - "id": "e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-11-27", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN\" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.", - "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1530" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "eventName", - "userIdentity.arn" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", - "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", - "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" - }, - { - "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", - "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", - "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", - "id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-08", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts.", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", - "known_false_positives": "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", - "analytic_story": [ - "GCP Cross Account Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Account", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout", - "src", - "src_user", - "data.resource.labels.project_id", - "data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail", - "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", - "data.protoPayload.request.location", - "http_user_agent" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", - "id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-17", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.", - "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1526" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "category", - "responseStatus.code", - "sourceIPs{}", - "userAgent", - "verb", - "requestURI", - "responseStatus.reason", - "properties.pod" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", - "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-24", - "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", - "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", - "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments", - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "GDrive", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [ - [] - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "src_ip", - "parameters.owner", - "parameters.target_user", - "parameters.doc_title", - "parameters.doc_type" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gsuite_drive", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", - "id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-10-24", - "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments.", - "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", - "known_false_positives": "This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.", - "references": [ - "https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-avoid-the-dreaded-google-calendar-malicious-invite-issue/", - "https://gcn.com/articles/2012/09/26/20-most-common-words-phishing-attacks.aspx" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "GSuite", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [ - [] - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "email", - "parameters.event_title", - "parameters.target_calendar_id", - "parameters.event_title" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "gsuite_calendar", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", - "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.", - "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", - "analytic_story": [ - "Office 365 Detections" - ], - "asset_type": "Office 365", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1110.001", - "T1110" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Operation", - "record_type", - "app", - "user", - "LogonError", - "authentication_method", - "signature", - "UserAgent", - "src_ip", - "record_type" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", - "id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-23", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", - "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" - ], - "asset_type": "Kubernetes", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userAgent", - "sourceIPs{}", - "src_user", - "src_ip", - "verb", - "requestURI" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", - "id": "f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.", - "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!=\"AssumeRole\" AND Compute.http_user_agent=\"AWS Internal\" AND Compute.event_name=\"PutImage\" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Compute\")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", - "analytic_story": [ - "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation" - ], - "asset_type": "AWS ECR container", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1525" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml", - "source": "cloud" - }, - { - "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", - "id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-03-16", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 5", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.AC", - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2018-8440" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2018-8440", - "cvss": 7.2, - "summary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when Windows improperly handles calls to Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC), aka \"Windows ALPC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability.\" This affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", - "id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-27", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", - "search": "`linux_hosts` | search \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", - "analytic_story": [ - "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "linux_hosts", - "definition": "index=*", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-3156", - "cvss": 7.2, - "summary": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", - "id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-29", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", - "search": "`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host", - "known_false_positives": "If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", - "analytic_story": [ - "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "linux_hosts", - "definition": "index=*", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-3156", - "cvss": 7.2, - "summary": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", - "id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-28", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", - "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "columns.cmdline" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-3156" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "osquery_process", - "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-3156", - "cvss": 7.2, - "summary": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", - "id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-18", - "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "None thus far found", - "references": [ - "https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", - "analytic_story": [ - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 70, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1210" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "EventCode", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "TargetUserName", - "LogonType", - "TargetDomainName", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 49, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2020-1472" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2020-1472", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), aka 'Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", - "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", - "known_false_positives": "It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", - "analytic_story": [ - "Spearphishing Attachments" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1566", - "T1566.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rare Executables", - "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-03-16", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Rare Executables", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Unusual Processes", - "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.PT", - "PR.DS", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", - "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", - "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_rare_executables_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", - "id": "3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A " - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1072" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1072", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-1314" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", - "id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-27", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \\\nModification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \\\nA suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \\\nAn event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \\\nReview the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles.", - "search": "| `exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover.json*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/master/AzureSentinel/Exchange-Powershell-via-SSRF", - "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", - "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", - "analytic_story": [ - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "cs_uri_query", - "cs_method", - "c_uri" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "exchange", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", - "id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-27", - "author": "Michael Haag", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \\\nInherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \\\nModule - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \\\nModule - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG).", - "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", - "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-managementroleassignment?view=exchange-ps", - "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxyshell-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-3.html", - "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "ProxyShell" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery", - "Stage:Recon" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 30, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1059", - "T1059.001" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Path", - "Message", - "OpCode", - "ComputerName", - "User", - "EventCode" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", - "id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window.", - "known_false_positives": "A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1068" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process Name", - "role": [ - "Attacker", - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 64, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", - "description": "A list of suspicious file names", - "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", - "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", - "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", - "version": 4, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", - "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", - "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Service Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 2", - "CIS 9" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1569", - "T1569.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS", - "PR.AC", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", - "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", - "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", - "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" - } - ], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", - "id": "40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-07", - "author": "Jamie Windley, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*com.apple.loginwindow*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", - "analytic_story": [ - "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Installation", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "macos___re_opened_applications_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", - "id": "985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-07", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", - "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", - "analytic_story": [ - "ProxyShell", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1505", - "T1505.003", - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "file_name", - "type": "File Name", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.process_id", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.file_hash", - "Filesystem.user", - "Filesystem.process_guid", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process_guid" - ], - "risk_score": 81, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", - "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-28", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", - "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Privilege Escalation" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log" - ], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1547.012", - "T1547" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Registry.dest", - "Registry.user", - "Registry.registry_path", - "Registry.registry_key_name", - "Registry.registry_value_name" - ], - "risk_score": 80, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", - "id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-01-25", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input", - "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.", - "known_false_positives": "There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", - "analytic_story": [ - "ColdRoot MacOS RAT" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 4", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.DP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "app", - "name", - "columns.cmdline", - "columns.name", - "columns.pid", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", - "id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-29", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not.", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", - "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Persistence", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1053", - "T1053.005" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "Task_Name", - "Description", - "Command" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", - "id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-29", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not.", - "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543", - "T1543.003" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Service_File_Name", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - }, - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "ComputerName", - "Service_File_Name", - "Service_Type", - "Service_Name", - "Service_Start_Type" - ], - "risk_score": 45, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", - "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", - "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 9", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.001", - "T1021" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest_category", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Spike in File Writes", - "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", - "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Spike in File Writes", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.action", - "Filesystem.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", - "id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-14", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.", - "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Windows", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 6", - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1203" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "ImageLoaded", - "QueryName" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Elderwood", - "Frankenstein", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", - "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", - "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow", - "Ingress Tool Transfer" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1105" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", - "id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", - "references": [ - "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543.001", - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", - "id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", - "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", - "references": [ - "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1543.001", - "T1543" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "columns.cmdline" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "osquery_process", - "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", - "id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-22", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", - "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", - "analytic_story": [ - "Silver Sparrow" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1074" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1074", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", - "id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "Client_Address", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Ticket_Options", - "Ticket_Encryption_Type", - "dest", - "service", - "service_id" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", - "id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-01", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", - "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", - "analytic_story": [ - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Lateral Movement" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1078" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "ComputerName", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Logon_Type", - "Caller_Process_Name", - "Security_ID", - "Account_Name", - "ComputerName" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", - "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", - "version": 5, - "date": "2020-12-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusually Long Command Line", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Unusual Processes", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 60, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "Processes.process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process" - ], - "risk_score": 42, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", - "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-05-08", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", - "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Unusual Processes", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", - "id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query.", - "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", - "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Defense Evasion" - ], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 80, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 40, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "windows_shells", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "windows_java_spawning_shells_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", - "id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-21", - "author": "Drew Church, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", - "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys", - "https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", - "analytic_story": [ - "Unusual Processes" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "dataset": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-31166" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "winrm_spawning_a_process_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-31166", - "cvss": 7.5, - "summary": "HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability" - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", - "id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-23", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.", - "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", - "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "consumer", - "ComputerName" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wmi", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", - "id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-23", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.", - "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", - "known_false_positives": "Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1047" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "PR.AT", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Message", - "query" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "wmi", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml", - "source": "endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", - "id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-11", - "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", - "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Delivery", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1200", - "T1498", - "T1557", - "T1557.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "facility", - "mnemonic", - "disable_cause", - "src_int_prefix_long", - "src_int_suffix", - "host", - "src_interface" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cisco_networks", - "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_arp_poisoning_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", - "id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-28", - "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", - "known_false_positives": "None currently known", - "references": [ - "https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Delivery", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1200", - "T1498", - "T1557", - "T1557.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "facility", - "mnemonic", - "src_int_prefix_long", - "src_int_suffix", - "dest_int_prefix_long", - "dest_int_suffix", - "src_mac", - "src_vlan", - "vendor_explanation", - "action" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cisco_networks", - "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", - "id": "e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-06-01", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", - "known_false_positives": "ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", - "analytic_story": [ - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 9", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1095" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.action", - "All_Traffic.bytes", - "All_Traffic.dest_category", - "All_Traffic.protocol", - "All_Traffic.transport", - "All_Traffic.src_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1095", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "FIN6", - "HAFNIUM", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", - "id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", - "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071.002", - "T1071" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.action", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "sourcetype", - "All_Traffic.dest_category", - "All_Traffic.src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", - "id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-28", - "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", - "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Port Security Violation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1200", - "T1498", - "T1557", - "T1557.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "facility", - "mnemonic", - "disable_cause", - "src_int_prefix_long", - "src_int_suffix", - "src_mac", - "src_vlan", - "action", - "host", - "src_interface" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cisco_networks", - "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_port_security_violation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", - "id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-11", - "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).", - "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", - "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Delivery", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1200", - "T1498", - "T1557" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "facility", - "mnemonic", - "message_type", - "src_mac", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cisco_networks", - "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", - "id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-21", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.", - "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/", - "https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1041" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "DE.CM", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "server_name", - "src_ip", - "dest_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Chimera", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "zeek_ssl", - "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", - "id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-28", - "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.", - "known_false_positives": "This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1542.005", - "T1542" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.transport", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.dest_category", - "All_Traffic.src_category", - "All_Traffic.src", - "All_Traffic.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", - "id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-28", - "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.", - "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.", - "known_false_positives": "This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", - "analytic_story": [ - "Router and Infrastructure Security" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1200", - "T1020", - "T1498", - "T1020.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "facility", - "mnemonic", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "cisco_networks", - "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_traffic_mirroring_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", - "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Sessions" - ], - "description": "By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Sessions\")`|`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Sessions\")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated.", - "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", - "analytic_story": [ - "Asset Tracking" - ], - "asset_type": "Infrastructure", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 1" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Delivery", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.AM", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Sessions.signature", - "All_Sessions.src_ip", - "All_Sessions.dest_mac" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", - "id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-28", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.", - "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1203" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2020-1350" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Elderwood", - "Frankenstein", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "stream_tcp", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "stream_dns", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2020-1350", - "cvss": 10.0, - "summary": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests, aka 'Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", - "id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-28", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", - "analytic_story": [ - "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1203" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.query_type", - "DNS.flow_id", - "All_Traffic.bytes_in", - "All_Traffic.flow_id" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2020-1350" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Elderwood", - "Frankenstein", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2020-1350", - "cvss": 10.0, - "summary": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests, aka 'Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", - "id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-15", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC", - "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", - "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", - "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", - "analytic_story": [ - "Detect Zerologon Attack" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "operation" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2020-1472" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "zeek_rpc", - "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2020-1472", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), aka 'Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", - "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071.004", - "T1071" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.src", - "DNS.dest", - "DNS.query", - "DNS.record_type" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", - "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", - "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Excessive DNS Failures", - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 9", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071.004", - "T1071" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.query", - "DNS.reply_code", - "DNS.src" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", - "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", - "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1114.002", - "T1114" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.CM", - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.bytes_in", - "All_Traffic.dest_category", - "All_Traffic.src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", - "id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-20", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", - "known_false_positives": "Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", - "analytic_story": [ - "DNS Amplification Attacks" - ], - "asset_type": "DNS Servers", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 11", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1498", - "T1498.002" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.message_type", - "DNS.record_type", - "DNS.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", - "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 9", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.action", - "All_Traffic.src_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", - "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 9", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003", - "T1048" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "PR.AC" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.src_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", - "id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-08-19", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport=\"tcp\" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"23\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"143\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"110\" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"21\" AND All_Traffic.user != \"anonymous\")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22)", - "known_false_positives": "Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.", - "references": [ - "https://www.rackaid.com/blog/secure-your-email-and-file-transfers/", - "https://www.infosecmatter.com/capture-passwords-using-wireshark/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", - "analytic_story": [ - "Use of Cleartext Protocols" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 9", - "CIS 14" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "PR.AC", - "PR.DS" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.transport", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.user", - "All_Traffic.src", - "All_Traffic.dest", - "All_Traffic.action" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", - "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-21", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", - "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12", - "CIS 9", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.001", - "T1021" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.src", - "All_Traffic.dest", - "All_Traffic.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", - "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-07", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", - "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", - "analytic_story": [ - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 9", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.001", - "T1021" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE", - "PR.AC", - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.dest_category", - "All_Traffic.src_category", - "All_Traffic.src", - "All_Traffic.dest", - "All_Traffic.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", - "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", - "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ransomware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.002", - "T1021" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.src" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", - "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Ransomware", - "DHS Report TA18-074A" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1021.002", - "T1021" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.src" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "TOR Traffic", - "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-07-22", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", - "known_false_positives": "None at this time", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "TOR Traffic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "NOBELIUM Group", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 9", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1071", - "T1071.001" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.AE" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.app", - "All_Traffic.action", - "All_Traffic.src_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_port" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "tor_traffic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", - "id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-10-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server.", - "search": "`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", - "known_false_positives": "Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", - "analytic_story": [ - "Apache Struts Vulnerability" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 4", - "CIS 18", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.RA", - "RS.MI", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP", - "DE.AE", - "PR.MA", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "cs_content_type", - "endtime", - "src_ip", - "dest_ip", - "url" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "unusually_long_content_type_length_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", - "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-23", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", - "analytic_story": [ - "JBoss Vulnerability", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1082" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.http_method", - "Web.url", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-02", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices", - "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", - "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "analytic_story": [ - "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902" - ], - "asset_type": "Network", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 11" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Other" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2020-5902" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "f5_bigip_rogue", - "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2020-5902", - "cvss": 10.0, - "summary": "In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", - "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-23", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", - "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", - "analytic_story": [ - "JBoss Vulnerability", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12", - "CIS 4", - "CIS 18" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "ID.RA", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP", - "DE.AE", - "PR.MA", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.http_method", - "Web.url", - "Web.url_length", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", - "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-23", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", - "known_false_positives": "None at this time", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", - "analytic_story": [ - "Brand Monitoring" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 7" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "nist": [ - "PR.IP" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.url", - "Web.src" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low" - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "brand_abuse_web", - "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", - "id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", - "version": 3, - "date": "2022-03-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval url=lower(url) | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", - "analytic_story": [ - "SQL Injection" - ], - "asset_type": "Database Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 4", - "CIS 13", - "CIS 18" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Discovery" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ], - "message": "SQL injection attempt with url $url$ detected on $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "ID.RA", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Endpoint", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.dest_category", - "Web.url_length", - "Web.http_user_agent_length", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest", - "Web.url", - "Web.http_user_agent" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "Supernova Webshell", - "id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-06", - "author": "John Stoner, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.", - "known_false_positives": "There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html", - "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Supernova Webshell", - "analytic_story": [ - "NOBELIUM Group" - ], - "asset_type": "Web Server", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 4", - "CIS 13", - "CIS 18" - ], - "confidence": 50, - "context": [], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "tbd", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1505.003" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "ID.RA", - "PR.PT", - "PR.IP", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.url", - "Web.src", - "Web.dest", - "Web.vendor_product", - "Web.user", - "Web.http_user_agent" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "supernova_webshell_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", - "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-01-14", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", - "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Protection", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12", - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1189" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.answer", - "DNS.query", - "host" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", - "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", - "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", - "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", - "type": "Hunting", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", - "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", - "references": [ - "https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 12", - "CIS 13" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Initial Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190", - "T1059" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.DS", - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "src_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest_ip", - "type": "IP Address", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.dest_ip", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.src_ip" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", - "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", - "version": 4, - "date": "2021-10-06", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", - "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 8", - "CIS 12" - ], - "confidence": 80, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ], - "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003", - "T1048" - ], - "nist": [ - "PR.PT", - "DE.AE", - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "host", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "DNS.query" - ], - "risk_score": 56, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", - "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-21", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", - "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 50, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003", - "T1048" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "uri_path", - "type": "URL", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "form_data", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_method", - "http_user_agent", - "uri_path", - "url", - "bytes_in", - "bytes_out", - "archive_hdr1", - "archive_hdr2", - "form_data" - ], - "risk_score": 25, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "low", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", - "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-22", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", - "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", - "analytic_story": [ - "Data Exfiltration", - "Command and Control" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "confidence": 90, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Exfiltration" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log" - ], - "impact": 70, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1048.003", - "T1048" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "uri_path", - "type": "URL", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - }, - { - "name": "form_data", - "type": "Other", - "role": [ - "Attacker" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "http_method", - "http_user_agent", - "uri_path", - "url", - "bytes_in", - "bytes_out" - ], - "risk_score": 63, - "security_domain": "network", - "risk_severity": "medium", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml", - "source": "network" - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", - "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Jose Hernandez", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", - "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance", - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "action", - "category", - "dest", - "dest_port", - "http_content_type", - "http_method", - "http_referrer", - "http_user_agent", - "site", - "src", - "url", - "url_domain", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", - "source": "web" - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", - "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-13", - "author": "Jose Hernandez", - "type": "Anomaly", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic", - "Web" - ], - "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", - "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", - "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", - "analytic_story": [ - "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 30, - "context": [ - "Source:Application Log", - "Stage:Execution" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log" - ], - "impact": 50, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ], - "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1190" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "action", - "category", - "dest", - "dest_port", - "http_content_type", - "http_method", - "http_referrer", - "http_user_agent", - "site", - "src", - "url", - "url_domain", - "user" - ], - "risk_score": 15, - "security_domain": "threat", - "risk_severity": "low", - "cve": [ - "CVE-2021-44228" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [ - { - "id": "CVE-2021-44228", - "cvss": 9.3, - "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects." - } - ], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", - "source": "web" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"detections": [{"name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", "id": "fc246e56-953b-40c1-8634-868f9e474cbd", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-24", "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "On March 24th, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a possible Denial of Service stemming from the lack of validation in a specific key-value field in the Splunk-to-Splunk (S2S) protocol. This detection will alert on attempted exploitation in patched versions of Splunk.", "search": "`splunkd` log_level=ERROR component=TcpInputProc thread_name=FwdDataReceiverThread | table host, src | `splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection does not require you to ingest any new data. The detection does require the ability to search the _internal index. This detection will only find attempted exploitation on versions of Splunk already patched for CVE-2021-3422.", "known_false_positives": "None.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0301.html"], "tags": {"name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", "analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1498/splunk_indexer_dos/splunkd.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An attempt to exploit CVE-2021-3422 was detected from $src$ against $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1498"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["host", "src", "log_level", "component", "thread_name"], "risk_score": 50, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-3422"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "splunkd", "definition": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/application/splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user.", "search": "| tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.status"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", "id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user.", "search": "| tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has made $api_calls$ api calls related to security groups, violating the dynamic threshold of $expected_upper_threshold$ with the following command $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | search key_policy_action_1 = \"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_create_policy_version/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-03", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_createaccesskey_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createaccesskey.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_createloginprofile_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_createloginprofile.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", "id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time.", "search": "| tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role \"arn:aws:sts:*:(?.*):\" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"),\"New Cross Account Activity\",\"Previously Seen\") | where status = \"New Cross Account Activity\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS account $requestingAccountId$ is trying to access resource from some other account $requestedAccountId$, for the first time.", "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "requestingAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "requestedAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.vendor_account", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.user_role", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", "id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action=\"kms:Encrypt\" AND key_policy_principal=\"*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/aws_kms_key/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "AWS account is potentially compromised and user $userIdentity.principalId$ is trying to compromise other accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventSource", "eventID", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.policy", "userIdentity.principalId"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", "id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Patrick Bareiss Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption=\"aws:kms\" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucket_name, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "bucket with S3 encryption", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/s3_file_encryption/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $user$ with KMS keys is performing encryption, against S3 buckets on these files $dest_file$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest_file", "type": "File", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption", "requestParameters.bucketName", "requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source", "requestParameters.key", "userAgent", "region"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", "id": "62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", "id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN (LOW, INFORMATIONAL, UNKNWON) | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repositoryName | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repositoryName, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in repository $repositoryName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 7, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", "id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.\", \".finding_description | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{}", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", "id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 NOT (date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday) | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Container uploaded outside business hours from $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageTag", "requestParameters.registryId", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", "id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase=\"release\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Container uploaded from unknown user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["eventSource", "eventName", "awsRegion", "requestParameters.imageTag", "requestParameters.registryId", "requestParameters.repositoryName", "user", "userName", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_ecr_users", "definition": "userName IN (user)", "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get* | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/aws_security_scanner/aws_security_scanner.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "user $user$ has excessive number of api calls $dc_events$ from these IP addresses $src$, violating the threshold of 50, using the following commands $command$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "src", "userAgent", "user", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_excessive_security_scanning.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", "id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode = \"AccessDenied\") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/troubleshoot-iam-permission-errors/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Blocked", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.json"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "User $userIdentity.arn$ is seen to perform excessive number of discovery related api calls- $failures$, within an hour where the access was denied.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1580"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userIdentity.arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventSource", "userAgent", "errorCode", "userIdentity.type"], "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", "id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.", "references": ["https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/", "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Credential Access", "Other:Policy Violation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1580", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.policyName"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", "id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeletePolicy.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/delete-policy.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Other:Policy Violation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_delete_policy/aws_iam_delete_policy.json"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has deleted AWS Policies from IP address $src$ by executing the following command $eventName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.policyArn"], "risk_score": 10, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_iam_delete_policy_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_delete_policy.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", "id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", "references": ["https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has had mulitple failures while attempting to delete groups from $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "group_name", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.groupName"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "cloud", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", "id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).", "references": ["https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/iam/delete-group.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGroup.html"], "tags": {"name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has sucessfully deleted mulitple groups $group_deleted$ from $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069.003", "T1098", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "group_deleted", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.groupName"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "cloud", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", "id": "211b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=lambda.amazonaws.com eventName=UpdateFunctionCode* errorCode = success user_type=IAMUser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.functionName) as function_updated by src_ip user_arn user_agent user_type eventName aws_account_id |`aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Cloudtrail logs in your AWS Environment.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin or an autorized IAM user has updated the lambda fuction code legitimately.", "references": ["http://detectioninthe.cloud/execution/modify_lambda_function_code/", "https://sysdig.com/blog/exploit-mitigate-aws-lambdas-mitre/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/aws_updatelambdafunctioncode/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ is attempting to update the lambda function code of $function_updated$ from this IP $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "cloud", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-11", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", "analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_create_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has created network ACLs with all the ports open to a specified CIDR $requestParameters.cidrBlock$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userName", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.ruleAction", "requestParameters.egress", "requestParameters.aclProtocol", "requestParameters.portRange.to", "requestParameters.portRange.from", "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", "analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/aws_delete_acl/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ from $src$ has sucessfully deleted network ACLs entry (eventName= $eventName$), such that the instance is accessible from anywhere", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.egress", "userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "src", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", "id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"], "tags": {"name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/assume_role_with_saml/assume_role_with_saml.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for account ID $recipientAccountId$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "recipientAccountId", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim", "Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "requestParameters.principalArn", "requestParameters.roleArn", "requestParameters.roleSessionName", "recipientAccountId", "responseElements.issuer", "sourceIPAddress", "userAgent"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", "id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"], "tags": {"name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "AWS Federated Account", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/update_saml_provider/update_saml_provider.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $userIdentity.principalId$ from IP address $sourceIPAddress$ has trigged an event $eventName$ to update the SAML provider to $requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim", "Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "eventType", "requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn", "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.accessKeyId", "userIdentity.principalId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_saml_update_identity_provider.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the the default policy version", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName", "eventSource"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", "id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-03", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)", "search": " `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.", "references": ["https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", "analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_updateloginprofile/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "From IP address $sourceIPAddress$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userAgent", "errorCode", "requestParameters.userName"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_updateloginprofile_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/aws_updateloginprofile.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", "id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline.", "search": "`circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as * | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, \"%\".mandatory_job.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase=\"build\" | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "CircleCI", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_job/circle_ci_disable_security_job.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "disable security job $mandatory_job$ in workflow $workflow_name$ from user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1554", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "circleci", "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_job.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", "id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline.", "search": "`circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, \"%\".mandatory_step.\"%\"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url \"(?[^\\/]*\\/[^\\/]*)$\" | eval phase=\"build\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index CircleCI logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "CircleCI", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1554/circle_ci_disable_security_step/circle_ci_disable_security_step.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "disable security step $mandatory_step$ in job $job_name$ from user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1554", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "circleci", "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "mandatory_step_for_job", "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/circle_ci_disable_security_step.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", "id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for new commands from each user role.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`", "known_false_positives": ".", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ of type AssumedRole attempting to execute new API calls $command$ that have not been seen before", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.user_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.object"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", "id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-13", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User\" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is creating a new instance $dest$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.vendor_region"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", "id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ in a new region for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.vendor_region", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", "id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs.", "search": "| tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where image_id != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an image that has not been previously seen.", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Instance_Changes\")` | where instance_type != \"unknown\" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "Cloud Compute Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is creating an instance $dest$ with an instance type $instance_type$ that has not been previously seen.", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", "id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-29", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search \"Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update\" should be enabled for this detection to properly work.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is modifying an instance $dest$ for the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.command", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.change_type", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $dest$ for the first time in City $City$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities"}, {"name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in Country $Country$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object_id$ for the first time from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object_id", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities"}, {"name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", "id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is starting or creating an instance $object$ for the first time in region $Region$ from IP address $src$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "object", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.src", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.object", "All_Changes.command"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_aws-kinesis-firehose"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities"}, {"name": "cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Amazon Kinesis Firehose", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3719"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", "id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score", "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "signals", "definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_repository_and_risk.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Correlation by User and Risk", "id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search correlations detections by user and risk_score", "search": "`signals` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "For Dev Sec Ops POC", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Correlation by User and Risk", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Correlation triggered for user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "signals", "definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/correlation_by_user_and_risk.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\", \"Previously Seen User\") | where userStatus=\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console for the first time", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user City | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user City | fields earliestseen user City] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New City\",\"Previously Seen City\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCity = \"New City\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user City userStatus userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from City $City$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Country | fields earliestseen user Country] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Country\",\"Previously Seen Country\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(),\"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userCountry = \"New Country\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Country userStatus userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Country $Country$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user Region | fields earliestseen user Region] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\"), \"New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), \"-24h@h\") OR isnull(earliestseen), \"New User\",\"Old User\") | where userRegion = \"New Region\" AND userStatus != \"Old User\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user Region userStatus userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/abnormally_high_cloud_instances_launched/cloudtrail_behavioural_detections.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ is logging into the AWS console from Region $Region$ for the first time", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", "version": 3, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw \"(?{.+})\" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN (\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers\",\"http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers\") | search permission IN (\"READ\",\"READ_ACP\",\"WRITE\",\"WRITE_ACP\",\"FULL_CONTROL\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user_arn$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ with the following permissions $permission$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "bucketName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventSource", "eventName", "requestParameters.bucketName", "user_arn", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent", "uri", "permission"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", "id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventSource=\"s3.amazonaws.com\" (userAgent=\"[aws-cli*\" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN (\"*AuthenticatedUsers\",\"*AllUsers\") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the \"All Users\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1530/aws_s3_public_bucket/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $userIdentity.userName$ has created an open/public bucket $bucketName$ using AWS CLI with the following permissions - $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp$ $requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.userName", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "bucketName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventSource", "eventName", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp", "requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control", "requestParameters.bucketName", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.principalId", "userAgent", "bucketName"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,\"Match\",\"No Match\") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent | where match = \"No Match\" | `detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.", "references": ["https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect shared ec2 snapshot", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "EC2 Snapshot", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "AWS EC2 snapshot from account $aws_account_id$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user_arn$ from $src_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "user_arn", "src_ip", "requestParameters.attributeType", "aws_account_id", "vendor_region", "user_agent"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_shared_ec2_snapshot_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_shared_ec2_snapshot.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals", "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", "analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/security_hub_ec2_spike/security_hub_ec2_spike.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Spike in AWS security Hub alerts with title $Title$ for EC2 instance $dest$", "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Resources{}.Type", "Title", "Types{}", "vendor_account", "vendor_region", "severity", "dest"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_securityhub_finding", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", "id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master | eval severity=\"low\" | eval phase=\"code\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date, phase, severity | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to master branch", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_master.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to main branch", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1199", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "github", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "github_commit_changes_in_master_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_changes_in_master.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Github Commit In Develop", "id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch", "search": "`github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project.", "known_false_positives": "admin can do changes directly to develop branch", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"name": "Github Commit In Develop", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1199/github_push_master/github_push_develop.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious commit by $commit.commit.author.email$ to develop branch", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1199", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "github", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "github_commit_in_develop_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_commit_in_develop.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", "id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs.", "search": "`github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html"], "tags": {"name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_security_advisor_alert/github_security_advisor_alert.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "alert.id", "repository.full_name", "repository.html_url", "action", "alert.affected_package_name", "alert.affected_range", "alert.created_at", "alert.external_identifier", "alert.external_reference", "alert.fixed_in", "alert.severity"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195", "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "github", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "github_dependabot_alert_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_dependabot_alert.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", "id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user.", "search": "`github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase=\"code\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/getting-github-data-with-webhooks.html"], "tags": {"name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GitHub", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Application Log"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1195.001/github_pull_request/github_pull_request.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Vulnerabilities found in packages used by GitHub repository $repository$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "alert.id", "repository.full_name", "repository.html_url", "action", "alert.affected_package_name", "alert.affected_range", "alert.created_at", "alert.external_identifier", "alert.external_reference", "alert.fixed_in", "alert.severity"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195", "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "github_known_users", "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "github", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine.", "search": "`gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN(\"\", \"null\")) | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=email \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where src_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain = \"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", "known_false_positives": "network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1567.002/gsuite_share_drive/gdrive_share_external.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "email", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "parameters.doc_title", "src_domain", "dest_domain", "email", "parameters.visibility", "parameters.owner", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Leviathan", "Turla", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "gsuite_drive", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", "id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"attachment{}.file_extension_type\" IN (\"pl\", \"py\", \"rb\", \"sh\", \"bat\", \"exe\", \"dll\", \"cpl\", \"com\", \"js\", \"vbs\", \"ps1\", \"reg\",\"swf\", \"cmd\", \"go\") | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_attachment_ext/gsuite_gmail_file_ext.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "attachment{}.file_extension_type", "attachment{}.sha256", "destination{}.service", "num_message_attachments", "payload_size", "subject", "destination{}.address", "source.address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "gsuite_gmail", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", "id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"* fedex *\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN (\"doc\", \"docx\", \"xls\", \"xlsx\", \"ppt\", \"pptx\", \"pdf\", \"zip\", \"rar\", \"html\",\"htm\",\"hta\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_subj/gsuite_susp_subj_attach.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "gsuite_gmail", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", "id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` \"link_domain{}\" IN (\"*pastebin.com*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\",\"t.me\") | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/22/malware-increasingly-targets-discord-for-abuse/"], "tags": {"name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_susp_url/gsuite_susp_url.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "gsuite_gmail", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.", "search": "`gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=destination{}.address \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and not dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc.", "known_false_positives": "network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gsuite_outbound_email_to_external/gsuite_external_domain.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious email from $source.address$ to $destination{}.address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "gsuite_gmail", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", "id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.", "search": "`gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false \"parameters.doc_title\" IN (\"*dhl*\", \"* ups *\", \"*delivery*\", \"*parcel*\", \"*label*\", \"*invoice*\", \"*postal*\", \"*fedex*\", \"* usps *\", \"* express *\", \"*shipment*\", \"*Banking/Tax*\",\"*shipment*\", \"*new order*\") parameters.doc_type IN (\"document\",\"pdf\", \"msexcel\", \"msword\", \"spreadsheet\", \"presentation\") | rex field=parameters.owner \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | rex field=parameters.target_user \"[^@]+@(?[^@]+)\" | where not source_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" and dest_domain=\"internal_test_email.com\" | eval phase=\"plan\" | eval severity=\"low\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. In order for the search to work for your environment, please edit the query to use your company specific email domain instead of `internal_test_email.com`.", "known_false_positives": "normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-top-spear-phishing-words.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/gdrive_susp_file_share/gdrive_susp_attach.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious share gdrive from $parameters.owner$ to $email$ namely as $parameters.doc_title$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "email", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "parameters.doc_title", "src_domain", "dest_domain", "email", "parameters.visibility", "parameters.owner", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "gsuite_drive", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", "id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.", "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/"], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Unknown"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_lfi_attack.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["raw"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_container_controller", "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", "id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.", "search": "`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw \"^(?\\S+)\\s+-\\s+-\\s+\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s\\\"(?[^\\\"]*)\\\"\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s\\[(?[^\\]]*)\\]\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\\s(?\\S*)\" | rex field=request \"^(?\\S+)?\\s(?\\S+)\\s\" | rex field=url \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3})\" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"medium\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes", "https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/remote-file-inclusion-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Unknown"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1212/kuberntest_nginx_rfi_attack/kubernetes_nginx_rfi_attack.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Remote File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["raw"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_container_controller", "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", "id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.", "search": "`kube_objects_events` object.message IN (\"Pulling image *kube-hunter*\", \"Pulling image *kube-bench*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\", \"Pulling image *kube-recon*\") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase=\"operate\" | eval severity=\"high\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes"], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", "analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Unknown"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/kubernetes_kube_hunter/kubernetes_kube_hunter.json"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Kubernetes Scanner image pulled on host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["object.message", "source.host", "object.involvedObject.name", "object.involvedObject.namespace", "object.involvedObject.kind", "object.message", "object.reason"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "kube_objects_events", "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment grant to user.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type by ActorIpAddress dest ResultStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "tags": {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federation/o365_new_federation.json"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ has created a new federation setting on $dest$ from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Actor{}.ID", "Actor{}.Type", "ActorIpAddress", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-03", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add service principal credentials.\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as ModifiedProperties.Name values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as ModifiedProperties.NewValue values(Target{}.ID) as Target.ID by ActorIpAddress Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory"], "tags": {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_add_service_principal/o365_add_service_principal.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $Actor.ID$ created a new federation setting on $Target.ID$ and added service principal credentials from IP Address $ActorIpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "Target.ID", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "signature", "Actor{}.ID", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "Target{}.ID", "ActorIpAddress"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_added_service_principal_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_added_service_principal.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-03", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Set Company Information.\" ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue \"(?\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\/\\d{1,2})\" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,\"0\") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/"], "tags": {"name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.007/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $user_id$ has added new IP addresses $ip_addresses_new_added$ to a list of trusted IPs to bypass MFA", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ip_addresses_new_added", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user_id", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature", "ModifiedProperties{}.Name", "ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue", "ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue", "user", "vendor_account", "status", "user_id", "action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Disable MFA", "id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-03", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=\"Disable Strong Authentication.\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"], "tags": {"name": "O365 Disable MFA", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_disable_mfa/o365_disable_mfa.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $user$ has executed an operation $Operation$ for this destination $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "UserType", "user", "status", "signature", "dest", "ResultStatus"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_disable_mfa_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_disable_mfa.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", "id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"], "tags": {"name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110/o365_brute_force_login/o365_brute_force_login.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $user$ has caused excessive number of authentication failures from $src_ip$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "UserAuthenticationMethod", "status", "UserAgent", "src_ip", "user"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by LogonError ActorIpAddress UserAgent UserId | where count > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.", "references": ["https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/"], "tags": {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556/o365_sso_logon_errors/o365_sso_logon_errors.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $UserId$ has caused excessive number of SSO logon errors from $ActorIpAddress$ using UserAgent $UserAgent$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "LogonError", "ActorIpAddress", "UserAgent", "UserId"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=\"Add-FederatedDomain\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Parameters{}.Value) as Parameters.Value by ObjectId Operation OrganizationName OriginatingServer UserId UserKey | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity.", "known_false_positives": "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/"], "tags": {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.003/o365_new_federated_domain/o365_new_federated_domain.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $UserId$ has added a new federated domaain $Parameters.Value$ for $OrganizationName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "UserId", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Workload", "Operation", "Parameters{}.Value", "ObjectId", "OrganizationName", "OriginatingServer", "UserId", "UserKey"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name=\"eDiscovery search started or exported\" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/"], "tags": {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114/o365_export_pst_file/o365_export_pst_file.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $Source$ has exported a PST file from the search using this operation- $Operation$ with a severity of $Severity$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Category", "Name", "Source", "Severity", "AlertEntityId", "Operation"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_pst_export_alert_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_pst_export_alert.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination $ForwardingAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", "id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-15", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "Service Accounts", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.002/suspicious_rights_delegation/suspicious_rights_delegation.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ has delegated suspicious rights $AccessRights$ to user $dest_user$ that allow access to sensitive", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1114.003/o365_email_forwarding_rule/o365_email_forwarding_rule.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ configured multiple users $src_user$ with a count of $count_src_user$, a forwarding rule to same destination $ForwardingSmtpAddress$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "type": "Email Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "Parameters"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/cloud/o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", "id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "userName"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "id": "dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "src_user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", "id": "8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"-10m@m\")| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "userName"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "id": "1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jason Brewer, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_terminated)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "src_user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", "id": "344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", "analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", "id": "ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", "analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", "id": "42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. ", "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", "analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", "id": "7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with \"Run\" or \"Create.\" This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources\" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources.", "known_false_positives": "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"false positive\" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no \"false positives\" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\\\n This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", "analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Resolution\")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\\\nThis search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.dest", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.src"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", "id": "021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-08", "author": "Peter Gael, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn", "errorMessage", "errorCode", "userAgent", "src", "userName", "arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", "id": "4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-17", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users.", "search": "`cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", "analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn", "userIdentity.type", "user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "aws_service_accounts", "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard.", "search": "`cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called \"Create a list of approved AWS service accounts\": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", "analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "errorCode", "userName", "eventName", "user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "aws_service_accounts", "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename \"Web.*\" as * | rex field=site \".*?(?[^./:]+\\.(\\S{2,3}|\\S{2,3}.\\S{2,3}))$\" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\\\n", "known_false_positives": "If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", "analytic_story": ["Common Phishing Frameworks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.dest", "DNS.src", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Ajax Security Team", "Dark Caracal", "FIN6", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Windshift"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon"}, {"name": "detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", "id": "05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as \"Source IP\", dest as \"Destination IP\", answer as \"DNS Answer\" anslen as \"Answer Length\" record_type as \"DNS Record Type\" firstTime as \"First Time\" lastTime as \"Last Time\" count as Count | table \"Source IP\" \"Destination IP\" \"DNS Answer\" \"DNS Record Type\" \"Answer Length\" Count \"First Time\" \"Last Time\" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.record_type", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest", "DNS.answer"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", "id": "98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-27", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message \"Enabled Privileges:\\s+(?\\w+)\\s+Disabled Privileges:\" | where privs=\"SeDebugPrivilege\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as \"Enabled Privilege\" | rename Process_Name as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is \"Administrators\" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "Process_Name", "Message", "dest", "Process_ID"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName] |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail\" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", "analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventType", "errorCode", "userIdentity.type", "userName", "eventName"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), \"First Time Logging into AWS Console\",\"Previously Seen User\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus =\"First Time Logging into AWS Console\" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run \"Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail\" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.", "known_false_positives": "When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\\\nThis search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", "analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventType", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls"}, {"name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", "analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "network_acl_events", "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs"}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv"}, {"name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-18", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN\" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.", "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", "analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "serIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_group_api_calls", "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups"}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "security_group_activity_baseline", "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv"}, {"name": "security_group_activity_baseline", "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect USB device insertion", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5", "version": 1, "date": "2017-11-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Change_Analysis"], "description": "The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result=\"Removable Storage device\" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect USB device insertion", "analytic_story": ["Data Protection"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.result", "All_Changes.result_id", "All_Changes.src_priority", "All_Changes.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_usb_device_insertion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_usb_device_insertion.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\\\nThis search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", "analytic_story": ["Dynamic DNS"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.status", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This is a description"}, {"name": "detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. \\\nNOTE:Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. This detection is replaced with two other variations, if you are using MLTK then you can use this search `ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule` or use the standard deviation version `ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule`, as an alternantive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.query\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.query\" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(\"DNS.answer\") as count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search(\"DNS.query\")`) NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.in-addr.arpa\" NOT (\"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_dns\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_webproxy\" OR \"DNS.src_category\"=\"svc_infra_email*\" ) by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.answer\" | rename \"DNS.src\" as src \"DNS.answer\" as message | eval message=if(message==\"unknown\",\"\", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.src_category", "DNS.src"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/detection_of_dns_tunnels.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.dest_category", "DNS.src_category", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "DNS record changed", "id": "44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day.", "search": "| inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!=\"unknown\" DNS.answer!=\"\" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!=\"unknown\" | rex field=query \"(?\\w+\\.\\w+?)(?:$|/)\"] | makemv delim=\" \" answer | makemv delim=\" \" type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search \"Discover DNS record\". \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"DNS Hijack Enrichment\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\\\n", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "DNS record changed", "analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.record_type", "DNS.answer", "DNS.src", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.query"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dns_record_changed_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "discovered_dns_records", "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dns_record_changed.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "id": "21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump process_name!=procdump*.exe EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump"], "tags": {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$, attempting to dump lsass.exe.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OriginalFileName", "process_name", "EventID", "CommandLine", "Computer", "parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", "id": "56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", "analytic_story": ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "errorCode", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75", "version": 1, "date": "2018-02-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started", "search": "`cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),\"-1d@d\"), \"Instance Started in a New Region\",\"Previously Seen Region\") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus=\"Instance Started in a New Region\" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the \"Previously seen AWS Regions\" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "awsRegion"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", "id": "347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 AMIs\" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs.", "known_false_positives": "After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "id": "65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value=\"m1.small\" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types\" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "requestParameters.instanceType"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", "id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User\" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "errorCode", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", "id": "ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-19", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* .*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", "analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring.", "search": "`netbackup` MESSAGE=\"Disk/Partition backup completed successfully.\" | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-7d@d\"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", "analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "MESSAGE", "COMPUTERNAME"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "netbackup", "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "First time seen command line argument", "id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = \"* /c *\" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search \"Previously seen command line arguments,\"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "First time seen command line argument", "analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/first_time_seen_command_line_argument.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", "id": "27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", "known_false_positives": "Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization", "references": ["https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-roles"], "tags": {"name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", "analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role", "data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource", "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role", "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", "id": "2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-09", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", "known_false_positives": "High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok", "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/permissions-reference"], "tags": {"name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", "analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", "data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{}", "data.resource.labels.project_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", "id": "a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-01", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", "known_false_positives": "GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs.", "references": ["https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-1", "https://www.netskope.com/blog/gcp-oauth-token-hijacking-in-google-cloud-part-2"], "tags": {"name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", "analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Account", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", "id": "4f00ca88-e766-4605-ac65-ae51c9fd185b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path.", "search": "|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Storage where Storage.event_name=storage.objects.create by Storage.src_user Storage.account Storage.action Storage.bucket_name Storage.event_name Storage.http_user_agent Storage.msg Storage.object_path | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Storage\")` | `gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "GCP GCR container uploaded", "analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "asset_type": "GCP GCR Container", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1525"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1525", "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "gcp_gcr_container_uploaded_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "id": "db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 \"data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision\"=forbid \"data.protoPayload.status.message\"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail=\"system:anonymous\" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Identify New User Accounts", "id": "475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week.", "search": "| from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, \"Accounts created in last week\") | search empStatus=\"Accounts created in last week\"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework.", "known_false_positives": "If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Identify New User Accounts", "analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Domain Server", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "Chimera", "Indrik Spider", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "identify_new_user_accounts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/identify_new_user_accounts.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", "id": "5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", "id": "de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", "id": "7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", "id": "b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "id": "a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace", "id": "55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", "id": "47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", "id": "1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", "id": "f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. ", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "id": "019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", "id": "4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", "id": "86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", "id": "c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-19", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure", "search": "`kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", "id": "99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_RBAC_authorizations_by_account.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", "id": "7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-10", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", "id": "bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", "known_false_positives": "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", "id": "a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1 | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs.", "known_false_positives": "Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. ", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "id": "7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs.", "known_false_positives": "This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", "id": "a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-11", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs.", "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", "id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", "analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "brand_abuse_dns", "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file"}, {"name": "monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", "id": "d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability.", "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to=\"/%09/*\" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`", "how_to_implement": "No extra steps needed to implement this search.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", "analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "asset_type": "Splunk Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2016-4859"]}, "macros": [{"name": "open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2016-4859", "cvss": 5.8, "summary": "Open redirect vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise 6.4.x prior to 6.4.3, Splunk Enterprise 6.3.x prior to 6.3.6, Splunk Enterprise 6.2.x prior to 6.2.10, Splunk Enterprise 6.1.x prior to 6.1.11, Splunk Enterprise 6.0.x prior to 6.0.12, Splunk Enterprise 5.0.x prior to 5.0.16 and Splunk Light prior to 6.4.3 allows to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/open_redirect_in_splunk_web.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", "id": "a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc", "version": 1, "date": "2019-01-29", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack.", "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model", "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", "analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/osquery_pack___coldroot_detection.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Processes created by netsh", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude \"C:\\Program Files\\rempl\\sedlauncher.exe\" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Processes created by netsh", "analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "processes_created_by_netsh_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/processes_created_by_netsh.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", "version": 2, "date": "2019-10-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_softwares` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as \"prohibited\" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as \"prohibited\", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_times"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "prohibited_softwares", "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/prohibited_software_on_endpoint.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process=\"*add*\" Processes.process=\"*Hidden*\" Processes.process=\"*REG_DWORD*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = \"(/d\\s+2)\" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None at the moment", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-02", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"\\\\\\\\*\" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.", "known_false_positives": "This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_registry_key_modifications_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/remote_registry_key_modifications.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= \"*create*\" OR Processes.process= \"*delete*\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "No known false positives", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", "id": "354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea", "version": 1, "date": "2017-01-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Vulnerabilities"], "description": "The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5753\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5715\" OR Vulnerabilities.cve =\"CVE-2017-5754\" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", "analytic_story": ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 4"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2017-5753"]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2017-5753", "cvss": 4.7, "summary": "Systems with microprocessors utilizing speculative execution and branch prediction may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", "id": "f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-14", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug.", "search": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path=\"*raw/services/server/info/server-info\" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", "analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "asset_type": "Splunk Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2018-11409"]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2018-11409", "cvss": 5.0, "summary": "Splunk through 7.0.1 allows information disclosure by appending __raw/services/server/info/server-info?output_mode=json to a query, as demonstrated by discovering a license key."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", "id": "1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Registry\")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes.", "known_false_positives": "There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["UEBA"], "description": "This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel\" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called \"SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel.\" Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.", "known_false_positives": "This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_email___uba_anomaly.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Suspicious File Write", "id": "57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8", "version": 3, "date": "2019-04-25", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious File Write", "analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "suspicious_writes", "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_file_write_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_file_write.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "id": "2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c", "version": 6, "date": "2021-01-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", "version": 4, "date": "2022-02-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", "id": "cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process.", "search": "(`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\\ Volume\\ Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "id": "29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "uncommon_processes", "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", "id": "56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed.", "search": "`netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE=\"An error occurred, failed to backup.\" | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", "analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "netbackup", "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", "id": "bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-08", "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name.", "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=\"/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/\" | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | search Username=* | rex field=Username \"@(?.*)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`", "how_to_implement": "We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream.", "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.", "references": ["https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/"], "tags": {"name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", "analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "asset_type": "Account", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_content_type", "uri", "cookie"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___account_harvesting.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", "id": "31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-08", "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session.", "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie \"form_key=(?\\w+)\" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/"], "tags": {"name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", "analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "asset_type": "account", "cis20": ["CIS 6"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_content_type", "cookie"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", "id": "31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-08", "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password.", "search": "`stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost* | rex field=form_data \"login\\[username\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | rex field=form_data \"login\\[password\\]=(?[^&|^$]+)\" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream.", "known_false_positives": "As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_ID", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_(computer_science)", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1809/"], "tags": {"name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", "analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "asset_type": "account", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_content_type", "uri"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", "id": "c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process=\"*C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_connhost_exe_force_flag.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "Windows hosts file modification", "id": "06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116", "version": 1, "date": "2018-11-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\System32\\\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Windows hosts file modification", "analytic_story": ["Host Redirection"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Unknown"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_hosts_file_modification_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/deprecated/windows_hosts_file_modification.yml", "source": "deprecated"}, {"name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", "id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name =\"7z.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"7za.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7z.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name = \"7za.exe\") AND (Processes.process=\"*\\\\C$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\Admin$\\\\*\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\\\IPC$\\\\*\") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon_7z.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "archive process $process_name$ with suspicious cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", "version": 2, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ injected into $TargetImage$ and was attempted dump LSASS on $dest$. Adversaries tend to do this when trying to accesss credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "CallTrace", "Computer", "TargetProcessId", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process=\"*user*\" OR Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*view /all*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product..", "known_false_positives": "admin or power user may used this series of command.", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "tags": {"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious $process_name$ usage detected on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"StubPath\" Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fPoisonivy.E", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014/"], "tags": {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1547.014/active_setup_stubpath/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "active_setup_registry_autostart_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", "id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", "analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Processes.process = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Processes.process=\"*-exclusion*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" Message = \"*objectcategory=user*\" Message = \"*.findAll()*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/adsisearcher_account_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"File and Printer Sharing\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable=Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_netsh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\SharedAccess\\\\Parameters\\\\FirewallPolicy\\\\FirewallRules\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Action=Allow|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Dir=In|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|Profile=Public|*\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*|LPort=*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious firewall modifications were detected via the registry on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 3, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", "id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*firewall*\" Message = \"*Inbound*\" Message = \"*Allow*\" Message = \"*-LocalPort*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/new-netfirewallrule?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", "analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious firewall modification detected on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 3, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" Processes.process= \"*group=\\\"Network Discovery\\\"*\" Processes.process=\"*enable*\" Processes.process=\"*Yes*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.", "references": ["https://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD52469", "https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_netsh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4", "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/no/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.MRDEC.MRA/"], "tags": {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/allow_operation_with_consent_admin.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"rundll32.exe\", \"dllhost.exe\") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/"], "tags": {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "any_powershell_downloadfile_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "any_powershell_downloadstring_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1595/attacker_scan_tools/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An attacker tool $process_name$,listed in attacker_tools.csv is executed on host $dest$ by User $user$. This process $process_name$ is known to do- $description$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TEMP.Veles", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "attacker_tools", "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", "version": 7, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to add a certificate to the store on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_certutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process=\"* stop *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-14---disable-arbitrary-security-windows-service", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_defend_service_stop/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable security services on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 20, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "security_services_lookup", "description": "A list of services that deal with security", "filename": "security_services.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", "min_matches": 1}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified registry key $registry_key_name$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ to prepare autoadminlogon", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Batch File Write to System32", "id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\system32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.bat\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string \"system32\", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Batch File Write to System32", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/batch_file_in_system32/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to system32 has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "batch_file_write_to_system32_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/batch_file_write_to_system32.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", "id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/deletevalue*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", "analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to bring back to normal boot configuration the $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*recoveryenabled*\" (Processes.process=\"* no*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-4---windows---disable-windows-recovery-console-repair"], "tags": {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting disable the ability to recover the endpoint.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md#atomic-test-3---persist-download--execute", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/"], "tags": {"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to persist using BITS.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_bitsadmin", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "bits_job_persistence_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bits_job_persistence.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process=*transfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8eb52117b748d378325f7719554a896e37bccec7/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-9---windows---bitsadmin-bits-download", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/bc705cb7aaa5f26f2d96585fac8e4c7052df0ff9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_bitsadmin", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "bitsadmin_download_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2022-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/certutil-qualms-they-came-to-drop-fombs.html"], "tags": {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_certutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2022-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\\..\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\`. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#-verifyctl", "https://www.avira.com/en/blog/certutil-abused-by-attackers-to-spread-threats"], "tags": {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_certutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = \"*-exportPFX*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting export a certificate.", "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/"], "tags": {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1140/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_certutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "certutil_with_decode_argument_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/certutil_with_decode_argument.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This techninique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious command to the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" Registry.registry_path = \"*HKCR\\\\*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/accessibility-features"], "tags": {"name": "Change Default File Association", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.001/txtfile_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "change_default_file_association_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_default_file_association.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", "id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process=\"*/set*\" Processes.process=\"*{current}*\" Processes.process=\"*safeboot*\" Processes.process=\"*network*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", "analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.002/autoadminlogon/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "bcdedit process with commandline $process$ to force safemode boot the $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe Processes.parent_process=*/c* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used.", "known_false_positives": "other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others", "references": ["https://ss64.com/nt/chcp.html", "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1419941156633329665?s=20"], "tags": {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "parent process $parent_process_name$ spawning chcp process $process_name$ with parent command line $parent_process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process", "parent_process_name", "parent_process", "process_id", "parent_process_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "chcp_command_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/chcp_command_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", "id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*whoami*\" Processes.process = \"*/group*\" Processes.process = \"* find *\" Processes.process = \"*12288*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", "analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", "id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cipher.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/w:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "administrator may execute this app to manage disk", "references": ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vatet-pyxie-defray777/3/", "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-ransomware-behavior-report.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", "id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is \"runrun\", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is \"temp.dat\", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"*temp.dat*\" Processes.process = \"*runrun*\" OR Processes.process = \"*temp.dat*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_b/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code related to Clop ransomware.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "clop_common_exec_parameter_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_common_exec_parameter.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", "id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_Name IN (\"SecurityCenterIBM\", \"WinCheckDRVs\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ executing known Clop Ransomware service names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "cmdline", "_time", "parent_process_name", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_path"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/clop_ransomware_known_service_name.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2022-01-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process=\"* /c *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "IcedID", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/cmd_carry_str_param/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting spawn a new process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\\\.\\Pipe\\5erg53`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", "https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c"], "tags": {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmd_echo_pipe___escalation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"ipconfig.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"systeminfo.exe\") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell*\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"pwsh.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"explorer.exe\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/jssloader/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A non-standard parent process $parent_process_name$ spawned child process $process_name$ to execute command-line tool on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\CMLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMSTPLUA.dll\", \"*\\\\CMLUAUTIL.dll\") NOT(process_name IN(\"CMSTP.exe\", \"CMMGR32.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/"], "tags": {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/darkside_cmstp_com/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \\\nUpon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\\\msagent_*, \\\\wkssvc*, \\\\DserNamePipe*, \\\\srvsvc_*, \\\\mojo.*, \\\\postex_*, \\\\status_*, \\\\MSSE-*, \\\\spoolss_*, \\\\win_svc*, \\\\ntsvcs*, \\\\winsock*, \\\\UIA_PIPE*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$ accessing known suspicious named pipes related to Cobalt Strike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "PipeName", "Computer", "process_name", "process_path", "process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | `ransomware_extensions` | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_extensions/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware file extension and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "ransomware_extensions", "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "common_ransomware_extensions_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_extensions.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/ransomware_notes/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, this is indicative of a known ransomware note file and should be reviewed immediately.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "ransomware_notes", "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "common_ransomware_notes_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/common_ransomware_notes.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", "id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*-m local*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m net*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-m all*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-nomutex*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.conti"], "tags": {"name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing specific Conti Ransomware related parameters.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "conti_common_exec_parameter_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/conti_common_exec_parameter.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-40444", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe .", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to add a user to the local Administrators group.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "id": "743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c", "version": 6, "date": "2020-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005"], "tags": {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ enumerating Windows file shares.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\cmd.exe\", \"*\\\\powershell*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId EventCode StartAddress SourceImage Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/07/19/icedid-and-cobalt-strike-vs-antivirus/"], "tags": {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", "id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-06", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process has created a remote thread into $TargetImage$ on $dest$. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "TargetImage", "Computer", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/create_remote_thread_into_lsass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \\AppData\\Local\\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$process_name$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$ writing $TargetFilename$ to disk. This behavior is related to dumping credentials via Task Manager.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetFilename", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "object_category"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create a shadow copy to perform offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", "id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\\\system32\\\\config\\\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\\\windows\\\\ntds\\\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to copy SAM and NTDS.dit for offline password cracking.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", "id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to create symlink to a shadow copy to grab credentials.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", "id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = \"*/noconfig*\" Processes.process = \"*/fullpaths*\" Processes.process = \"*@*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/", "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/06/maicious-macro-that-compile-c-code-as.html"], "tags": {"name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "csc.exe with commandline $process$ to compile .net code on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027.004", "T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_csc", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process=\"*-s *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*ShadowCopy*\" (Message = \"*Delete*\" OR Message = \"*Remove*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://searchwindowsserver.techtarget.com/tutorial/Set-up-PowerShell-script-block-logging-for-added-security"], "tags": {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An attempt to delete ShadowCopy was performed using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete accounts.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "deleting_of_net_users_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_of_net_users.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to delete shadow copies.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "deleting_shadow_copies_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/deleting_shadow_copies.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", "version": 5, "date": "2020-10-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp WorkstationName=WORKSTATION NOT AccountName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.002/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the pass the hash technique.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "EventCode", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Logon_Process", "WorkstationName", "user", "dest"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT32", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Kimsuky", "Night Dragon"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", "id": "26f02e96-c300-11eb-b611-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*invoke-azurehound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1"], "tags": {"name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ using AzureHound to enumerate AzureAD.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", "id": "1c34549e-c31b-11eb-996b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*-azurecollection.zip\", \"*-azprivroleadminrights.json\", \"*-azglobaladminrights.json\", \"*-azcloudappadmins.json\", \"*-azapplicationadmins.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/master/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1"], "tags": {"name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", "analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "file_path", "dest", "file_name", "process_id", "file_create_time"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_azurehound_file_modifications.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", "id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*copy*\",\"*[System.IO.File]::Copy*\") AND Message IN (\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\", \"*System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.", "references": ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/serioussam/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "PowerShell was identified running a script to capture the SAM hive on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-36934", "cvss": 4.6, "summary": "Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", "version": 3, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The $source_image$ has attempted access to read $TargetImage$ was identified on endpoint $Computer$, this is indicative of credential dumping and should be investigated.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "source_image", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "Computer", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*system.net.webclient* AND Message=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/", "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", "id": "c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \\\n **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \\\n(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\\\n", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $dest$ and results related to $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.user", "nodename", "All_Changes.result", "All_Changes.dest"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "Chimera", "Indrik Spider", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", "id": "95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where nodename=All_Changes.Account_Management All_Changes.result=\"lockout\" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Account_Management\")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", "analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/account_lockout/windows-system.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Multiple accounts have been locked out. Review $nodename$ and $result$ related to $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "result", "type": "Other", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.result", "nodename", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN10", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", "version": 3, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Shannon Davis, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation previously performed by HAFNIUM. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_exchange_web_shell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dark Caracal", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_hh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_html_help_renamed_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dark Caracal", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_proces_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dark Caracal", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_hh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The \"htm\" and \"html\" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN (\"*its:*\", \"*mk:@MSITStore:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/851869", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/", "https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7", "https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified using Infotech Storage Handlers to load a specific file within a CHM on $dest$ under user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dark Caracal", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_hh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by Computer, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.", "references": ["https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $Image$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $Computer$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "ProcessId", "Computer", "Image"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"mshta.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"mshta.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing with inline HTA, indicative of defense evasion.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_mshta", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_mshta", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_mshta_renamed_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=\"*http://*\" OR Processes.process=\"*https://*\") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $est$ by user $user$ attempting to access a remote destination to download an additional payload.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_mshta", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction member_id connected=false maxspan=180m | rename member_id as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732", "known_false_positives": "The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not \"Administrators\", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"], "message": "A $user$ on $dest$ was added recently. Identify if this was legitimate behavior or not.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Group_Name", "member_id", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_new_local_admin_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", "id": "cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-03", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process \"^.*?\\\\\\\\(?[^\\\\\\\\]*\\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))\" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.009", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", "version": 2, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN (\"\",\"unknown\") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings.", "known_false_positives": "It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/discovery_commands/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning multiple $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not a normal behavior of the process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 32, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration"}, {"name": "detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "version": 6, "date": "2020-11-10", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/powershell_spawn_cmd/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running prohibited applications.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe"}, {"name": "detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running the utility for possibly the first time.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_psexec", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN (\"*copy*\", \"*mega*\", \"*pcloud*\", \"*ftp*\", \"*--config*\", \"*--progress*\", \"*--no-check-certificate*\", \"*--ignore-existing*\", \"*--auto-confirm*\", \"*--transfers*\", \"*--multi-thread-streams*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service to move files or folders.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.original_file_name"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_rclone", "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name."}, {"name": "detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal behavior for $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "dest_ip", "process_name", "Computer", "user", "src_ip", "dest_host", "dest_ip"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regasm\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_regasm", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ typically not normal for this process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "dest_ip", "process_name", "Computer", "user", "src_ip", "dest_host"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "Endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v*\\regasm|regsvcs.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(regsvcs\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvcs", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack. \\\nUpon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for \"scrobj.dll\", the \".dll\" is not required to load scrobj. \"scrobj.dll\" will be loaded by \"regsvr32.exe\" upon execution. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ in an attempt to bypass detection and preventative controls was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", "id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_renamed_7_zip_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_7_zip.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_psexec", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_renamed_psexec_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_renamed_rclone_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_rclone.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1560.001/archive_utility/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 27, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_renamed_winrar_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_winrar.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Advpack/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Syssetup/", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"rundll32.exe\" execution with inline protocol handlers. \"JavaScript\", \"VBScript\", and \"About\" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"rundll32.exe\" and its parent process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "NOBELIUM Group", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*-collectionMethod*\",\"*invoke-bloodhound*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Possible SharpHound command-Line arguments identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*bloodhound.zip\", \"*_computers.json\", \"*_gpos.json\", \"*_domains.json\", \"*_users.json\", \"*_groups.json\") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Potential SharpHound file modifications identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "file_path", "dest", "file_name", "process_id", "file_create_time"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_file_modifications.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/", "https://thedfirreport.com/?s=bloodhound", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-2---run-bloodhound-from-local-disk"], "tags": {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/sharphound/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Potential SharpHound binary identified on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_sharphound_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_sharphound_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"cmd.exe\" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_spawns_cscript/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "cmd.exe launching script interpreters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", "id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible malicious WMI Subscription created on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Destination", "Computer", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Mustang Panda", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Script\\\\Settings\\\\AmsiEnable\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/", "https://gist.github.com/rxwx/8955e5abf18dc258fd6b43a3a7f4dbf9"], "tags": {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_amsi_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "id": "aa4f695a-3024-11ec-9987-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableAntiVirus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "id": "2dd719ac-3021-11ec-97b4-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it block suspicious file first seen in the host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "id": "dc65678c-301f-11ec-8e30-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the Enhanced Notification feature wher user or admin set to show or display alerts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting*\" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may choose to disable windows defender AV", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_defender_enhanced_notification_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "id": "cc391750-3024-11ec-955a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\MpEngine*\" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "id": "898debf4-3021-11ec-ba7c-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the spynet reporting for its telemetry.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "id": "73922ff8-3022-11ec-bf5e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "his analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender feature. This technique is to bypassed or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product specially the submit samples feature for further analysis..", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet*\" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework\\\\ETWEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_etw_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"wevtutil.exe\" Processes.process = \"*sl*\" Processes.process = \"*/e:false*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransom-x-ransomware-used-in-texas-txdot-cyberattack/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "WevtUtil.exe used to disable Event Logging on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_logs_using_wevtutil.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableRegistryTools\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_registry_tool_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled Registry Tools on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_registry_tool_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IceID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change* Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable problematic schedule task", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_schtask/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "schtask process with commandline $process$ to disable schedule task in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_schedule_task_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control\\\\MiniNt\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/minint_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\Hidden\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\HideFileExt\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") OR (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced\\\\ShowSuperHidden\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32~Tiotua-P/detailed-analysis.aspx"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled 'Show Hidden Files' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001", "T1564", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_show_hidden_files_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System*\" Registry.registry_value_name=\"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy\" Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction"], "tags": {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data= \"HotKey Disabled\" AND Registry.registry_value_name = \"Debugger\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled 'Windows App Hotkeys' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableOnAccessProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Windows Defender real time behavior monitoring disabled on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\SmartScreenEnabled\" Registry.registry_value_data= \"Off\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", "id": "114c6bfe-9406-11ec-bcce-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Message=\"*4194304*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled for legitimate purposes.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"], "tags": {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/getaduser/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser from $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", "id": "b0b34e2c-90de-11ec-baeb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage PowerView to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.", "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" AND Message=\"*PreauthNotRequired*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"], "tags": {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powerview/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView from $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\System\\\\DisableCMD\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows command prompt was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_cmd_application_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoControlPanel\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Control Panel was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_controlpanel_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "id": "911eacdc-317f-11ec-ad30-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\*\" AND (Registry.registry_path IN(\"*WdBoot*\", \"*WdFilter*\", \"*WdNisDrv*\", \"*WdNisSvc*\",\"*WinDefend*\", \"*SecurityHealthService*\")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disabling_defender_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_defender_services_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= \"*firewall*\" (Processes.process= \"*off*\" OR Processes.process= \"*disable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.htm"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Firewall was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_netsh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoFolderOptions\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Folder Options, to hide files, was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling Net User Account", "id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process=\"*user*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/active:no*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling Net User Account", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified disabling a user account on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_net_user_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_net_user_account.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoRun\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/pum-optional-norun/"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable run application in window start menu on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_norun_windows_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "David Dorsey, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC) were modified on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.action"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_remote_user_account_control.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableSR\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\SystemRestore\\\\DisableConfig\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows registry was modified to disable system restore on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_systemrestore_in_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableTaskMgr\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `disabling_task_manager_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin may disable this application for non technical user.", "references": ["https://any.run/report/ea4ea08407d4ee72e009103a3b77e5a09412b722fdef67315ea63f22011152af/a866d7b1-c236-4f26-a391-5ae32213dfc4#registry", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/05/threat-roundup-0424-0501.html"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/win_app_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows Task Manager was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "disabling_task_manager_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_dllhost.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_image$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" Processes.process = \"*-querytype=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-qt=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-q=*\" OR Processes.process=\"-type=*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-retry=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "admin nslookup usage", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Data Exfiltration", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing activity related to DNS exfiltration.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", "id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*user*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = \"* user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/do*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/playbook-domain-dominance", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", "id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*GET*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_samaccountname*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-30", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"nltest.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*/dclist:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*/dsgetdc:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", "id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=\"\" OR Processes.process=\"*DomainControllerAddress*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain controller discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", "id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*(objectcategory=group)*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 18, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", "id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_net.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", "id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = \"telegram.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*:Zone.Identifier\" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious files were downloaded with the Telegram application on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_id", "TargetFilename", "Hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "download_files_using_telegram_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/download_files_using_telegram.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Drop IcedID License dat", "id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as \"license.dat\" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\license.dat\" AND (TargetFilename=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\" OR TargetFilename=\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"name": "Drop IcedID License dat", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "drop_icedid_license_dat_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/drop_icedid_license_dat.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies \"dsquery.exe\" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of \"Dsquery.exe\" usage.\\\nWithin this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process \"dsquery.exe\" and its parent process.\\\nDSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\\\nIn addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dsquery_domain_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dsquery_domain_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817"], "tags": {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified accessing credentials using comsvcs.dll on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\\\nDuring triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-2---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-procdump"], "tags": {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified attempting to dump lsass.exe on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_procdump", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_procdump.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*group*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/do*\") (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658"], "tags": {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_net.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", "id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroupMember*\") AND Message IN (\"*Domain Admins*\",\"*Enterprise Admins*\", \"*Schema Admins*\", \"*Account Operators*\" , \"*Server Operators*\", \"*Protected Users*\", \"*Dns Admins*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroupMember/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"], "tags": {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated group discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", "id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*) (Processes.process=\"*Domain Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Enterprise Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Schema Admins*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Account Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Server Operators*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Protected Users*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Dns Admins*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658"], "tags": {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Elevated domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Terminal Server\\\\WinStations\\\\RDP-Tcp*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"PortNumber\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.mvps.net/docs/how-to-secure-remote-desktop-rdp/"], "tags": {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "RDP was moved to a non-standard port on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_rdp_in_other_port_number.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SecurityProviders\\\\WDigest\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name = \"UseLogonCredential\" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.csoonline.com/article/3438824/how-to-detect-and-halt-credential-theft-via-windows-wdigest.html"], "tags": {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/wdigest_enable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", "id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798 Process_Name = \"*\\\\telegram.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Process_Name Process_ID Account_Name Account_Domain Logon_ID Security_ID Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4798"], "tags": {"name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/minergate/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Telegram application has been identified enumerating local groups on $ComputerName$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ComputerName", "EventCode", "Process_Name", "Process_ID", "Account_Name", "Account_Domain", "Logon_ID", "Security_ID", "Message"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN (\"*ntds*\", \"*SAM*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/6a570c2a4630cf0c2bd41a2e8375b5d5ab92f700/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/"], "tags": {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to capture credentials for offline cracking or observability.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_esentutl", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "esentutl_sam_copy_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\.NETFramework*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3"], "tags": {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "etw_registry_disabled_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002", "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/"], "tags": {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry values were modified to bypass UAC using Event Viewer on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", "id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "excel_spawning_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", "id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"excel.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest", "user", "parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*config*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Disabled*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", "id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-28", "author": "Michael Hart, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\\Temp.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", "analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/windows_temp_processes/logExcessiveWindowsTemp.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Multiple processes were executed out of windows\\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_windows"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/742"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "id": "b5baa09a-7a05-11ec-8da4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen in the WhisperGate malware campaign in which adversaries abused Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privilege to then execute PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. This behavior is a good indicator the offending process is trying to corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image ProcessID Computer |where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and ProcessID executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Windows Defender AV updates may cause this alert. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/excessive_file_del_in_windefender_dir/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "deleted_files", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "user", "Image", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", "id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-25", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*start= disabled*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/sc-create", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/sc_service_start_disabled/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", "id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-07", "author": "Michael Hart", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = \"taskhost.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"taskhostex.exe\" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhost.exe\", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == \"taskhostex.exe\", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 and taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", "analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/meterpreter/taskhost_processes/logExcessiveTaskHost.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_windows"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/742"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR Processes.process_name = \"sc.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"net1.exe\" AND Processes.process=\"*stop*\" OR Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to disable services.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_service_stop_attempt.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"XCACLS.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An excessive amount of $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ attempting to modify permissions.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of net1.exe or net.exe within 1m, with command line $process$ has been detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_net_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Stanislav Miskovic, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"nslookup.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats count as numNsLookup by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgNsLookup > 20 and avgNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/dns-tunneling/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Data Exfiltration", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/nslookup_exfil/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of nslookup.exe has been detected on $Computer$. This detection is triggered as as it violates the dynamic threshold", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "process_name", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = \"sc.exe\" | bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by Computer, _time | eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by Computer | eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "process_name", "process"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"taskkill.exe\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Excessive usage of taskkill.exe with process id $process_id$ (more than 10 within 1m) has been detected on $dest$ with a parent process of $parent_process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode Share_Name Relative_Target_Name Object_Type Access_Mask user src_port Source_Address | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/03/09/psexec-demystified/", "https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Trickbot", "Hermetic Wiper"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/exe_smbshare/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$Share_Name$, Target name=$Relative_Target_Name$, and Access mask=$Access_Mask$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "analytic_story": ["Double Zero Destructor", "Data Destruction", "XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious executable or scripts with file name $file_name$, $file_path$ and process_id $process_id$ executed in suspicious file path in Windows by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", "id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" Processes.process=\"*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious process of cscript.exe with a parent process $parent_process_name$ where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ), detected on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.005"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", "version": 3, "date": "2020-11-18", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the \"real\" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = *.doc.exe OR Processes.process = *.htm.exe OR Processes.process = *.html.exe OR Processes.process = *.txt.exe OR Processes.process = *.pdf.exe OR Processes.process = *.doc.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "process $process$ have double extensions in the file name is executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process=\"*\\sam *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\system *\" OR Processes.process=\"*\\security *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md"], "tags": {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "extraction_of_registry_hives_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "File with Samsam Extension", "id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name \"(?\\.[^\\.]+)$\" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "File with Samsam Extension", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/samsam_extension/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "File writes $file_name$ with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack seen on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "file_with_samsam_extension_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/file_with_samsam_extension.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*firewall*\" Processes.process = \"*allowedprogram*\" Processes.process = \"*add*\" Processes.process = \"*ENABLE*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "firewall allowed program commandline $process$ of $process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute`\\\n1. `HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(default)`\\\nUpon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", "https://github.com/gushmazuko/WinBypass/blob/master/FodhelperBypass.ps1", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002"], "tags": {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspcious registy keys added by process fodhelper.exe (process_id- $process_id), with a parent_process of $parent_process_name$ that has been executed on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fodhelper_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-11", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process=\"*setzerodata*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/"], "tags": {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible file data deletion on $dest$ using $process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "fsutil_zeroing_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/fsutil_zeroing_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain password policy", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUser*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-filter*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-aduser*\" Message = \"*-filter*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduser?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, MAuricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-aduserresultantpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain user password policy.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", "id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/"], "tags": {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message =\"*Get-DomainPolicy*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainPolicy/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/"], "tags": {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ to query domain policy.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", "id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", "references": ["http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/"], "tags": {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.", "references": ["http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "Path", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/"], "tags": {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-DomainUser*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainUser/"], "tags": {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", "id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/"], "tags": {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-foresttrust*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES", "references": ["https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/"], "tags": {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ by user $User$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "Path", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", "id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \\ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Win32_Group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", "id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Get-WMIObject*\" AND Message = \"*Win32_Group*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", "id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-AdComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", "id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-ADGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adgroup?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", "id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*\" AND Message = \"*GetCurrent()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.principal.windowsidentity.getcurrent?view=net-5.0"], "tags": {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", "id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainComputer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainComputer/"], "tags": {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", "id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/"], "tags": {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainController*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainController/"], "tags": {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", "id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/"], "tags": {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery with PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-DomainGroup*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-DomainGroup/"], "tags": {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerView on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", "id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-LocalUser*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", "id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Get-NetTcpconnection*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/get-nettcpconnection?view=windowsserver2019-ps"], "tags": {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", "id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration using WMI on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 21, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_computer*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", "id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process=\"*class ds_group*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-25", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=*Get-WmiObject* AND Message=\"*namespace root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Message=\"*class ds_group*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Domain group discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", "id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"powershell*\") AND Processes.process = \"*get-wmiobject*\" AND Processes.process = \"*ds_user*\" AND Processes.process = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" AND Processes.process = \"*-namespace*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/dsquery.htm"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-wmiobject*\" Message = \"*ds_user*\" Message = \"*-namespace*\" Message = \"*root\\\\directory\\\\ldap*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-blue-purple/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/describing-the-ldap-namespace"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "powershell process having commandline $Message$ for user enumeration", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Get-WmiObject*\" AND Message=\"*Win32_UserAccount*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\"| join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process gpupdate.exe with parent_process $parent_process_name$ is executed on $dest$ by user $user$, followed by an outbound network connection to $connection_to_CNC$ on port $dest_port$. This behaviour is seen with cobaltstrike.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "connection_to_CNC", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventID", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\SpecialAccounts\\\\Userlist*\" AND Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/hotkey_disabled_hidden_user/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_value_name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "id": "6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. ", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Attrib.exe with +h flag to hide files on $dest$ executed by $user$ is detected.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name IN (\"*.doc\",\"*.docx\",\"*.xls\",\"*.xlsx\",\"*.ppt\",\"*.pptx\",\"*.log\",\"*.txt\",\"*.db\",\"*.7z\",\"*.zip\",\"*.rar\",\"*.tar\",\"*.gz\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.gif\",\"*.png\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.pdf\",\"*.rtf\",\"*.key\") Object_Type=File Share_Name IN (\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\C$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\admin$\") Access_Mask= \"0x2\" | bucket _time span=5m | stats values(Relative_Target_Name) as valRelativeTargetName, values(Share_Name) as valShareName, values(Object_Type) as valObjectType, values(Access_Mask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(Source_Address) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, user | eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) | eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`", "how_to_implement": "o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.", "known_false_positives": "this behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/"], "tags": {"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/high_copy_files_in_net_share/security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "high frequency copy of document in network share $Share_Name$ from $Source_Address$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1537"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Share_Name", "Relative_Target_Name", "Object_Type", "Access_Mask", "user", "src_port", "Source_Address"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency process termination (more than 15 processes within 3s) detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "proc_terminated", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Image", "Computer", "_time", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "high_process_termination_frequency_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/high_process_termination_frequency.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score. \\\nThe first jndi match identifies the standard pattern of `{jndi:` \\\njndi_fastmatch is meant to identify any jndi in the logs. The score is set low and is meant to be the \"base\" score used later. \\\njndi_proto is a protocol match that identifies `jndi` and one of `ldap, ldaps, rmi, dns, nis, iiop, corba, nds, http, https.` \\\nall_match is a very well written regex by https://gist.github.com/Schvenn that identifies nearly all patterns of this attack behavior. \\\nenv works to identify environment variables in the header, meant to capture `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and `env`. \\\nuri_detect is string match looking for the common uri paths currently being scanned/abused in the wild. \\\nkeywords matches on enumerated values that, like `$ctx:loginId`, that may be found in the header used by the adversary. \\\nlookup matching is meant to catch some basic obfuscation that has been identified using upper, lower and date. \\\nScoring will then occur based on any findings. The base score is meant to be 2 , created by jndi_fastmatch. Everything else is meant to increase that score. \\\nFinally, a simple table is created to show the scoring and the _raw field. Sort based on score or columns of interest.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, \"(\\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:\"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}\"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,\"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):\"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\\$)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\\w\\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\\/)[^\\n]+\"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, \"env:\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\") OR match(_raw, \"env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)Basic\\/Command\\/Base64|Basic\\/ReverseShell|Basic\\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\\/JBossMemshell|Basic\\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\\/SpringMemshell|Basic\\/Command|Deserialization\\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\\/Jre8u20\\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\\/CVE_2020_2555\\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass\"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,\"(?i)\\$\\{ctx\\:loginId\\}|\\$\\{map\\:type\\}|\\$\\{filename\\}|\\$\\{date\\:MM-dd-yyyy\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{env\\:USER\\}|\\$\\{event\\:Marker\\}|\\$\\{mdc\\:UserId\\}|\\$\\{java\\:runtime\\}|\\$\\{java\\:vm\\}|\\$\\{java\\:os\\}|\\$\\{jndi\\:logging/context-name\\}|\\$\\{hostName\\}|\\$\\{docker\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:accountName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:clusterName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:containerName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:host\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.app\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:labels.podTemplateHash\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:masterUrl\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:namespaceName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podIp\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:podName\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageId\\}|\\$\\{k8s\\:imageName\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configLocation\\}|\\$\\{log4j\\:configParentLocation\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:spring.application.name\\}|\\$\\{main\\:myString\\}|\\$\\{main\\:0\\}|\\$\\{main\\:1\\}|\\$\\{main\\:2\\}|\\$\\{main\\:3\\}|\\$\\{main\\:4\\}|\\$\\{main\\:bar\\}|\\$\\{name\\}|\\$\\{marker\\}|\\$\\{marker\\:name\\}|\\$\\{spring\\:profiles.active[0]|\\$\\{sys\\:logPath\\}|\\$\\{web\\:rootDir\\}|\\$\\{sys\\:user.name\\}\"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, \"(\\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)\"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, \"(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)\"),4,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Out of the box, the Web datamodel is required to be pre-filled. However, tested was performed against raw httpd access logs. Change the first line to any dataset to pass the regex's against.", "known_false_positives": "It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72", "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b#gistcomment-3994449", "https://regex101.com/r/OSrm0q/1/", "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/expl_log4j_cve_2021_44228.yar", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/12/12/log4shell-hell-anatomy-of-an-exploit-outbreak/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/1899b8554f38c8692a9fb0ceba60b44c", "https://twitter.com/sasi2103/status/1469764719850442760?s=20"], "tags": {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/log4shell-nginx.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Hunting for Log4Shell exploitation has occurred.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "http_method", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "src", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.http_user_agent", "_raw"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "hunting_for_log4shell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/deny*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with deny argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "icacls_deny_command_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_deny_command.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*/grant*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with grant argument executed by $user$ to change security permission of a specific file or directory on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "icacls_grant_command_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icacls_grant_command.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", "id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode= 11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\passff.tar\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\cookie.tar\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "process_id", "process_name", "Computer"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-18", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*/c* \\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\*\" OR Processes.process= \"*/c* 2>&1\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005", "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket", "https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/impacket/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious command line parameters on $dest may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", "id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Enter-PSSession*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enter-pssession?view=powershell-7.2"], "tags": {"name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_pssession/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An interactive session was opened on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", "id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).", "search": "| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent=\"*Java*\" Web.http_method=\"GET\" Web.url=\"*.class*\" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting web or proxy logs, or ensure it is being filled by a proxy like device, into the Web Datamodel. For additional filtering, allow list private IP space or restrict by known good.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/12/as-log4shell-wreaks-havoc-payroll-service-reports-ransomware-attack/"], "tags": {"name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/java/java.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Java user agent $http_user_agent$ was performing a $http_method$ to retrieve a remote class file.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "http_user_agent", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "http_method", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.http_user_agent"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:jscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"cscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:jscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute jscript in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", "version": 4, "date": "2022-02-09", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1208/T1208.md", "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/post/trimarcresearch-detecting-kerberoasting-activity"], "tags": {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "service", "service_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", "id": "0cb847ee-9423-11ec-b2df-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes=\"*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*\" | table EventCode, Account_Name, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `User Account Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"], "tags": {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled for $Account_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Account_Name", "Security_ID", "MSADChangedAttributes"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", "id": "59b51620-94c9-11ec-b3d5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.", "search": " `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Set-ADAccountControl*\" AND Message=\"*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/useraccountcontrol-manipulate-account-properties", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"], "tags": {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.004/powershell/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 Message IN (\"*Volume Shadow Copy*\",\"*VSS*\", \"*backup*\", \"*sophos*\", \"*sql*\", \"*memtas*\", \"*mepocs*\", \"*veeam*\", \"*svc$*\") Message=\"*service entered the stopped state*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message dest Type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf3/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Known services $Message$ terminated by a potential ransomware on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Message", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest", "Type"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "id": "023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file if to consider it legitimate file.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/detecting-cronrat-malware-on-linux-instantly/", "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-do-i-add-jobs-to-cron-under-linux-or-unix-oses/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Add User Account", "id": "51fbcaf2-6259-11ec-b0f3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"useradd\", \"adduser\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*useradd *\", \"*adduser *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://linuxize.com/post/how-to-create-users-in-linux-using-the-useradd-command/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Add User Account", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_adduser/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create user account on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_add_user_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_add_user_account.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "id": "977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow user to execute \"at\" application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute \"at\" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "id": "bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it will execute.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"at\", \"atd\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/", "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "At application was executed in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_at_application_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "id": "c1400ea2-6257-11ec-ad49-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = \"*chown *\") AND Processes.process = \"* root *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/101073/how-to-change-permissions-from-root-user-to-all-users", "https://askubuntu.com/questions/617850/changing-from-user-to-superuser"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may change ownership to root on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_change_file_owner_to_root.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "id": "66ab15c0-63d0-11ec-9e70-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. Tis common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"chmod\", \"chown\", \"fchmod\", \"fchmodat\", \"fchown\", \"fchownat\", \"fremovexattr\", \"fsetxattr\", \"lchown\", \"lremovexattr\", \"lsetxattr\", \"removexattr\", \"setuid\", \"setgid\", \"setreuid\", \"setregid\", \"chattr\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*chmod *\", \"*chown *\", \"*fchmod *\", \"*fchmodat *\", \"*fchown *\", \"*fchownat *\", \"*fremovexattr *\", \"*fsetxattr *\", \"*lchown *\", \"*lremovexattr *\", \"*lsetxattr *\", \"*removexattr *\", \"*setuid *\", \"*setgid *\", \"*setreuid *\", \"*setregid *\", \"*setcap *\", \"*chattr *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/", "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules#L285-L297", "https://github.com/bfuzzy1/auditd-attack/blob/master/auditd-attack/auditd-attack.rules#L269-L270", "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/privilege_escalation/T1548.001_ElevationControl_CommonProcesses.xml"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ with process $process_name$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", "id": "9b6aae5e-8d85-11ec-b2ae-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"dd\" AND Processes.process = \"*of=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/dd/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1485/T1485.md"], "tags": {"name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/linux_dd_file_overwrite/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_dd_file_overwrite.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", "id": "f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/doas.conf\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", "id": "d5a62490-6e09-11ec-884e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"doas\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas", "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/doas_exec/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A doas $process_name$ with commandline $process$ was executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_doas_tool_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "id": "0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter. This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation purposes so filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = \"*crontab *\" Processes.process = \"* -e*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "id": "b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/kernel/drivers/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485"], "tags": {"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", "id": "97d9cfb2-61ad-11ec-bb2d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.d/*\", \"*/sbin/init.d/*\", \"*/etc/rc.local*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", "id": "46ba0082-61af-11ec-9826-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/profile.d/*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "id": "18b5a1a0-6326-11ec-943a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "id": "387b278a-6326-11ec-aa2c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"kmod\", \"sudo\") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/", "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup", "https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may install kernel module on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. Ensure EDR product is mapping OS Linux to the datamodel properly. Add any additional java process names for your environment to the analytic as needed.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.", "references": ["https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "linux_shells", "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_java_spawning_shell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", "id": "ab1e0d52-624a-11ec-8e0b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*NOPASSWD:*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands", "https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Sudoers"], "tags": {"name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/nopasswd_sudoers/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", "id": "03e22c1c-8086-11ec-ac2e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(^.{1}$)\" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Depending on the EDR product in use, there are multiple ways to \"null\" the command-line field, Processes.process. Two that may be useful `process=\"(^.{0}$)\"` or `| where isnull(process)`. To generate data for this behavior, Sysmon for Linux was utilized. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/sdfeig/20220126_cool_query_friday_hunting_pwnkit_local/", "https://linux.die.net/man/1/pkexec", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/linux-system-service-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/", "https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/?q=polkit&p=1&sort=portal_publication_date%20desc&rows=10&portal_advisory_type=Security%20Advisory&documentKind=PortalProduct"], "tags": {"name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/linux-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to a local privilege escalation in polkit pkexec.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-4034"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-4034", "cvss": 7.2, "summary": "A local privilege escalation vulnerability was found on polkit's pkexec utility. The pkexec application is a setuid tool designed to allow unprivileged users to run commands as privileged users according predefined policies. The current version of pkexec doesn't handle the calling parameters count correctly and ends trying to execute environment variables as commands. An attacker can leverage this by crafting environment variables in such a way it'll induce pkexec to execute arbitrary code. When successfully executed the attack can cause a local privilege escalation given unprivileged users administrative rights on the target machine."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "id": "7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-11", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/ssh/sshd_config\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", "id": "16107e0e-71fc-11ec-b862-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. \"etc/passwd\" store user information within linux OS while \"etc/shadow\" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/shadow*\", \"*/etc/passwd*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://askubuntu.com/questions/445361/what-is-difference-between-etc-shadow-and-etc-passwd", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", "id": "4479539c-71fc-11ec-b2e2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. \"/etc/sudoers\" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands. adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN(\"cat\", \"nano*\",\"vim*\", \"vi*\") AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/sudoers*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708035426/https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual43.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.008/copy_file_stdoutpipe/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "id": "7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/at.allow\", \"*/etc/at.deny\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.001", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", "id": "9c94732a-61af-11ec-91e3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*~/.bashrc\", \"*~/.bash_profile\", \"*/etc/profile\", \"~/.bash_login\", \"*~/.profile\", \"~/.bash_logout\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/129143/what-is-the-purpose-of-bashrc-and-how-does-it-work", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.004/linux_init_profile/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a commandline $process$ that may modify profile files in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "id": "b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*echo*\" AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/", "https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "id": "dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN(\"nano\",\"vim.basic\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*nano *\", \"*vi *\", \"*vim *\")) AND Processes.process IN(\"*/etc/cron*\", \"*/var/spool/cron/*\", \"*/etc/anacrontab*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 6, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "id": "c04ef40c-72da-11ec-8eac-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-11", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/.ssh*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/ssh_authorized_keys/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", "id": "cbe2ca30-631e-11ec-8670-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*LD_PRELOAD*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://compilepeace.medium.com/memory-malware-part-0x2-writing-userland-rootkits-via-ld-preload-30121c8343d5"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/lib_hijack/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may hijack library function on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "id": "c7495048-61b6-11ec-9a37-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in linux platform. systemd is a system and service manager for Linux distributions. From the Windows perspective, this process fulfills the duties of wininit.exe and services.exe combined. At the risk of simplifying the functionality of systemd, it initializes a Linux system and starts relevant services that are defined in service unit files. Adversaries, malware and red teamers may abuse this this feature by stashing systemd service file to persist on the targetted or compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*/etc/systemd/system*\", \"*/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/system*\", \"*/run/systemd/system*\", \"*~/.config/systemd/*\", \"*~/.local/share/systemd/*\",\"*/etc/systemd/user*\", \"*/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/usr/lib/systemd/user*\", \"*/run/systemd/user*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can create file in systemd folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006/", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/", "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/main/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A service file named as $file_path$ is created in systemd folder on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "id": "084275ba-61b8-11ec-8d64-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"*restart*\", \"*reload*\", \"*reenable*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and commandline executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_service_restarted_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_restarted.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "id": "e0428212-61b7-11ec-88a3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This technique can be executed or performed using systemctl or service tool application. Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Administrator may also create a legitimated service for a specific tool or normal application as part of task or automation, in this scenario it is suggested to look for the service path of the actual script or executable that register as service and who created the service for further verification.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN (\"systemctl\", \"service\") OR Processes.process IN (\"*systemctl *\", \"*service *\")) Processes.process IN (\"* start *\", \"* enable *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.006/service_systemd/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a commandline $process$ that may create or start a service on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_service_started_or_enabled.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "id": "bf0304b6-6250-11ec-9d7c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = \"*chmod *\") AND Processes.process IN(\"* g+s *\", \"* u+s *\", \"* 4777 *\", \"* 4577 *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/chmod_uid/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", "id": "9d96022e-6250-11ec-9a19-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = \"*setcap *\") AND Processes.process IN (\"* cap_setuid=ep *\", \"* cap_setuid+ep *\", \"* cap_net_bind_service+p *\", \"* cap_net_raw+ep *\", \"* cap_dac_read_search+ep *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.001/linux_setcap/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that may set suid or sgid on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", "id": "4b00f134-6d6a-11ec-a90c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The \"sudo\" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"sudo\", \"su\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudo_su/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ that execute sudo or su in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudo_or_su_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", "id": "be254a5c-63e7-11ec-89da-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*sudoers.tmp*\") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://forum.ubuntuusers.de/topic/sudo-visudo-gibt-etc-sudoers-tmp/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/sudoers_temp/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "id": "535cb214-8b47-11ec-a2c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-11", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"arp\", \"ifconfig\", \"ip\", \"netstat\", \"firewall-cmd\", \"ufw\", \"iptables\", \"ss\", \"route\") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1016/T1016.md"], "tags": {"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Network Discovery"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_system_network_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", "id": "08c41040-624c-11ec-a71f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://askubuntu.com/questions/334318/sudoers-file-enable-nopasswd-for-user-all-commands"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", "analytic_story": ["Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/visudo/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 16, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/linux_visudo_utility_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\dynwrapx.dll\" OR OriginalFileName = \"dynwrapx.dll\" OR Product = \"DynamicWrapperX\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_dynwrapx/sysmon_dynwraper.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1055.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "OriginalFileName", "Product", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/loading_of_dynwrapx_module.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "local_account_discovery_with_net_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_net.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", "id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/local_account_discovery_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", "id": "9be30d80-3a39-4df9-9102-64a467b24eac", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Correlation", "datamodel": ["Risk"], "description": "This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically 1. Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` 2. Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class 3. Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command and Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\" All_Risk.risk_object_type=\"system\" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic source | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | stats values(risk_object) as affected_systems values(source) as detection_name values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as tactics values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime dc(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as distinct_tactics | where distinct_tactics >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To implement this correlation search a user needs to enable all detections in the Log4Shell Analytic Story and confirm it is generation risk events. A simple search `index=risk analyticstories=\"Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228\"` should contain events.", "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation.", "references": ["https://research.splunk.com/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/simulating-detecting-and-responding-to-log4shell-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/suspicious_behaviour/log4shell_exploitation/log4shell_correlation.txt"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "Log4Shell Exploitation detected against $affected_systems$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "affected_systems", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Risk.analyticstories", "All_Risk.risk_object_type", "All_Risk.risk_object", "All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic", "source"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN (\"*\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001"], "tags": {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MacOS LOLbin", "id": "58d270fb-5b39-418e-a855-4b8ac046805e", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-04", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries in a short period of time.", "search": "`osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN (\"find*\", \"crontab*\", \"screencapture*\", \"openssl*\", \"curl*\", \"wget*\", \"killall*\", \"funzip*\") | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/"], "tags": {"name": "MacOS LOLbin", "analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/macos_lolbin/osquery.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Multiplle LOLbin are executed on host $host$ by user $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.004", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline", "columns.pid", "columns.parent", "columns.path", "columns.signing_id", "columns.username", "host"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "osquery", "definition": "sourcetype=osquery:results", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "macos_lolbin_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/macos_lolbin.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", "id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*\", \"*Invoke-SelfSearch*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*\", \"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*\",\"*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*\", \"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*\",\"*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*\",\"*Invoke-InjectGEvent*\",\"*Invoke-SearchGmail*\", \"*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*\", \"*Invoke-AddGmailRule*\",\"*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*\",\"*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/introducing-mailsniper-a-tool-for-searching-every-users-email-for-sensitive-data/"], "tags": {"name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", "analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "mailsniper.ps1 functions $Message$ executed on a $ComputerName$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID or HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID). Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID. The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\CLSID\\\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\\\InProcServer32\\\\(Default)\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.", "references": ["https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "registry_path", "registry_key_name", "registry_value_name", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "id": "8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-07", "author": "Ryan Becwar", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_Service_File_Name=lower(Service_File_Name) | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"powershell[.\\s]|powershell_ise[.\\s]|pwsh[.\\s]|psexec[.\\s]\" | regex l_Service_File_Name=\"-nop[rofile\\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\\s]+\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_Account user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf", "http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/", "https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier"], "tags": {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "analytic_story": ["Malicious Powershell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $Service_File_Name$ by $user$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type", "Service_Account", "user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", "version": 7, "date": "2022-01-18", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \\\nThe analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based on admin scripts in use. \\\nAlternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/662ov", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"* -ex*\" OR Processes.process=\"* bypass *\") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", "version": 5, "date": "2021-01-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,\"`\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"^\"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, \"'\"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/obfuscated_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "id": "13bbd574-83ac-11ec-99d4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*sekurlsa::tickets /export*\" OR Processes.process = \"*kerberos::ptt*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz.", "references": ["https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/mimikatz/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Mimikatz command line parameters for pass the ticket attacks were used on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-23", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mmc_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =13 (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Image != \"*\\\\explorer.exe\") OR (TargetObject= \"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\Wallpaper\" AND Details = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wallpaper modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Image", "TargetObject", "Details", "Computer", "process_guid", "process_id", "user_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "modification_of_wallpaper_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modification_of_wallpaper.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", "id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = \"cacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"icacls.exe\" OR Processes.process_name = \"xcacls.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*/G*\" AND (Processes.process = \"* everyone:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* SYSTEM:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* S-1-1-0:*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious ACL permission modification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 32, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", "version": 3, "date": "2020-01-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path=\"*CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.", "known_false_positives": "You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "New print monitor added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.action", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", "id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\Wldap32.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldp.dll\", \"*\\\\adsldpc.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", "analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ loading ldap modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "EventCode", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "Computer", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", "id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN (\"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemdisp.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemsvc.dll\" , \"*\\\\wmiutils.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", "analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_js_2/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ loading wmi modules $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "EventCode", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "Computer", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", "id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#"], "tags": {"name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", "analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/regsvr32_silent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe process spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ executed by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127.001", "T1127"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_msbuild", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"mshta.exe\" `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a mshta parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\mshtml.dll\", \"*\\\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll\",\"*\\\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDac.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDed.dll\",\"*\\\\MshtmlDer.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/index-dll"], "tags": {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_mshtml.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ loading mshtml.dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "OriginalFileName", "process_id", "dest"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-40444", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "id": "ccb98a66-5851-11ec-b91c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts \\\n1. Generation of an MSI that will trigger bad behavior. \\\n1. Preparing a directory for MSI installation. \\\n1. Inducing an error state. \\\n1. Racing to introduce a junction and a symlink to trick msiexec.exe to modify the attacker specified file. \\\nIn addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being loaded by non-system binaries.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\msi.dll\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\*\",\"*\\\\syswow64\\\\*\",\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\winsxs\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/7LstI2clmF/cve-2021-41379/rapid7-analysis", "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/msi.dll%20Hijack%20(Methodology).ioc"], "tags": {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-41379"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-41379", "cvss": 4.6, "summary": "Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = \"msmpeng.exe\" OR Filesystem.file_name = \"mpsvc.dll\") AND Filesystem.file_path != \"*\\\\Program Files\\\\windows defender\\\\*\" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "quite minimal false positive expected.", "references": ["https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers"], "tags": {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC0000064 action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776"], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "action", "Logon_Account", "Source_Workstation"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771"], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!=\"*$\" 0xC000006A action=failure | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776"], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential NTLM based password spraying attack from $Source_Workstation$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "action", "Logon_Account", "Source_Workstation"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", "id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Caller_Process_Name", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", "id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!=\"-\" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName", "Source_Network_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process=\"*localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "net_localgroup_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_localgroup_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", "id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\COR_PROFILER_PATH\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.dll\" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.", "references": ["https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"], "tags": {"name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/net_profiler_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"arp.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_arp.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_net.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"netstat.exe\") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/"], "tags": {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1049/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_connection_discovery_netstat.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Network Connection discovery on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1016", "T1016.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_route", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", "id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.", "references": ["https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", "analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine behavior on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nishang_powershelltcponeline.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.process_name!=nltest.exe) (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", "https://malware.news/t/lets-learn-trickbot-implements-network-collector-module-leveraging-cmd-wmi-ldap/19104", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://www.owasp.org/images/4/4b/Red_Team_Operating_in_a_Modern_Environment.pdf", "https://ss64.com/nt/nltest.html", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/domain-trust-discovery/", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/"], "tags": {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Domain trust discovery execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/nltest_domain_trust_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security2.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-15", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (process_name IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\", \"*sql*\")) Object_Name=\"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Mozilla\\\\Firefox\\\\Profiles*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Object_Name Object_Type process_name Access_Mask Accesses process_id EventCode dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_sacl/security.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "a non firefox browser process $process_name$ accessing $Object_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Object_Name", "Object_Type", "process_name", "Access_Mask", "Accesses", "process_id", "EventCode", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \\\nntdsutil \"ac i ntds\" \"ifm\" \"create full C:\\Temp\" q q \\\nThis technique uses \"Install from Media\" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md#atomic-test-3---dump-active-directory-database-with-ntdsutil", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753343(v=ws.11)", "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vss_ps.dll-97B15BDAE9777F454C9A6BA25E938DB3.html"], "tags": {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Active Directory NTDS export on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 50, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.exe\",\"*.dll\",\"*.pif\",\"*.scr\",\"*.js\",\"*.vbs\",\"*.vbe\",\"*.ps1\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "office macro for automation may do this behavior", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/"], "tags": {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "ProcessGuid", "dest", "user_id"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_application_drop_executable_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-30", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"outlook.exe\") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/phish_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning regsvr32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/trickbot", "https://any.run/report/47561b4e949041eff0a0f4693c59c81726591779fe21183ae9185b5eb6a69847/aba3722a-b373-4dae-8273-8730fb40cdbe"], "tags": {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office application spawning rundll32.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", "id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded = \"*\\\\taskschd.dll\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/"], "tags": {"name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document creating a schedule task on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_creating_schedule_task.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN (\"WINWORD.EXE\", \"EXCEL.EXE\", \"POWERPNT.EXE\") ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\VBE7INTL.DLL\",\"*\\\\VBE7.DLL\", \"*\\\\VBEUI.DLL\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config.", "known_false_positives": "Normal Office Document macro use for automation", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/386500/0/html"], "tags": {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document executing a macro on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["ImageLoaded", "AllImageLoaded", "Computer", "EventCode", "Image", "process_name", "ProcessId", "ProcessGuid", "_time"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "office_document_executing_macro_code_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_executing_macro_code.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") Processes.process IN (\"*http:*\",\"*https:*\") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN(\"firefox.exe\", \"chrome.exe\",\"iexplore.exe\",\"msedge.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Default browser not in the filter list.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/#"], "tags": {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/datasets2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Office document spawning suspicious child process on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"winword.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name= \"excel.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powerpnt.exe\") `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1416050325870587910?s=21"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/spear_phish/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "an office product parent process $parent_process_name$ spawn child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_bitsadmin", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_certutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_spawning_certutil_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_certutil.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/TA551/"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_mshta", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_spawning_mshta_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_mshta.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/395471/0/html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cef4b8ba-023c-4b3b-b2ef-6486a44f6ed9/", "https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_icedid.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and no dll commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives known. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/fb894ab8-a966-4b72-920b-935f41756afd/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.md"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_macros.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "office parent process $parent_process_name$ will execute a suspicious child process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_spawning_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawning_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.inf\",\"*.cab\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1436326057179860992?s=20", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20"], "tags": {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_cabinf.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on $dest$ writing an inf or cab file to this. This is not typical of $process_name$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-40444", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_product_writing_cab_or_inf.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"winword.exe\",\"excel.exe\",\"powerpnt.exe\",\"mspub.exe\",\"visio.exe\",\"wordpad.exe\",\"wordview.exe\") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/control.exe-1F13E714A0FEA8887707DFF49287996F.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml"], "tags": {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_control.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ clicking a suspicious attachment.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "office_spawning_control_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-40444", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", "id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"java.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where (Ports.dest_port= 389 OR Ports.dest_port= 636 OR Ports.dest_port = 1389 OR Ports.dest_port = 1099 ) by Ports.process_guid Ports.dest Ports.dest_port| `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port | `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/"], "tags": {"name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_java/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Java performed outbound connections to default ports of LDAP or RMI on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_guid", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", "id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") AND Processes.process = \"*accounts*\" AND Processes.process = \"*/domain*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet"], "tags": {"name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1201/pwd_policy_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "an instance of process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/password_policy_discovery_with_net.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"takeown.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/f*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.", "references": ["https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/"], "tags": {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious of execution of $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ and commandline $process$ to modify permission of directory or files in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/permission_modification_using_takeown_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", "id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access\". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \\\nTo enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \\\nIt is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` Account_Name=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" EventCode=5145 Relative_Target_Name=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Security_ID, Share_Name, Source_Address, Accesses, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments.", "known_false_positives": "False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=5145", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5145"], "tags": {"name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", "analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A remote host is enumerating a $dest$ to identify permissions. This is a precursor event to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1187"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Security_ID", "Share_Name", "Source_Address", "Accesses", "Message"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1187", "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkHydrus", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-36942", "cvss": 5.0, "summary": "Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Client_Address!=\"::1\" Certificate_Thumbprint!=\"\" Account_Name=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Account_Name, Client_Address, action, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.", "references": ["https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768", "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/"], "tags": {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1187/petitpotam/windows-security.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Account_Name", "Client_Address", "action", "Message"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-36942", "cvss": 5.0, "summary": "Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "id": "ce058d6c-79f2-11ec-b476-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = \"*ping*\" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.parent_process=\"*>*\") OR (Processes.process = \"*ping*\" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process=\"* Nul*\"Processes.process=\"*>*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious $process$ commandline run in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_ping", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "ping_sleep_batch_command_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", "id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the \"/stext\" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN (\"*/stext *\", \"*/shtml *\", \"*/LoadPasswordsIE*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsChrome*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsOpera*\", \"*/LoadPasswordsSafari*\" , \"*/UseOperaPasswordFile*\", \"*/OperaPasswordFile*\",\"*/stab*\", \"*/scomma*\", \"*/stabular*\", \"*/shtml*\", \"*/sverhtml*\", \"*/sxml*\", \"*/skeepass*\" ) AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed", "references": ["https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/web_browser_password.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/"], "tags": {"name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555/web_browser_pass_view/sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ contains commandline $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1555.003", "T1555"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 16, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as a child or grand child process of commonly abused processes during lateral movement techniques including `services.exe`, `wmiprsve.exe`, `svchost.exe`, `wsmprovhost.exe` and `mmc.exe`. Legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management and the DCOM protocol can be abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. Looking for PowerShell spawned out of this processes may reveal a lateral movement attack. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse these services during a breach for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", "id": "9c53c446-757e-11ec-871d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-14", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines. The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication. For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as \"streamreader\" and \"webclient\", threading capabilties such as \"mutex\" locks, programmatic constructs like \"function\" and \"catch\", and cryptographic operations like \"computehash\". Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline. The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=\"Endpoint.Processes\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. You will also need to install the Machine Learning Toolkit version 5.3 or above to apply the pretrained model.", "known_false_positives": "This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity. These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 20, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/malicious_cmd_line_samples/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Unusual command-line execution with hallmarks of malicious activity run by $user$ found on $dest$ with commandline $process$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier"}, {"name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(Message,\"(?i)(\\$doit)\"), \"4\", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(Message,\"[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\\/]{2}==)\") OR match(Message, \"(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(Message, \"(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\\S+|invoke-\\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand\"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"frombase64\"), \"4\", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(Message),\"system.net.webclient\") AND match(lower(Message), \"frombase64string\") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(Message),\"mimikatz\") OR match(lower(Message), \"-dumpcr\") OR match(lower(Message), \"SEKURLSA::Pth\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::ptt\") OR match(lower(Message), \"kerberos::golden\") ,5,0) | eval iex = if(match(lower(Message),\"iex\"), \"2\", 0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(Message),\"http\") OR match(lower(Message),\"web(client|request)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"socket\") OR match(lower(Message),\"download(file|string)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"bitstransfer\") OR match(lower(Message),\"internetexplorer.application\") OR match(lower(Message),\"xmlhttp\"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(Message),\"get-\"), \"1\", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(Message),\"rundll32\"), \"4\", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(Message, \"(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\\.Security\\.Cryptography|lsass\\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)\"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(Message),\"syswow64\"), \"3\", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(Message),\"http://127.0.0.1\"), \"4\", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(Message),\"reflection\"), \"1\", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(Message), \"(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)\"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(Message, \"(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\\s+2)\") OR match(lower(Message),\"powershell -version\"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(Message, \"(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive\"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(Message),\"invoke-command\"), \"4\", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. May filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/inodee/threathunting-spl/blob/master/hunt-queries/powershell_qualifiers.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell", "https://github.com/marcurdy/dfir-toolset/blob/master/Powershell%20Blueteam.txt", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging?view=powershell-5.1", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html", "https://hurricanelabs.com/splunk-tutorials/how-to-use-powershell-transcription-logs-in-splunk/"], "tags": {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_4104_hunting_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "version": 8, "date": "2022-01-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|–|—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.", "references": ["https://regexr.com/663rr", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1", "https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html", "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20", "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"], "tags": {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/hidden_powershell/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", "id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Threading.Mutex*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.", "references": ["https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Some+Powershell+Malicious+Code/22988/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains Thread Mutex in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "TEMP.Veles", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_creating_thread_mutex.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=\"*set-mppreference*\" AND Processes.process IN (\"*disablerealtimemonitoring*\",\"*disableioavprotection*\",\"*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*\",\"*disablescriptscanning*\",\"*disableblockatfirstseen*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-15---tamper-with-windows-defender-atp-powershell"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "ComputerName", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_domain_enumeration_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through \"powershell.exe\". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*\" Message = \"*SMB1Protocol*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "TEMP.Veles", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*\" OR Message = \"*CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID*\"| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network operrator may use this command.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 5, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_execute_com_object_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \\\nIn use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \\\nCommand example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*frombase64string* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", "id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process=\"*get-localgroup*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", "id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*get-localgroup*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Tune as needed.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/powershell-detections-threat-research-release-august-2021.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*\",\"*[reflection.assembly]*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*IO.Compression.*\" OR Message = \"*IO.StreamReader*\" OR Message = \"*]::Decompress*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to process compressed data.", "references": ["https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User", "Score"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", "id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode = 8 process_name IN (\"powershell_ise.exe\", \"powershell.exe\") TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\svchost.exe\",\"*\\\\csrss.exe\" \"*\\\\gpupdate.exe\", \"*\\\\explorer.exe\",\"*\\\\services.exe\",\"*\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"*\\\\smss.exe\",\"*\\\\wininit.exe\",\"*\\\\userinit.exe\",\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\",\"*\\\\taskhost.exe\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell process $process_name$ that tries to create a remote thread on target process $TargetImage$ with eventcode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "process_name", "SourceProcessId", "SourceProcessGuid", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "NewThreadId", "StartAddress", "Computer", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", "id": "adf47620-79fa-11ec-b248-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*rmdir *\" AND Message = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", "analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/rmdir_defender_pwsh/powershell.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious powershell script $Message$ was executed on the $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", "id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell \"version\" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.", "references": ["https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs"], "tags": {"name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", "analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_start_bitstransfer.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message = \"*New-Object IO.MemoryStream*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*Add-MpPreference *\" OR Message = \"*Set-MpPreference *\") AND Message = \"*-exclusion*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_powershell/powershell.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion command $Message$ executed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"bcdedit.exe\" Processes.process = \"*bootstatuspolicy*\" Processes.process = \"*ignoreallfailures*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.", "references": ["https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2020/pdf/JSAC2020_1_tamada-yamazaki-nakatsuru_en.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with process id $process_id$ contains commandline $process$ to ignore all bcdedit execution failure in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", "id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - \"Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required.\" \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began.", "search": "`printservice` EventCode=316 category = \"Adding a printer driver\" Message = \"*kernelbase.dll,*\" Message = \"*UNIDRV.DLL,*\" Message = \"*.DLL.*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. This may require filtering.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421445608476679?s=20", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-printservice_operational.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious print driver was loaded on endpoint $ComputerName$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OpCode", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Message"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "printservice", "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}, {"id": "CVE-2021-1675", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", "id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \\\nWithin the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - \"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information.\" \\\nThe analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \\\nDuring triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "`printservice` ((ErrorCode=\"0x45A\" (EventCode=\"808\" OR EventCode=\"4909\")) OR (\"The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module\" OR \"\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious printer spooler errors have occured on endpoint $ComputerName$ with EventCode $EventCode$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "OpCode", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Message"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "printservice", "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}, {"id": "CVE-2021-1675", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", "version": 5, "date": "2021-08-26", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\\User*` or `*\\Local\\Temp\\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"*.lnk\" AND (Filesystem.file_path=\"C:\\\\User\\\\*\" OR Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/e/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware.html"], "tags": {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.002/lnk_file_temp_folder/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that launching .lnk file in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = \"* /c *\" CommandLine = \"* del*\" Image = \"*\\\\cmd.exe\" | eval result = if(like(process,\"%\".parent_process.\"%\"), \"Found\", \"Not Found\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = \"Found\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $Image$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $cmdline$ as part of defense evasion in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Computer", "user", "ParentImage", "ParentCommandLine", "Image", "cmdline", "ProcessID", "result", "_time"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_deleting_its_process_file_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Process Execution via WMI", "id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", "version": 4, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Process Execution via WMI", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A remote instance execution of wmic.exe that will spawn $parent_process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_execution_via_wmi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_execution_via_wmi.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", "id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-05-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*executablepath*\" AND Processes.process=\"*delete*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ attempt to kill process by its file path using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", "id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=\"dynwrapx.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).", "references": ["https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", "https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html", "https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ downloading the DynamicWrapperX dll.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1559.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "process_name", "process_guid", "file_name", "file_path", "file_create_time user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", "version": 4, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Josef Kuepker, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that tries to execute netsh commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_netsh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "processes_launching_netsh_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN (\"*\\.txt\",\"*\\.html\",\"*\\.hta\") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A high frequency file creation of $file_name$ in different file path in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "file_name", "_time", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "Image", "user"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*SELECT*\" OR Message = \"*WMIC*\") AND (Message = \"*AntiVirusProduct*\" OR Message = \"*AntiSpywareProduct*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-10", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message= \"*SELECT*\" OR Message= \"*Get-WmiObject*\") AND (Message= \"*Win32_Bios*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_OperatingSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_Processor*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystem*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ComputerSystemProduct*\" OR Message= \"*Win32_ShadowCopy*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "recon_using_wmi_class_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c* Processes.process=* rd * Processes.process=\"*/s*\" Processes.process=\"*/q*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/c0f98850-af65-4352-9746-fbebadee4f05/"], "tags": {"name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", "version": 5, "date": "2020-11-26", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A reg.exe process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", "version": 4, "date": "2020-01-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\InstalledSDB* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to shim modication in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "version": 7, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Jose Hernandez, David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentVersion\\\\Windows\\\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Winlogon\\\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\policies\\\\explorer\\\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\\\currentversion\\\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh\\\\* OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\OSConfig\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Security Packages\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\SilentProcessExit\\\\*\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*currentVersion\\\\Windows\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Load\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentVersion\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"Svchost\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\"AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"BootExecute\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Software\\\\Run\" AND Registry.registry_key_name=\"auto_update\")) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/t1547001-runonce.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to persistence in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", "version": 5, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under \"Image File Execution Options\" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options*\") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/"], "tags": {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.012/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process=\"*/i*\" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/#", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"], "tags": {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos", "Hermetic Wiper", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \\ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/][Ss]{1}\") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/56680cba-2bbc-4b34-8633-5f7878ddf858/", "https://regexr.com/699e2"], "tags": {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Remcos", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent parameter.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects registry key license at host where Remcos RAT agent is installed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\\\Software\\\\Remcos*) by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/"], "tags": {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_registry/sysmon.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_panel_client/remcos_registry_entry.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry keyname $registry_key_name$ related to Remcos RAT in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.process_id", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_client_registry_install_entry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", "id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.dat\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\remcos\\\\*\" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "file $file_name$ created in $file_path$ of $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path"], "risk_score": 100, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", "id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing DCOM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Document.Application.ShellExecute*\" OR Message=\"*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.003/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", "id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-ComputerName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-16", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-Command*\" AND Message=\"*-ComputerName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_psh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WinRM using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", "id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process=\"*-r:*\" OR Processes.process=\"*-remote:*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", "version": 7, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=\"*/node:*\" AND Processes.process=\"*process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*call*\" AND Processes.process=\"*create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/create-method-in-class-win32-process"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain process spawn commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", "id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-CN*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-Name create*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $dest by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", "id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message=\"*Invoke-WmiMethod*\" AND Message=\"*-CN*\" AND Message=\"*-Class Win32_Process*\" AND Message=\"*-Name create*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup instructions can be found https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/invoke-wmimethod?view=powershell-5.1"], "tags": {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process was started on a remote endpoint from $ComputerName by abusing WMI using PowerShell.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", "id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*[adsisearcher]*\" AND Message = \"*objectclass=computer*\" AND Message = \"*findAll()*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/use-the-powershell-adsisearcher-type-accelerator-to-search-active-directory/"], "tags": {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", "id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dsquery.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*computer*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-30", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*domain computers*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process=\"*view*\" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"], "tags": {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_net.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", "id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"wmic.exe\") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\\\\\root\\\\directory\\\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process=\"*GET ds_samaccountname*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic"], "tags": {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Remote system discovery enumeration on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", "version": 4, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1047/T1047.yaml"], "tags": {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process$ contain node commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_id"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/remote_wmi_command_attempt.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"cmd.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"powershell_ise.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name = \"wmic.exe\" Processes.process_name = \"vssadmin.exe\" Processes.process=\"*resize*\" Processes.process=\"*shadowstorage*\" Processes.process=\"*/maxsize*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin-resize-shadowstorage"], "tags": {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $parent_process_name$ attempt to resize shadow copy with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.process", "Process.parent_process_name", "_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/resize_shadowstorage_volume.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"* -nolan *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -nolocal *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -fast *\" OR Processes.process = \"* -full *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "revil_common_exec_parameter_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Facebook_Assistant\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\BlackLivesMatter*\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `revil_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A registry entry $registry_path$ with registry value $registry_value_name$ and $registry_value_name$ related to revil ransomware in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "revil_registry_entry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/revil_registry_entry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "id": "cca37478-8377-11ec-b59a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = \"*ptt /ticket*\" OR Processes.process = \"* monitor*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgt* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asktgs* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* golden* /user:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* silver* /service:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* kerberoast*\" OR Processes.process =\"* asreproast*\" OR Processes.process = \"* renew* /ticket:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /password:*\" OR Processes.process = \"* brute* /passwords:*\" OR Processes.process =\"* harvest*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Rubeus command line parameters were used on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", "id": "5ed8c50a-8869-11ec-876f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic.", "search": " `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed", "references": ["https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "CallTrace", "Computer", "TargetProcessId", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = \"*/user:*\" AND Processes.process = \"*admin*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/ad4c3cda-41f2-4401-8dba-56cc2d245488/#"], "tags": {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/vilsel/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_runas", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "runas_execution_in_commandline_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \\ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \\ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-40444", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.", "references": ["https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/rundll32.exe-111474C61232202B5B588D2B512CBB25.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/36c14029-9df8-439c-bba0-45f2643b0c70/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.002/T1218.002.yaml", "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021/"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a suspicious file from disk.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-40444", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage = \"*.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to \"firefox.exe\" and \"chrome.exe\" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = \"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\firefox.exe\", \"*\\\\chrome.exe\", \"*\\\\iexplore.exe\",\"*\\\\microsoftedgecp.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/380662/0/html"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundl32 process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to browser process $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "TargetProcessId", "SourceProcessId", "StartAddress", "EventCode", "Computer"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "ProcessId", "Computer"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "rundll32_dnsquery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name=\"rundll32.exe\" TargetFilename IN (\"*.exe\", \"*.dll\",) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ drops a file $TargetFilename$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "ProcessGuid", "dest", "user_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = \"*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blueteamops.medium.com/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/shimcache_flush/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process execute $process$ to clear shim cache in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", "version": 4, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with no commandline argument like this process commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", "version": 6, "date": "2022-02-08", "author": "Michael Haag, David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"rundll32.+\\#\\d+\") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/"], "tags": {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/ordinal_windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A rundll32 process $process_name$ with ordinal parameter like this process commandline $process$ on host $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", "id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE \"Filesystem.file_path\"=C:\\\\*Ryuk* BY \"Filesystem.dest\", \"Filesystem.user\", \"Filesystem.file_path\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A creation of ryuk test file $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "ryuk_test_files_detected_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_test_files_detected.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", "id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\\appdata\\roaming) and in public directories (users\\public\\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*8 LAN*\" OR Processes.process=\"*9 REP*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no known false positives.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-now-self-spreads-to-other-windows-lan-devices/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-006.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ with wake on LAN commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-23", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\\system32\\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663) process_name!=*\\\\dllhost.exe Object_Name IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SAM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SYSTEM*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\config\\\\SECURITY*\") | stats values(Accesses) count by process_name Object_Name dest user | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable \"Audit Object Access\" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both \"Success\" and \"Failure.\"", "known_false_positives": "Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.", "references": ["https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4663", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4663", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36934", "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", "https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/Guidance-Advice/tree/main/SAM_Permissions", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Account_Manager"], "tags": {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following process $process_name$ accessed the object $Object_Name$ attempting to gain access to credentials on $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}, {"name": "Object_Name", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "Object_Name", "dest", "user"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-36934", "cvss": 4.6, "summary": "Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Samsam Test File Write", "id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for a file named \"test.txt\" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "No false positives have been identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Samsam Test File Write", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/sam_sam_note/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "A samsam ransomware test file creation in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path"], "risk_score": 12, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "samsam_test_file_write_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/samsam_test_file_write.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process=\"* create *\" OR Processes.process=\"* config *\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "message": "A sc process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to create of configure services in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", "id": "991eb510-0fc6-11ec-82d3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SchCache or %systemroot%\\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 TargetFilename = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SchCache\\\\*\" TargetFilename = \"*.sch*\" NOT (Image IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mmc.exe\")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id process_name Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adsi/adsi-and-uac", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/"], "tags": {"name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", "analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $Image$ create a file $TargetFilename$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "process_id", "process_name", "Computer"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments \"HTTP\" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN (\"*http*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/92d7ef61-bfd7-4c92-bc15-322172b4ebec/"], "tags": {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline arguments $Arguments$ with http string on it in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.'", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*rundll32*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A schedule task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Command", "Author", "Enabled", "Hidden", "Arguments"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The `at.exe` binary internally leverages the AT protocol which was deprecated starting with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 but may still work on previous versions of Windows. Furthermore, attackers may enable this protocol on demand by changing a sytem registry key.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/at", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-scheduledjob?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.002/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", "version": 6, "date": "2022-02-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with flags - create or delete being passed on the command-line. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. This analytic replaces \"Scheduled Task used in BadRabbit Ransomware\".", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/"], "tags": {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with create or delete commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Scheduled Task was ran on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"schtasks.exe\" Processes.process = \"*/run*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/"], "tags": {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A \"on demand\" execution of schedule task process $process_name$ using commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_run_task_on_demand.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", "version": 5, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=\"*/create*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/s*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with remote job commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", "version": 4, "date": "2020-12-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*shutdown*\" Processes.process=\"*/create *\" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_shutdown/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-27", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\Control Panel\\\\Desktop\\\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*\") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/", "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver"], "tags": {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Script Execution via WMI", "id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", "version": 4, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for scripts launched via WMI.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/"], "tags": {"name": "Script Execution via WMI", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/execution_scrcons/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A wmic.exe process $process_name$ taht execute script in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "script_execution_via_wmi_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/script_execution_via_wmi.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\*\") (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"IsolatedCommand\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited to no false positives are expected.", "references": ["https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://www.cyborgsecurity.com/cyborg_labs/threat-hunt-deep-dives-user-account-control-bypass-via-registry-modification/"], "tags": {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "sdclt_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "user may execute and use this application", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/956f50be-2c13-465a-ac00-6224c14c5f89/"], "tags": {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/sdelete/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "sdelete process $process_name$ executed in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_sdelete", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "sdelete_application_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc"], "tags": {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon_searchprotocolhost.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A searchprotocolhost.exe process $process_name$ with no commandline in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest_port", "process_path"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = \"python*.exe\" Processes.process = \"*.py*\" Processes.process = \"*-ntds*\" (Processes.process = \"*-system*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-sam*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-security*\" OR Processes.process = \"*-bootkey*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py"], "tags": {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/casper/datasets1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nThe following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=\"*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \\\nWhat is a ServicePrincipleName? \\\nA service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\\\nExample usage includes the following \\\n1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \\\nValues \\\n1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process=\"*-t*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-f*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\" AND Processes.process=\"**/**\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-q*\") OR (Processes.process=\"*-s*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx", "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/", "https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/", "https://msitpros.com/?p=3113", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466"], "tags": {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_setspn", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-18", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\\Windows\\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\400619a\\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-beacon"], "tags": {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A service process $parent_process_name$ with process path $process_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 76, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "services_escalate_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_escalate_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Services.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/services_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", "version": 7, "date": "2022-02-18", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass,\" which allows the execution of malicious scripts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Powershell\\\\1\\\\ShellIds\\\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass) by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to \"unrestricted\" or \"bypass\" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_execution_policy/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "registry_path", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Shim Database File Creation", "id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\\\AppPatch\\\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Shim Database File Creation", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process that possibly write shim database in $file_path$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "shim_database_file_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_file_creation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", "id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", "version": 4, "date": "2020-11-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process $process_name$ that possible create a shim db silently in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created` and Windows Security EventCode 4699, `A scheduled task was deleted` to identify scheduled tasks created and deleted in less than 30 seconds. This behavior may represent a lateral movement attack abusing the Task Scheduler to obtain code execution. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler"], "tags": {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created and deleted in 30 seconds on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "ComputerName", "Account_Name", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "short_lived_scheduled_task_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_scheduled_task.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", "id": "b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", "analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A user account created or delete shortly in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.result_id", "All_Changes.user", "All_Changes.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "short_lived_windows_accounts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/short_lived_windows_accounts.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\Environment\\\\windir\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"*.exe*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/"], "tags": {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", "id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == \".exe\", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/single_letter_exe/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A suspicious process $process_name$ with single letter in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/single_letter_process_on_endpoint.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\exefile\\shell` and `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\launcher.Systemsettings\\Shell\\open\\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://medium.com/@mattharr0ey/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", "https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "slui_runas_elevated_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_runas_elevated.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998", "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/slui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "slui_spawning_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/slui_spawning_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", "id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process$ has spawned $process_name$ on endpoint $ComputerName$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", "id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 Image =\"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImgLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer process_id EventCode | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hieuttmmo/sigma/dceb13fe3f1821b119ae495b41e24438bd97e3d0/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_cve_2021_1675_print_nightmare.yml"], "tags": {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$Image$ with process id $process_id$ has loaded a driver from $ImageLoaded$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "Computer", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", "id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\" CallTrace = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\spool\\\\DRIVERS\\\\x64\\\\*\" TargetImage IN (\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\", \"*\\\\spoolsv.exe\") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$SourceImage$ was GrantedAccess open access to $TargetImage$ on endpoint $Computer$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ProcessID", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "SourceImage", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "CallTrace", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", "id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_name=\"*.dll\" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", "id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.", "search": "`sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path=\"*\\\\spool\\\\drivers\\\\x64\\\\*\" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket/commit/73b9466c17761384ece11e1028ec6689abad6818", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", "analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/printnightmare/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$process_name$ has been identified writing dll's to $file_path$ on endpoint $dest$. This behavior is suspicious and related to PrintNightmare.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_id", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}, {"name": "file_path", "type": "File", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "UserID", "process_name", "file_path", "file_name", "TargetFilename"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", "id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-03", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite32.dll\" OR TargetFilename = \"*\\\\sqlite64.dll\") (TargetFilename = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by process_name TargetFilename EventCode ProcessId Image | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/security-primer-icedid/"], "tags": {"name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/simulated_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $SourceImage$ create a file $TargetImage$ in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1005"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "TargetFilename", "EventCode", "ProcessId", "Image"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Dust Storm", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Windigo", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", "id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry", "references": ["https://malware.news/t/threat-analysis-unit-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-snatch-ransomware/36365"], "tags": {"name": "Start Up During Safe Mode Boot", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data1/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Safeboot registry $registry_path$ was added or modified with a new value $registry_value_name$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "start_up_during_safe_mode_boot_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", "id": "35a61ed8-61c4-11ec-bc1e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\" | table _time, ComputerName, Account_Name, Old_Account_Name, New_Account_Name | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios.", "references": ["https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", "analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A computer account $Old_Account_Name$ was renamed with a suspicious computer name", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Account_Name", "Old_Account_Name", "New_Account_Name"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "Chimera", "Indrik Spider", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-42287", "cvss": 6.5, "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42291."}, {"id": "CVE-2021-42278", "cvss": 6.5, "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42291."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_computer_account_name_change.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\", \"sqlps.exe\", \"sqltoolsps.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWow64\\\\*\") AND Processes.process = \"*copy*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "every user may do this event but very un-ussual.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/copy_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "execution of copy exe to copy file from $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_copy", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_copy_on_system32.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(dllhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/threatexpress/malleable-c2/c3385e481159a759f79b8acfe11acf240893b830/jquery-c2.4.2.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_dllhost", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = \"*.sys\" NOT (ImageLoaded IN(\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\inf\",\"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\FileRepository\\\\*\")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "ImageLoaded", "Hashes", "IMPHASH", "Signature", "Signed"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-17", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1100", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The Windows Event Log Service shutdown on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 9, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(gpupdate\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xx0hcd/Malleable-C2-Profiles/0ef8cf4556e26f6d4190c56ba697c2159faa5822/crimeware/trick_ryuk.profile", "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious gpupdate.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_gpupdate", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", "id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.png\",\"*.jpg\",\"*.bmp\",\"*.gif\",\"*.tiff\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path", "process_name", "process_path", "process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "id": "8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(Service_Name) = lower(mvindex(split(Account_Name,\"@\"),0)+\"$\"),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | table _time, Client_Address, Account_Name, Service_Name, Failure_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/02636893-7a1f-4357-af9a-b672e3e3de13"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Service_Name", "Account_Name", "Client_Address", "Failure_Code"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "Chimera", "Indrik Spider", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-42287", "cvss": 6.5, "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42291."}, {"id": "CVE-2021-42278", "cvss": 6.5, "summary": "Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-42282, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42291."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", "id": "0edd5112-56c9-11ec-b990-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\\\nThe search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in a short period of time.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection search is based on Splunk add-on for Microsoft Sysmon-Linux.(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6176/). Please install this add-on to parse fields correctly and execute detection search. Consider customizing the time window and threshold values according to your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/", "https://github.com/IvanGlinkin/AutoSUID", "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS", "https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", "analytic_story": ["Linux Post-Exploitation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.004/linux_discovery_tools/sysmon_linux.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands detected on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.004"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 3, "date": "2021-09-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe process ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\\\framework*\\\\v*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Msbuild.exe ran from an uncommon path on $dest$ execyted by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_msbuild", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_msbuild_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319 and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_msbuild", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious msbuild.exe process executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_msbuild", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from \"mshta.exe\". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process \"mshta.exe\" and its child process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious mshta child process detected on host $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Parent Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses", "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "mshta.exe spawned by wmiprvse.exe on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_mshta", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-18", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*pastebin*\", \"*discord*\", \"*telegram*\", \"*t.me*\") process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\", \"*powershell*\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest you run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", "references": ["https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/1798923/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "analytic_story": ["Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_pastebin_download/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "process_name", "QueryResults", "Computer"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-05", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious software. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\fonts\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\windows\\\\debug\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Music\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\servicing\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*\\\\Users\\\\Default\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path.file_path = \"*Recycle.bin*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Media\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"\\\\Windows\\\\repair\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\" OR Processes.process_path = \"*\\\\PerfLogs\\\\*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Double Zero Destructor", "XMRig", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicioues process $Processes.process_path.file_path$ running from suspicious location", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_process_file_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", "id": "4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN (\"*discord*\") process_path != \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\*\" AND process_path != \"*\\\\Program Files*\" AND process_name != \"discord.exe\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`", "how_to_implement": "his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.", "known_false_positives": "Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", "analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "process_name", "QueryResults", "Computer", "process_path"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.", "references": ["https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-03-001"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process running with an uncommon parent process $Processes.parent_process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_reg_exe_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` (Processes.process=*appdata* OR Processes.process=*programdata* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*) (Processes.process!=*.dll Processes.process!=*.ax Processes.process!=*.ocx) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5", "https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious $Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", "version": 2, "date": "2021-02-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", "https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2020-12-10-IOCs-from-Ursnif-infection-with-Delf-variant.txt", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/duck-hunting-with-falcon-complete-qakbot-zip-based-campaign/", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms682162(v=vs.85).aspx"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "$Processes.process_path.file_path$ process potentially loading malicious code", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", "id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-07-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", "analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "rundll32 process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", "version": 3, "date": "2021-02-04", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "rundll32.exe running with suspicious parameters on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(rundll32\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32", "https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34527", "cvss": 9.0, "summary": "Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-01", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\\public, \\programdata\\ and \\windows\\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\* OR Processes.process=*\\\\programdata\\\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\\\temp*) Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtasks/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\\Windows\\system32 and C:\\Windows\\syswow64.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process=\"(?i)(searchprotocolhost\\.exe.{0,4}$)\" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.", "references": ["https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/PGF/supplemental/hxioc/SUSPICIOUS%20EXECUTION%20OF%20SEARCHPROTOCOLHOST%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious searchprotocolhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "id": "d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 Old_Account_Name=\"*$\" New_Account_Name!=\"*$\") OR (EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(New_Account_Name, mvindex(Account_Name,0)) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),\"TRUE\") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Account_Name,RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived |`suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078.002/samaccountname_spoofing/windows-security.log"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A suspicious TGT was requested was requested", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Old_Account_Name", "New_Account_Name", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "Chimera", "Indrik Spider", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", "id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path=\"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN (\"*.wav\") Filesystem.file_path = \"*\\\\appdata\\\\Roaming\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time ] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/07/remcos-rat-delivered-via-visual-basic/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos_agent/sysmon_wav.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ creating image file $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "file_create_time", "file_name", "file_path", "process_name", "process_path", "process"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-11", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN (\"* cl *\", \"*clear-log*\") (Processes.process=\"*System*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Security*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Setup*\" OR Processes.process=\"*Application*\" OR Processes.process=\"*trace*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_wevtutil_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = \"*$Recycle.Bin*\" by Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")`| search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != \"explorer.exe\" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | table process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes.", "known_false_positives": "Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/write_to_recycle_bin/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin process $Processes.process_name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 28, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Task Scheduler and creating a malicious remote scheduled task, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `svchost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of svchost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-security.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Svchost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/svchost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", "id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = \"* /t *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/df0baf9f-8baf-4c32-a452-16562ecb19be/"], "tags": {"name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/t1592/host_info_dxdiag/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "dxdiag.exe process with commandline $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_dxdiag", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "System Information Discovery Detection", "id": "8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72", "version": 2, "date": "2021-09-07", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"*wmic* qfe*\" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators debugging servers", "references": ["https://oscp.infosecsanyam.in/priv-escalation/windows-priv-escalation"], "tags": {"name": "System Information Discovery Detection", "analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1082/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Potential system information discovery behavior on $dest$ by $User$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "system_information_discovery_detection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_information_discovery_detection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "version": 6, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\\Windows\\System32\\` or `C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\\\nThis detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\\\nDuring triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation?", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32*\" Processes.process_path !=\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System process running from unexpected location on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_hash"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "is_windows_system_file", "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Query", "id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"query.exe\") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"name": "System User Discovery With Query", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "system_user_discovery_with_query_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_query.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"whoami.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/system_user_discovery_with_whoami.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\W32Time\\\\TimeProviders*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "time_provider_persistence_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", "id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=\"\\\\pipe\\\\*lacesomepipe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. .", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/namedpipe/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Trickbot namedpipe created on $Computer$ by $Image$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Image", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "user_id", "EventCode", "PipeName", "signature", "Image", "process_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "trickbot_named_pipe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/trickbot_named_pipe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", "id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-12", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = \"*.dll\" Image = \"*\\\\mmc.exe\" Signed=false Company != \"Microsoft Corporation\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName Computer EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.", "references": ["https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"], "tags": {"name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon2.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $Computer$ with EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "Signed", "ProcessId", "OriginalFileName", "Computer", "EventCode", "Company"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=\"*\\\\colorui.dll\" process_name != \"colorcpl.exe\" NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/"], "tags": {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/uac_colorui/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", "id": "f1126df0-7bd5-11eb-988f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of \"wermgr.exe\" or \"WerFault.exe\" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"umworkerprocess.exe\" OR Processes.parent_process_name=\"UMService.exe\" (Processes.process_name!=\"wermgr.exe\" OR Processes.process_name!=\"werfault.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives.", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"name": "Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process", "analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_umservices.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible CVE-2021-26857 exploitation on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-26857"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-26857", "cvss": 6.8, "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-27078."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", "id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-09", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= \"* /qn *\" Processes.process= \"*/X*\" Processes.process= \"*REBOOT=*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown.", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "tags": {"name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ with a cmdline $process$ in host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "id": "e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv* by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible Sysmon filter driver unloading on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-09", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \\\nThis analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe(\"System.Management.Automation.Amsi\"+\"Utils\")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message=*system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode ComputerName User EventCode Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", "https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/"], "tags": {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", "id": "eb3e6702-8936-11ec-98fe-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-08", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number service ticket requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name!=\"*$\" Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_services values(Service_Name) as requested_services by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting"], "tags": {"name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/rubeus/windows-security.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "Service_Name", "service_id", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", "id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"powershell.exe\") (Processes.process=\"*$env:UserName*\" OR Processes.process=\"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discocvery_with_env_vars_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", "id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = \"*$env:UserName*\" OR Message = \"*[System.Environment]::UserName*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1033/AD_discovery/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "System user discovery on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", "version": 2, "date": "2018-12-03", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=\"*deletejournal*\" AND process=\"*usn*\" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Possible USN journal deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "usn_journal_deletion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/usn_journal_deletion.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-01", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.parent_process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") OR (Processes.process_name = \"wscript.exe\" AND Processes.process = \"*//e:vbscript*\") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/369332/0/html"], "tags": {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process name $process_name$ with commandline $process$ to execute vbsscript", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", "id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process=\"*/S*\" Processes.process=\"*/C*\" AND Processes.process=\"*{*\" AND Processes.process=\"*}*\" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.012", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_verclsid", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "verclsid_clsid_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do"], "tags": {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "w3wp_spawning_shell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-34473", "cvss": 10.0, "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-31206."}, {"id": "CVE-2021-34523", "cvss": 7.5, "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-34470."}, {"id": "CVE-2021-31207", "cvss": 6.5, "summary": "Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND (Processes.process=\"*catalog*\" OR Processes.process=\"*systemstatebackup*\") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may modify the boot configuration.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin"], "tags": {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1490/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "System backups deletion on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbadmin_delete_system_backups.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll,", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\fastprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemprox.dll\", \"*\\\\wbemcomn.dll\") NOT (process_name IN (\"wmiprvse.exe\", \"WmiApSrv.exe\", \"unsecapp.exe\")) NOT(Image IN(\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\",\"*\\\\program files*\", \"*\\\\wbem\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/revil/inf2/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious COM Object Execution on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "ImageLoaded", "process_name", "Computer", "EventCode", "Signed", "ProcessId", "Hashes", "IMPHASH"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", "id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN (\"*wtfismyip.com\", \"*checkip.amazonaws.com\", \"*ipecho.net\", \"*ipinfo.io\", \"*api.ipify.org\", \"*icanhazip.com\", \"*ip.anysrc.com\",\"*api.ip.sb\", \"ident.me\", \"www.myexternalip.com\", \"*zen.spamhaus.org\", \"*cbl.abuseat.org\", \"*b.barracudacentral.org\",\"*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net\", \"*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net\") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_path process_name process_id QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe process connecting IP location web services on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1590", "T1590.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_path", "process_name", "process_id", "QueryName", "QueryStatus", "QueryResults", "Computer", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", "id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" TargetFilename = \"*.exe\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe writing executable files on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Image", "TargetFilename", "process_name", "dest", "EventCode", "ProcessId"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = \"wermgr.exe\" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/", "https://blog.whitehat.eu/2019/05/incident-trickbot-ryuk-2.html"], "tags": {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/infection/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wermgr.exe spawning suspicious processes on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process=\"*-q *\" OR Processes.process=\"*--quiet*\" AND Processes.process=\"*-O- *\") OR (Processes.process=\"*|*\" AND Processes.process=\"*bash*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon for Linux, you will need to ensure mapping is occurring correctly. If the EDR is not parsing the pipe bash in the command-line, modifying the analytic will be required. Add parent process name (Processes.parent_process_name) as needed to filter.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-critical-rce-vulnerability-is-affecting-java", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://gist.github.com/nathanqthai/01808c569903f41a52e7e7b575caa890"], "tags": {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/linux-sysmon_curlwget.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to download a remote file and run it with bash.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wget_download_and_bash_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-03", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* -f *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -b *\") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process=\"* -gcb *\" OR Processes.process=\"* -sc *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons", "references": ["https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Windows AdFind Exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_adfind_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_adfind_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location. \\\n-O or --output is used when a file is to be downloaded and placed in a specified location. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the download was successful. If a file was downloaded, capture and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-O *\",\"*--output*\") Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\public\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1105/T1105.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "analytic_story": ["IceID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ to download a file to a suspicious directory.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_curl", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination. \\\n`-T` or `--upload-file` is used when a file is to be uploaded to a remotge destination. \\\n`-d` or `--data` POST is the HTTP method that was invented to send data to a receiving web application, and it is, for example, how most common HTML forms on the web work. \\\nHTTP multipart formposts are done with `-F`, but this appears to not be compatible with the Windows version of Curl. Will update if identified adversary tradecraft. \\\nAdversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and what they are attempting to upload (zip vs txt). During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, identify if the upload was successful in network logs. If a file was uploaded, isolate the endpoint and review.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN (\"*-T *\",\"*--upload-file *\", \"*-d *\", \"*--data *\", \"*-F *\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.", "references": ["https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/uploads", "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/containers/tar-and-curl-come-to-windows/ba-p/382409", "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664?s=20"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_curl_upload.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ uploading a file to a remote destination.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_curl", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\*\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to use this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html", "https://app.any.run/tasks/cf1245de-06a7-4366-8209-8e3006f2bfe5/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/defender_exclusion_sysmon/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.registry_value_data"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", "id": "15e70689-f55b-489e-8a80-6d0cd6d8aad2", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic is to detect deletion of registry with suspicious process file path. This technique was seen in Double Zero wiper malware where it will delete all the subkey in HKLM, HKCU and HKU registry hive as part of its destructive payload to the targeted hosts. This anomaly detections can catch possible malware or advesaries deleting registry as part of defense evasion or even payload impact but can also catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=deleted by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\windows\\\\*\", \"*\\\\program files*\")) by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action] | table _time parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action dest user | `windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "This detection can catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", "analytic_story": ["Double Zero Destructor"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/doublezero_wiper/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": [], "message": "registry was deleted by a suspicious $process_name$ with proces path $process_path in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.action", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid", "Processes.process_path"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", "id": "0df33e1a-9ef6-11ec-a1ad-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable change password feature of the windows host. This registry modification may disables the Change Password button on the Windows Security dialog box (which appears when you press Ctrl+Alt+Del). As a result, users cannot change their Windows password on demand. This technique was seen in some malware family like ransomware to prevent the user to change the password after ownning the network or a system during attack. This windows feature may implemented by administrator to prevent normal user to change the password of a critical host or server, In this type of scenario filter is needed to minimized false positive.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableChangePassword\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_change_password_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "This windows feature may implemented by administrator to prevent normal user to change the password of a critical host or server, In this type of scenario filter is needed to minimized false positive.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom_heartbleed.thdobah"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification in \"DisableChangePassword\" on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_change_password_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_change_password_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "id": "c82adbc6-9f00-11ec-a81f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable Lock Computer windows features. This registry modification prevent the user from locking its screen or computer that are being abused by several malware for example ransomware. This technique was used by threat actor to make its payload more impactful to the compromised host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\DisableLockWorkstation\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/", "https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/fatalrat-targets-telegram/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification in \"DisableLockWorkstation\" on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", "id": "b2fb6830-9ed1-11ec-9fcb-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable logoff feature in windows host. This registry when enable will prevent users to log off of the system by using any method, including programs run from the command line, such as scripts. It also disables or removes all menu items and buttons that log the user off of the system. This technique was seen abused by ransomware malware to make the compromised host un-useful and hard to remove other registry modification made on the machine that needs restart to take effect. This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"NoLogOff\", \"StartMenuLogOff\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e2d4018fd3bd541c153af98ef7c25b2bf4a66bc3bfb89e437cde89fd08a9dd7b/5b1f4d947ca3e10f22714774", "https://malwiki.org/index.php?title=DigiPop.xp", "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/be/threat-encyclopedia/search/js_noclose.e/2"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification in \"NoLogOff\" on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\CrashControl\\\\CrashDumpEnabled\") AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000000\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/performance/memory-dump-file-options"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Ransomware", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A process $process_name$ was identified attempting to disable memory crash dumps on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.dest", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "id": "1cd983c8-8fd6-11ec-a09d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the windows notification center feature in a windows host machine. This registry modification removes notification and action center from the notification area on the task bar. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name= \"DisableNotificationCenter\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `windows_disable_notification_center_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.", "references": ["https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/disable_notif_center/sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "The Windows notification center was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_nam"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_notification_center_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_notification_center.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", "id": "55fb2958-9ecd-11ec-a06a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable shutdown button on the logon user. This technique was seen in several malware especially in ransomware family like killdisk malware variant to make the compromised host un-useful and hard to remove other registry modification made on the machine that needs restart to take effect. This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\shutdownwithoutlogon\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000000\") OR (Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\NoClose\" Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.msil.screenlocker.a/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification in \"shutdownwithoutlogon\" on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "id": "63a449ae-9f04-11ec-945e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable windows features. These techniques are seen in several ransomware malware to impair the compromised host to make it hard for analyst to mitigate or response from the attack. Disabling these known features make the analysis and forensic response more hard. Disabling these feature is not so common but can still be implemented by the administrator for security purposes. In this scenario filters for users that are allowed doing this is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" OR Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\System\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"NoDesktop\", \"NoFind\", \"NoControlPanel\", \"NoFileMenu\", \"NoSetTaskbar\", \"NoTrayContextMenu\", \"TaskbarLockAll\", \"NoThemesTab\",\"NoPropertiesMyDocuments\",\"NoVisualStyleChoice\",\"NoColorChoice\",\"NoPropertiesMyDocuments\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef1c427394c205580576d18ba68d5911089c7da0386f19d1ca126929d3e671ab?environmentId=120&lang=en", "https://www.sophos.com/de-de/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~Krotten-N/detailed-analysis", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2d7855bf6470aa323edf2949b54ce2a04d9e38770f1322c3d0420c2303178d91/details"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification to disable windows features on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", "version": 2, "date": "2021-03-02", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name=\"DisableAntiSpyware\" AND Registry.registry_value_data=\"0x00000001\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path"], "risk_score": 24, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_reg.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos", "id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!=\"*$\" Result_Code=0x12 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", "id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=\"dcrypt.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", "https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor"], "tags": {"name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to encrypt disks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 35, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskcryptor_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", "id": "58adae9e-8ea3-11ec-90f6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-15", "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`", "references": ["https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", "analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/diskshadow/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Possible Signed Binary Proxy Execution on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Porcesses.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.original_file_name"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_diskshadow", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", "id": "8567da9e-47f0-11ec-99a9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-17", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process=\"*/online*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/disable-feature*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Windows-Defender*\" AND Processes.process=\"*/remove*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_dism.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to disable Windows Defender.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_dism_remove_defender_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "is_net_windows_file", "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", "id": "9c2620a8-94a1-11ec-b40c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Message User Sid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed.", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Service was disabled on $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ComputerName", "EventCode", "Message", "User", "Sid"], "risk_score": 36, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", "version": 6, "date": "2020-07-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.", "search": "(`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Message EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/disabling-windows-event-logs-by-suspending-eventlog-service-threads", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/atomic_red_team/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Windows event logs cleared on $dest$ via EventCode $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "dest"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_event_log_cleared_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", "id": "c3f85976-94a5-11ec-9a58-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 Message = \"*service was changed from demand start to disabled.\" | stats count values(Message) as MessageList dc(Message) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode User Sid | where MessageCount >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Service was disabled in $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "ComputerName", "EventCode", "Message", "User", "Sid"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", "id": "0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like \"System32\\Drivers\" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\System32\\\\drivers\\\\*\", \"*\\\\syswow64\\\\drivers\\\\*\") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=\"file_name\" \"\\.(?[^\\.]*$)\" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this point", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Driver file with out file extension drop in $file_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_create_time", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_guid", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "id": "cafa4bce-9f06-11ec-a7b2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-08", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to hide common windows notification feature from compromised host. This technique was seen in some ransomware family to add more impact to its payload that are visually seen by user aside from the encrypted files and ransomware notes. Even this a good anomaly detection, administrator may implement this changes for auditing or security reason. In this scenario filter is needed.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Policies\\\\Explorer\\\\*\" Registry.registry_value_name IN (\"HideClock\", \"HideSCAHealth\", \"HideSCANetwork\", \"HideSCAPower\", \"HideSCAVolume\") Registry.registry_value_data = \"0x00000001\" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/Ransom.Win32.ONALOCKER.A/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/ransomware_disable_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification to hide windows notification on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-16", "author": "Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN (\"*.cmd\", \"*.ini\",\"*.gif\", \"*.jpg\", \"*.jpeg\", \"*.db\", \"*.ps1\", \"*.doc*\", \"*.xls*\", \"*.ppt*\", \"*.bmp\",\"*.zip\", \"*.rar\", \"*.7z\", \"*.chm\", \"*.png\", \"*.log\", \"*.vbs\", \"*.js\", \"*.vhd\", \"*.bak\", \"*.wbcat\", \"*.bkf\" , \"*.backup*\", \"*.dsk\", , \"*.win\") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID |where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "High frequency file deletion activity detected on host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "deleted_files", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "TargetFilename", "Computer", "user", "Image", "ProcessID", "_time"], "risk_score": 72, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", "id": "1c6abb08-73d1-11ec-9ca0-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "SourceUser", "TargetUser"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", "id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loading `vaultcli.dll` and Samlib.dll`. This technique may be used to execute code to bypassing application control and capture credentials by utilizing a tool like MimiKatz. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe ImageLoaded IN (\"*\\\\samlib.dll\", \"*\\\\vaultcli.dll\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name, ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, process_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and module loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Typically this will not trigger as by it's very nature InstallUtil does not need credentials. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/xorrior/bbac3919ca2aef8d924bdf3b16cce3d0"], "tags": {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", "analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ loading samlib.dll and vaultcli.dll to potentially capture credentials in memory.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\Windows\\\\ADWS\\\\*\",\"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\system32*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\NetworkController\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\*\", \"*\\\\WinSxS\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Microsoft.NET\\\\*\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "WhisperGate", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_installutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-03-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ generating a remote download.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_installutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.", "references": ["https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_installutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-03-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch. \\\nInstallUtil uses the functions install and uninstall within the System.Configuration.Install namespace to process .net assembly. Install function requires admin privileges, however, uninstall function can be run as an unprivileged user.\\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*/u*\", \"*uninstall*\") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Ports` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://evi1cg.me/archives/AppLocker_Bypass_Techniques.html#menu_index_12", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList/blob/master/md/Installutil.exe.md", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ performing an uninstall.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Ports.process_guid", "Ports.dest", "Ports.dest_port"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_installutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control. \\\nWhen `InstallUtil.exe` is used in a malicous manner, the path to an executable on the filesystem is typically specified. Take note of the parent process. In a suspicious instance, this will be spawned from a non-standard process like `Cmd.exe`, `PowerShell.exe` or `Explorer.exe`. \\\nIf used by a developer, typically this will be found with multiple command-line switches/arguments and spawn from Visual Studio. \\\nDuring triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and parallel processes. Capture any artifacts and review further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\",\"*https://*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md", "https://gist.github.com/DanielRTeixeira/0fd06ec8f041f34a32bf5623c6dd479d"], "tags": {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "Living Off The Land"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ passing a URL on the command-line.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "process_installutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos", "id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-14", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $Client_Address$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Result_Code", "Account_Name", "Client_Address"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "id": "b7548c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = \"*\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\Advanced*\" AND Registry.registry_value_name IN(\"ShowCompColor\", \"ShowInfoTip\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/globalfolderoptions_reg/sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Registry modification in \"ShowCompColor\" and \"ShowInfoTips\" on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest Registry.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN (\"*EXEFilename*\",\"*/cfg*\",\"*RunAs*\", \"*WindowState*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.", "references": ["http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/advanced_run.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of advancedrun.exe, $process_name$, was spawned by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1588.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 60, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "CostaRicto", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", "id": "5b2f4596-7d4c-11ec-88a7-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "http://www.nirsoft.net/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", "analytic_story": ["WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1588.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ related to NiRSoft software usage.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1588.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "CostaRicto", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "is_nirsoft_software", "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based."}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", "id": "b1ce9a72-73cf-11ec-981b-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe SourceUser!=\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\*\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "SourceUser", "TargetUser"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-01-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping. \\\nGrantedAccess is the requested permissions by the SourceImage into the TargetImage. \\\nCallTrace Stack trace of where open process is called. Included is the DLL and the relative virtual address of the functions in the call stack right before the open process call. \\\ndbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll are two core Windows debug DLLs that have minidump functions which provide a way for applications to produce crashdump files that contain a useful subset of the entire process context. \\\nThe idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. For example in sekurlsa module there are many ntdll exported api, like RtlCopyMemory, used to execute this module which is related to lsass dumping.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN (\"0x01000\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x40\", \"0x1400\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x1410\", \"0x143a\", \"0x1438\", \"0x1000\") CallTrace IN (\"*dbgcore.dll*\", \"*dbghelp.dll*\", \"*ntdll.dll*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_creddump.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $ImageLoaded$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "type": "Process", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "SourceImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "TargetImage", "GrantedAccess", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "SourceUser", "TargetUser"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", "id": "e64399d4-94a8-11ec-a9da-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = \"*\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\*\" NOT (Processes.process_path IN (\"*\\\\program files*\")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", "id": "c9f010da-57ab-11ec-82bd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine. Raccine is a \"ransomware vaccine\" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=\"*delete*\" AND Processes.process=\"*Raccine*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", "analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_raccine.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user user$ attempting to disable Raccines scheduled task.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", "id": "6f42b8be-8e96-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-15", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process=\"* -d *\"AND Processes.process=\"* -p *\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/mandiant/DueDLLigence", "https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/blob/master/utilities/Invoke-SPLDLLigence.ps1", "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/c6043e4b302d5424f701f15baf136513", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055.001/rasautou/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ attempting to load a DLL in a suspicious manner.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "id": "a85aa37e-9647-11ec-90c5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the \"hermeticwiper\" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/02/threat-advisory-hermeticwiper.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "analytic_story": ["Caddy Wiper", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/hermetic_wiper/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Process accessing disk partition $device$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "Image", "Device", "ProcessGuid", "ProcessId", "EventDescription", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "id": "7b83f666-900c-11ec-a2d9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\\\Device\\\\Harddisk0\\\\DR0 NOT (Image IN(\"*\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the raw access read event (like sysmon eventcode 9), process name and process guid from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/technical-analysis-of-whispergate-malware/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Caddy Wiper", "WhisperGate", "Hermetic Wiper"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.002/mbr_raw_access/sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process accessing MBR $device$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "Image", "Device", "ProcessGuid", "ProcessId", "EventDescription", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", "id": "ced50492-8849-11ec-9f68-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/msra/msra-windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, generating behavior not common with msra.exe.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_shells", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "id": "41a0e58e-884c-11ec-9976-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM. This is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process=\"*/create *\" AND Processes.process=\"*/ru *\" AND Processes.process=\"*system*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it.", "references": ["https://pentestlab.blog/2019/11/04/persistence-scheduled-tasks/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask", "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/schtask_system/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An $process_name$ was created on endpoint $dest$ attempting to spawn as SYSTEM.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 48, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_schtasks", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", "id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (\"Processes.process_name\"=\"net*.exe\" \"Processes.process\"=\"*stop \\\"samss\\\"*\") BY \"Processes.dest\", \"Processes.user\", \"Processes.process\" | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.", "known_false_positives": "SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", "analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ryuk/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "The Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via cli by $user$ on $dest$ by this command: $processs$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_security_account_manager_stopped.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", "id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft.html", "https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path", "analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/clop/clop_a/windows-system.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A service $Service_File_Name$ was created from a non-standard path using $Service_Name$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "Service_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 Service_File_Name = \"*\\.exe\" NOT (Service_File_Name IN (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\*\", \"C:\\\\Program File*\", \"C:\\\\Programdata\\\\*\", \"%systemroot%\\\\*\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_suspicious_path/windows-system.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Service $Service_File_Name$ with a public path was created on $ComputerName", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["EventCode", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "_time", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_within_public_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Service was created on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=\"*\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services*\" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.011/change_registry_path_service/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.user", "Registry.dest", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-10", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/controlling-a-service-using-sc", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Service was started on a remote endpoint from $dest", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", "id": "7ab3c319-a4e7-4211-9e8c-40a049d0dba6", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious process terminating Lsass process. Lsass process is known to be a critical process that is responsible for enforcing security policy system. This process was commonly targetted by threat actor or red teamer to gain privilege escalation or persistence in the targeted machine because it handles credentials of the logon users. In this analytic we tried to detect a suspicious process having a granted access PROCESS_TERMINATE to lsass process to modify or delete protected registrys. This technique was seen in doublezero malware that tries to wipe files and registry in compromised hosts. This anomaly detection can be a good pivot of incident response for possible credential dumping or evading security policy in a host or network environment.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess = 0x1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceProcessId, GrantedAccess CallTrace, Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", "analytic_story": ["Double Zero Destructor"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/doublezero_wiper/sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": [], "message": "a process $SourceImage$ terminates Lsass process in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "TargetImage", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetImage", "CallTrace", "Computer", "TargetProcessId", "SourceImage", "SourceProcessId", "GrantedAccess"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_terminating_lsass_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", "id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-13", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\\nThis detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\\\nThe analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | search Source_Account != \"*$\" Source_Account !=\"-\" Destination_Account !=\"*$\" | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "id": "0661c2de-93de-11ec-9833-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"* process *\" Processes.process = \"* call *\" Processes.process = \"* create *\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.", "references": ["https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/2b804d25418004a5f1ba50e9dc637946ab8733c7/atomics/T1047/T1047.md"], "tags": {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*powershell.exe*\", \"*wscript.exe*\", \"*cscript.exe*\", \"*cmd.exe*\", \"*sh.exe*\", \"*ksh.exe*\", \"*zsh.exe*\", \"*bash.exe*\", \"*scrcons.exe*\", \"*pwsh.exe*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN"], "tags": {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\\\nThe search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\\\nschtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\\Windows\\system32` and `C:\\Windows\\syswow64`.\\\nThe following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\\\nUpon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN (\"*\\\\users\\\\public\\\\*\", \"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\Windows\\\\Tasks\\\\*\", \"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/", "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4698", "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/scheduled-task-job/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/time-trigger-example--scripting-?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://app.any.run/tasks/e26f1b2e-befa-483b-91d2-e18636e2faf3/"], "tags": {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/taskschedule/windows-security.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task was created (task name=$Task_Name$) on $dest$ by the following command: $Command$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Command", "type": "Unknown", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-19", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that have been registered and ran in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed). It is recommended to filter based on ActionName by specifying specific paths not used in your environment. After some basic tuning, this may be effective in capturing evasive ways to register tasks on Windows. Review parallel events related to tasks being scheduled. EventID 106 will generate when a new task is generated, however, that does not mean it ran. Capture any files on disk and analyze.", "search": "`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN (\"200\",\"201\") | rename ComputerName as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message dest EventCode category | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.", "known_false_positives": "False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/windows_taskschedule/windows-taskschedule.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Scheduled Task was scheduled and ran on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "TaskName", "ActionName", "EventID", "dest", "ProcessID"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", "id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-05", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\\windows\\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the \".hlp\" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN (\"*\\\\appdata\\\\*\",\"*\\\\programdata\\\\*\", \"*\\\\temp\\\\*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16541", "https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89"], "tags": {"name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", "analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$, and is not typical activity for this process.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winhlp32_spawning_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://app.any.run/tasks/73af0064-a785-4c0a-ab0d-cde593fe16ef/"], "tags": {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched command: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "winword_spawning_cmd_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/powershell/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/b79fa381-f35c-4b3e-8d02-507e7ee7342f/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/181ac90b-0898-4631-8701-b778a30610ad/"], "tags": {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "$parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$ launched the following powershell process: $process_name$ which is very common in spearphishing attacks", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "winword_spawning_powershell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "id": "637e1b5c-9be1-11eb-9c32-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\\windows\\system32\\` or c:windows\\syswow64\\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=\"winword.exe\" Processes.process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"], "tags": {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachment"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon_wsh.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "process_name", "process_id", "parent_process_name", "dest", "user", "parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 70, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", "id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", "version": 3, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\\\nAll event subscriptions have three components \\\n1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \\\n1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \\\n1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \\\nMonitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "User $user$ on $host$ executed the following suspicious WMI query: $Query$. Filter: $filter$. Consumer: $Consumer$. EventCode: $EventCode$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "host", "user", "Operation", "EventType", "Query", "Consumer", "Filter"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Mustang Panda", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= \"*SELECT*\" AND (Message=\"*Win32_Process*\" OR Message=\"*Win32_Service*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "network administrator may used this command for checking purposes", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/", "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/WMI-events.md", "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/"], "tags": {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/honeypots/pwsh/windows-powershell.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "User", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "ComputerName", "User"], "risk_score": 30, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wmic Group Discovery", "id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \\\nTypically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \\\nDuring triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process=\"*group get name*\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md"], "tags": {"name": "Wmic Group Discovery", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wmic_group_discovery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_group_discovery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "id": "bff0e7a0-317f-11ec-ab4e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-20", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall application non interactively. This technique was seen in IceID to uninstall av products to the compromised host to bypassed and evade detections. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=\"* product *\" Processes.process=\"*where name*\" Processes.process=\"*call uninstall*\" Processes.process=\"*/nointeractive*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "third party application may use this approach to uninstall there application", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/"], "tags": {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "analytic_story": ["IceID"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/disable_av/sysmon2.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wmic $process$ with commandline $process$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Target"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", "id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN (\"*http://*\", \"*https://*\") Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-4---wmic-bypass-using-remote-xsl-file"], "tags": {"name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1220/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to download a remote XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1220", "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "Higaisa"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1047-wmi-for-lateral-movement", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wmiprsve.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wmiprsve_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/"], "tags": {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-22", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN (\"Regsvcs.exe\", \"Ftp.exe\", \"OfflineScannerShell.exe\", \"Rasautou.exe\", \"Schtasks.exe\", \"Xwizard.exe\", \"Dllhost.exe\", \"Pnputil.exe\", \"Atbroker.exe\", \"Pcwrun.exe\", \"Ttdinject.exe\",\"Mshta.exe\", \"Bitsadmin.exe\", \"Certoc.exe\", \"Ieexec.exe\", \"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe\", \"Runscripthelper.exe\", \"Forfiles.exe\", \"Msbuild.exe\", \"Register-cimprovider.exe\", \"Tttracer.exe\", \"Ie4uinit.exe\", \"Bash.exe\", \"Hh.exe\", \"SettingSyncHost.exe\", \"Cmstp.exe\", \"Mmc.exe\", \"Stordiag.exe\", \"Scriptrunner.exe\", \"Odbcconf.exe\", \"Extexport.exe\", \"Msdt.exe\", \"WorkFolders.exe\", \"Diskshadow.exe\", \"Mavinject.exe\", \"Regasm.exe\", \"Gpscript.exe\", \"Rundll32.exe\", \"Regsvr32.exe\", \"Msiexec.exe\", \"Wuauclt.exe\", \"Presentationhost.exe\", \"Wmic.exe\", \"Runonce.exe\", \"Syncappvpublishingserver.exe\", \"Verclsid.exe\", \"Infdefaultinstall.exe\", \"Explorer.exe\", \"Installutil.exe\", \"Netsh.exe\", \"Wab.exe\", \"Dnscmd.exe\", \"At.exe\", \"Pcalua.exe\", \"Msconfig.exe\")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/"], "tags": {"name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Wsmprovhost.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 54, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsmprovhost_exe_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= \"*\\\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\\\Shell\\\\open\\\\command*\" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = \"(Default)\" OR Registry.registry_value_name = \"DelegateExecute\") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", "https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass"], "tags": {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Living Off The Land", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Inbound"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name", "Registry.dest"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "wsreset_uac_bypass_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature=\"Noriyuki MIYAZAKI\" OR ImageLoaded= \"*\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "False positives should be limited.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/"], "tags": {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A driver $ImageLoaded$ related to xmrig crytominer loaded in host $Computer$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Computer", "ImageLoaded", "Hashes", "IMPHASH", "Signature", "Signed"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "xmrig_driver_loaded_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xmrig_driver_loaded.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-13", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = \"*os get*\" Processes.process=\"*/format:*\" Processes.process = \"*.xsl*\" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190814201250/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1220/T1220.md#atomic-test-3---wmic-bypass-using-local-xsl-file"], "tags": {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ utilizing wmic to load a XSL script.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1220", "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "Higaisa"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/endpoint/xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", "id": "bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d@d\"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as \"router\" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.dest_category", "Authentication.dest", "Authentication.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name,\" \"))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 | rex field=recipient_address \"(?.*)@\" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.message_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", "id": "8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != \"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\My Documents\\\\Outlook Files\\\\*\" Filesystem.file_path!=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Outlook*\" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Filesystem\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_out", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", "version": 2, "date": "2018-01-05", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, \"@\") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", "id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address.", "search": "`okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) as distinct_users values(user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "outcome.reason", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city", "user", "src_ip", "displayMessage"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "okta", "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", "id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Updates"], "description": "This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product=\"Microsoft Windows\" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as \"Update Status\" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), \"-60d@d\"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as \"Last Update Time\", | table Host, \"Update Status\", Product, \"Last Update Time\" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", "analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Updates.status", "Updates.vendor_product", "Updates.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", "id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect Okta user lockout events", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"Max sign in attempts exceeded\" | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, country, state, city, src_ip | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "okta", "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "okta_account_lockout_events_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_account_lockout_events.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", "id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Detect failed Okta SSO events", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User attempted unauthorized access to app\" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "app", "user", "result", "src_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "okta", "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_failed_sso_attempts.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", "id": "7594fa07-9f34-4d01-81cc-d6af6a5db9e8", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period.", "search": "`okta` displayMessage=\"User login to Okta\" client.geographicalContext.city!=null | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(client.geographicalContext.city) as locations values(client.geographicalContext.city) as cities values(client.geographicalContext.state) as states by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter` | search locations > 1", "how_to_implement": "This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment.", "known_false_positives": "Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "displayMessage", "client.geographicalContext.city", "client.geographicalContext.state", "user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "access", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "okta", "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name=\"*\" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Email\")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \\\n **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\\\nIf Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called \"Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete\" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the \"Phantom Instance\" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.file_name", "All_Email.src_user", "All_Email.message_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_email_attachments", "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions"}, {"name": "suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Suspicious Java Classes", "id": "6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-06", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data=\"(?i)java\\.lang\\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)\" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.", "known_false_positives": "There are no known false positives.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Java Classes", "analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_content_length", "src_ip", "url", "status", "http_user_agent", "src", "dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_java_classes_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/suspicious_java_classes.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", "id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category=\"web_server\" AND (Processes.process=\"*whoami*\" OR Processes.process=\"*ping*\" OR Processes.process=\"*iptables*\" OR Processes.process=\"*wget*\" OR Processes.process=\"*service*\" OR Processes.process=\"*curl*\") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security.", "known_false_positives": "Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", "analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.yml", "source": "application"}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "Cloud", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", "version": 2, "date": "2020-08-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Change"], "description": "This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers.", "search": "| tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Changes\")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%w\") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename \"IsOutlier(instances_launched)\" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), \":\"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function.", "known_false_positives": "Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "asset_type": "Cloud Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Changes.object_id", "All_Changes.action", "All_Changes.status", "All_Changes.object_category", "All_Changes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "Cloud", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" userAgent!=\"AWS Security Scanner\" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user.username", "userAgent", "sourceIPs{}", "responseStatus.reason", "source", "responseStatus.code", "verb", "requestURI", "src_ip", "user.groups{}"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", "id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` \"user.username\"=\"system:anonymous\" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI=\"/api/v1/pods\" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user.username", "verb", "objectRef.resource", "requestURI", "source", "sourceIPs{}", "responseStatus.reason", "responseStatus.code", "userAgent", "src_ip", "user.groups{}"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "aws detect attach to role policy", "id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "aws detect attach to role policy", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "requestParameters.policyArn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "aws detect permanent key creation", "id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey \"userIdentity.type\"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "aws detect permanent key creation", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.type", "sourceIPAddress", "userName userIdentity.type", "userAgent", "action", "status", "responseElements.accessKey.createDate", "esponseElements.accessKey.status", "responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_permanent_key_creation.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "aws detect role creation", "id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "aws detect role creation", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "event_name", "action", "userIdentity.type", "requestParameters.description", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.principalId", "userIdentity.arn", "action", "event_name", "awsRegion", "http_user_agent", "mfa_auth", "msg", "requestParameters.roleName", "requestParameters.description", "responseElements.role.arn", "responseElements.role.createDate"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_role_creation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_role_creation.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", "id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs", "known_false_positives": "Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user_type", "userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "user_agent", "user_access_key", "status", "action", "requestParameters.roleName", "esponseElements.role.roleName", "esponseElements.role.createDate"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", "id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-27", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs", "known_false_positives": "Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", "analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "AWS Account", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1550"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.type", "eventName", "sourceIPAddress", "eventTime", "userIdentity.arn", "userName", "userAgent", "user_type", "status", "region"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", "id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-10", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status=\"\\\"200\\\"\" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),\"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,\"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S\") | table first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets.", "known_false_positives": "GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sc_status_", "cs_object_", "c_ip_", "cs_uri_", "cs_method_"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", "id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-05", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview).", "known_false_positives": "While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the \"allUsers\" group.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "asset_type": "GCP Storage Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.resource.type", "data.protoPayload.methodName", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action", "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", "data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{}", "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", "data.protoPayload.resourceName", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role", "data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", "id": "e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket.", "search": "`aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), \"-70m@m\"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the \"Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP\" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names.", "known_false_positives": "S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_status", "bucket_name", "remote_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", "id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals.", "search": "`aws_securityhub_finding` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval.", "known_false_positives": "None", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", "analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", "indings{}.Resources{}.Id", "user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_securityhub_finding", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "id": "d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) [search `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as \"Blocked Destination IPs\", values(interface_id) as \"resourceId\" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of \"spike.\" The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection\" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "AWS Instance", "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "action", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}, {"name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", "id": "e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68", "version": 1, "date": "2018-11-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.", "search": "`cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the \"Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN\" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity.", "known_false_positives": "Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "asset_type": "S3 Bucket", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "eventName", "userIdentity.arn"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}, {"name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", "id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-08", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts.", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs", "known_false_positives": "Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects", "references": ["https://github.com/dxa4481/gcploit", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ml09R38jpok"], "tags": {"name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", "analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Account", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout", "src", "src_user", "data.resource.labels.project_id", "data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail", "data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission", "data.protoPayload.request.location", "http_user_agent"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_detect_gcploit_framework.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", "id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-17", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "asset_type": "GCP Kubernetes cluster", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1526"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "category", "responseStatus.code", "sourceIPs{}", "userAgent", "verb", "requestURI", "responseStatus.reason", "properties.pod"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing .", "search": "`gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = \"*@yourdomain.com\" target_user != \"*@yourdomain.com\" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Need to implement Gsuite logging targeting Google suite drive activity. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/investigating-gsuite-phishing-attacks-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "GDrive", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [[]], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip", "parameters.owner", "parameters.target_user", "parameters.doc_title", "parameters.doc_type"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "gsuite_drive", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", "id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-10-24", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments.", "search": "`gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email=\"*yourdomain.com\"| stats count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite (gsuite:calendar:json) having the file sharing metadata like file type, source owner, destination target user, description, etc. This search can also be made more specific by selecting specific emails, subdomains timeframe, organizational units, targeted user, etc. In order for the search to work for your environment please update `yourdomain.com` value in the query with the domain relavant for your organization.", "known_false_positives": "This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.", "references": ["https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-avoid-the-dreaded-google-calendar-malicious-invite-issue/", "https://gcn.com/articles/2012/09/26/20-most-common-words-phishing-attacks.aspx"], "tags": {"name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "GSuite", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [[]], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "email", "parameters.event_title", "parameters.target_calendar_id", "parameters.event_title"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "gsuite_calendar", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", "id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.", "search": "`o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon app=AzureActiveDirectory | stats count dc(user) as accounts_locked values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by src_ip record_type Operation app | search accounts_locked >= 5| `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`", "how_to_implement": "", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", "analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "asset_type": "Office 365", "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Operation", "record_type", "app", "user", "LogonError", "authentication_method", "signature", "UserAgent", "src_ip", "record_type"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", "id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-23", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs.", "known_false_positives": "Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", "analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "asset_type": "Kubernetes", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userAgent", "sourceIPs{}", "src_user", "src_ip", "verb", "requestURI"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", "id": "f0f70b40-f7ad-489d-9905-23d149da8099", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model.", "search": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!=\"AssumeRole\" AND Compute.http_user_agent=\"AWS Internal\" AND Compute.event_name=\"PutImage\" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.region Compute.msg Compute.user_type | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Compute\")` | `new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives.", "known_false_positives": "Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "New container uploaded to AWS ECR", "analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "asset_type": "AWS ECR container", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1525"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1525", "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/cloud/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml", "source": "cloud"}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2018-8440", "cvss": 7.2, "summary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when Windows improperly handles calls to Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC), aka \"Windows ALPC Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability.\" This affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 10, Windows 10 Servers."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-27", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`linux_hosts` | search \"sudoedit -s \\\\\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "linux_hosts", "definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-3156", "cvss": 7.2, "summary": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", "id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-29", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`linux_hosts` | search sudoedit segfault | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | search count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host", "known_false_positives": "If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", "analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "host"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "linux_hosts", "definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-3156", "cvss": 7.2, "summary": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", "id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit", "search": "`osquery_process` | search \"columns.cmdline\"=\"sudoedit -s \\\\*\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \\ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", "analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "osquery_process", "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-3156", "cvss": 7.2, "summary": "Sudo before 1.9.5p2 contains an off-by-one error that can result in a heap-based buffer overflow, which allows privilege escalation to root via \"sudoedit -s\" and a command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", "id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-18", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName=\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "None thus far found", "references": ["https://www.lares.com/blog/from-lares-labs-defensive-guidance-for-zerologon-cve-2020-1472/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", "analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "The following $EventCode$ occurred on $dest$ by $user$ with Logon Type 3, which may be indicative of the an account or group being changed by an anonymous account.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "EventCode", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "TargetUserName", "LogonType", "TargetDomainName", "user"], "risk_score": 49, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2020-1472", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), aka 'Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe OR Processes.process_name=explorer.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*zip* OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\\\Temp*) by _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path | where file_name != \"\" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", "version": 5, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user \"(?.*)\\\\\\\\(?.*)\" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare"}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_rare_executables_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detect_rare_executables.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", "id": "3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process=\"* /stext *\" OR Processes.process=\"* /scomma *\" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1072", "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Silence", "Threat Group-1314"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-27", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \\\nModification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \\\nA suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \\\nAn event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \\\nReview the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles.", "search": "| `exchange` c_uri=\"*//autodiscover.json*\" cs_uri_query=\"*PowerShell*\" cs_method=\"POST\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`", "how_to_implement": "The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.", "references": ["https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/master/AzureSentinel/Exchange-Powershell-via-SSRF", "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1"], "tags": {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/exchange-events.json"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "Activity related to ProxyShell has been identified on $dest$. Review events and take action accordingly.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "cs_uri_query", "cs_method", "c_uri"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "exchange", "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-27", "author": "Michael Haag", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \\\nInherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \\\nModule - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \\\nModule - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG).", "search": "`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message IN (\"*New-MailboxExportRequest*\", \"*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*\") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Path Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.", "known_false_positives": "Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-mailboxexportrequest?view=exchange-ps", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-managementroleassignment?view=exchange-ps", "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxyshell-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-3.html", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/"], "tags": {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "dataset": [], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "Local user discovery enumeration using PowerShell on $dest$ by $user$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Path", "Message", "OpCode", "ComputerName", "User", "EventCode"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/exchange_powershell_module_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", "id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), \"`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window.", "known_false_positives": "A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/zoom_child_process/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Child process $process_name$ with $process_id$ spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us which has not been previously on host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process Name", "role": ["Attacker", "Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 64, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "description": "A list of suspicious file names", "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", "version": 4, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached.", "search": "`wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message \"The (?[-\\(\\)\\s\\w]+) service entered the (?\\w+) state\" | where state=\"running\" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`", "how_to_implement": "While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.", "known_false_positives": "A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services"}, {"name": "first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/first_time_seen_running_windows_service.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", "id": "40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-07", "author": "Jamie Windley, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=\"*com.apple.loginwindow*\" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", "analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "macos___re_opened_applications_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/macos___re_opened_applications.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "id": "985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-07", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`, `\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\`, and `\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN (\"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\*\", \"*\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot\\\\aspnet_client\\\\*\", \"*\\\\HttpProxy\\\\OAB\\\\*\") Filesystem.file_name=\"*.aspx\" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node.", "known_false_positives": "The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/"], "tags": {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "analytic_story": ["ProxyShell", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/windows-sysmon_proxylogon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to IIS exploitation related to ProxyShell. Review further file modifications on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "file_name", "type": "File Name", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.process_id", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.file_hash", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.process_guid", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process_guid"], "risk_score": 81, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-28", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path =\"*\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\Windows x64\\\\Print Processors*\" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.", "known_false_positives": "possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/"], "tags": {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.012/print_reg/sysmon_print.log"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Registry.dest", "Registry.user", "Registry.registry_path", "Registry.registry_key_name", "Registry.registry_value_name"], "risk_score": 80, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "print_processor_registry_autostart_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", "id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", "version": 1, "date": "2019-01-25", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input", "search": "| from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model.", "known_false_positives": "There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", "analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "app", "name", "columns.cmdline", "columns.name", "columns.pid", "host"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not.", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)"], "tags": {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A windows scheduled task with a suspicious task name was created on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "Task_Name", "Description", "Command"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", "id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-29", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not.", "search": " `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. The Windows TA as well as the URL ToolBox application are also required.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A Windows Service with a suspicious service name was installed on $ComputerName$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}, {"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ComputerName", "Service_File_Name", "Service_Type", "Service_Name", "Service_Start_Type"], "risk_score": 45, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/randomly_generated_windows_service_name.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", "version": 5, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop\" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest_category", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", "version": 3, "date": "2020-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-1d@d\"), count, null))) as \"count\" avg(eval(if(_time upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system.", "known_false_positives": "It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.action", "Filesystem.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "spike_in_file_writes_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/spike_in_file_writes.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", "id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-14", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events.", "search": "(`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html"], "tags": {"name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", "analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Windows", "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "ImageLoaded", "QueryName"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Elderwood", "Frankenstein", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Filter as needed.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", "id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", "references": ["https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", "analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", "id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :Label string init_verx\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :RunAtLoad bool true\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :StartInterval integer 3600\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments array\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\n- PlistBuddy -c \"Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c\" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \\\nUpon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further.", "search": "`osquery_process` \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*LaunchAgents*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*RunAtLoad*\" OR \"columns.cmdline\"=\"*true*\" | `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`", "how_to_implement": "OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.", "references": ["https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", "analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "columns.cmdline"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "osquery_process", "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", "id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-22", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://marcosantadev.com/manage-plist-files-plistbuddy/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", "analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1074"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1074", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name=\"*$\" Account_Name!=\"*$*\" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"], "tags": {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Ticket_Options", "Ticket_Encryption_Type", "dest", "service", "service_id"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-01", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": [], "description": "The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\\\nThe detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time, the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\\", "search": " `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!=\"*$\" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.", "known_false_positives": "An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"], "tags": {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "Caller_Process_Name", "Security_ID", "Account_Name", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "version": 5, "date": "2020-12-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "Unusually long command line $Processes.process_name$ on $dest$", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 42, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "unusually_long_command_line_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-08", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(processlen)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.", "known_false_positives": "Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "asset_type": "", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.dest", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/unusually_long_command_line___mltk.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. Restrict the analytic to publicly facing endpoints to reduce false positives. Add any additional identified web application process name to the query. Add any further Windows process names to the macro (ex. LOLBins) to further expand this query.", "known_false_positives": "Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.", "references": ["https://blog.netlab.360.com/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/", "https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/916ebc673ba066537740164f7e7e1d72"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "dataset": [], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Windows shell, potentially indicative of exploitation.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 40, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "windows_shells", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "windows_java_spawning_shells_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/windows_java_spawning_shells.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-21", "author": "Drew Church, Michael Haag, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN (\"cmd.exe\",\"sh.exe\",\"bash.exe\",\"powershell.exe\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"schtasks.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"whoami.exe\",\"bitsadmin.exe\",\"scp.exe\") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.", "references": ["https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys", "https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py"], "tags": {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "dataset": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-31166"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "winrm_spawning_a_process_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-31166", "cvss": 7.5, "summary": "HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability"}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/winrm_spawning_a_process.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", "id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions.", "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message \"Consumer =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search consumer!=\"NTEventLogEventConsumer=\\\"SCM Event Log Consumer\\\"\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", "known_false_positives": "Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "consumer", "ComputerName"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "wmi", "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_permanent_event_subscription.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", "id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions.", "search": "`wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message \"NotificationQuery =\\s+(?[^;|^$]+)\" | search query!=\"SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'\" AND query!=\"SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'\" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].", "known_false_positives": "Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Message", "query"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "wmi", "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/endpoint/wmi_temporary_event_subscription.yml", "source": "endpoint"}, {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd7aac", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-11", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure.", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"arp-inspection\" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "disable_cause", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "host", "src_interface"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cleaver"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cisco_networks", "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_arp_poisoning_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_arp_poisoning.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure.", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"SISF\" mnemonic IN (\"IP_THEFT\",\"MAC_THEFT\",\"MAC_AND_IP_THEFT\",\"PAK_DROP\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "None currently known", "references": ["https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/BRKSEC-3200.pdf", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-ra-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-snooping.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dad-proxy.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-nd-mcast-supp.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-dhcpv6-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ip6-src-guard.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/ipv6_fhsec/configuration/xe-16-12/ip6f-xe-16-12-book/ipv6-dest-guard.html"], "tags": {"name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "dest_int_prefix_long", "dest_int_suffix", "src_mac", "src_vlan", "vendor_explanation", "action"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cleaver"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cisco_networks", "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", "id": "e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419", "version": 2, "date": "2018-06-01", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", "analytic_story": ["Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.bytes", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.protocol", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Stuart Hopkins from Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where ((All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=\"smb\") AND NOT (All_Traffic.action=\"blocked\" OR All_Traffic.dest_category=\"internal\" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=100.64.0.0/10)) by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model", "known_false_positives": "It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "sourcetype", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_outbound_smb_traffic.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs.", "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"PM\" mnemonic=\"ERR_DISABLE\" disable_cause=\"psecure-violation\") OR (facility=\"PORT_SECURITY\" mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION\" OR mnemonic=\"PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN\") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "disable_cause", "src_int_prefix_long", "src_int_suffix", "src_mac", "src_vlan", "action", "host", "src_interface"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cleaver"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cisco_networks", "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_port_security_violation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_port_security_violation.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-11", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack).", "search": "`cisco_networks` facility=\"DHCP_SNOOPING\" mnemonic=\"DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT\" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "message_type", "src_mac", "host"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cisco_networks", "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_rogue_dhcp_server.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", "id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field.", "search": "`zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name \"(?(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\\.)\" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown", "references": ["https://www.mnemonic.no/blog/introducing-snicat/", "https://github.com/mnemonic-no/SNIcat", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", "analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "server_name", "src_ip", "dest_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1041", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Chimera", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "zeek_ssl", "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory.", "known_false_positives": "This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_software_download_to_network_device.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-28", "author": "Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device.", "search": "`cisco_networks` (facility=\"MIRROR\" mnemonic=\"ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"SESSION_UP\") OR (facility=\"SPAN\" mnemonic=\"PKTCAP_START\") OR (mnemonic=\"CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD\" command=\"monitor session*\") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum \"5 - notification\". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring.", "known_false_positives": "This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "facility", "mnemonic", "host"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "cisco_networks", "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_traffic_mirroring_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_traffic_mirroring.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", "id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Sessions"], "description": "By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Network_Sessions\")`|`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Sessions\")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated.", "known_false_positives": "This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", "analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "asset_type": "Infrastructure", "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Sessions.signature", "All_Sessions.src_ip", "All_Sessions.dest_mac"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", "id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream.", "search": "`stream_dns` | spath \"query_type{}\" | search \"query_type{}\" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack=\"ip:tcp:dns\" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", "analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Elderwood", "Frankenstein", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "stream_dns", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "stream_tcp", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2020-1350", "cvss": 10.0, "summary": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests, aka 'Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", "id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count ", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", "analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query_type", "DNS.flow_id", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.flow_id"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Elderwood", "Frankenstein", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2020-1350", "cvss": 10.0, "summary": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Windows Domain Name System servers when they fail to properly handle requests, aka 'Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-15", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC", "search": "`zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerReqChallenge\")) as challenge count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerAuthenticate3\")) as authcount count(eval(operation==\"NetrServerPasswordSet2\")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "operation"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "zeek_rpc", "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2020-1472", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), aka 'Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/detect_zerologon_via_zeek.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename \"IsOutlier(query_length)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.src", "DNS.dest", "DNS.query", "DNS.record_type"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/dns_query_length_outliers___mltk.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(\"DNS.query\") as queries from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"No Error\" \"DNS.reply_code\"!=\"NoError\" DNS.reply_code!=\"unknown\" NOT \"DNS.query\"=\"*.arpa\" \"DNS.query\"=\"*.*\" by \"DNS.src\",\"DNS.query\"| `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")`| lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain| where isnull(domain)| lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank| where isnull(rank)| stats sum(count) as count mode(queries) as queries by src| `get_asset(src)`| where count>50 | `excessive_dns_failures_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query", "DNS.reply_code", "DNS.src"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "excessive_dns_failures_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/excessive_dns_failures.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), \"@d\"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), \"@d\") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as \"email_server\" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The \"deviation_threshold\" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The \"minimum_data_samples\" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid.", "known_false_positives": "The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", "analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", "id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS \"DNS.message_type\"=\"QUERY\" \"DNS.record_type\"=\"ANY\" by \"DNS.dest\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", "analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "asset_type": "DNS Servers", "cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.message_type", "DNS.record_type", "DNS.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/large_volume_of_dns_any_queries.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table \"lookup_interesting_ports\", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`", "how_to_implement": "Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports.", "known_false_positives": "None identified", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocol_or_port_mismatch.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", "id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", "version": 3, "date": "2021-08-19", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport=\"tcp\" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"23\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"143\" OR All_Traffic.dest_port=\"110\" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=\"21\" AND All_Traffic.user != \"anonymous\")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22)", "known_false_positives": "Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.", "references": ["https://www.rackaid.com/blog/secure-your-email-and-file-transfers/", "https://www.infosecmatter.com/capture-passwords-using-wireshark/"], "tags": {"name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", "analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.transport", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.user", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.action"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-21", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model.", "known_false_positives": "RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_bruteforce.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-07", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search \"Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search \"Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic\" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the \"common_rdp_source\" or \"common_rdp_destination\" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.", "known_false_positives": "Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.dest_category", "All_Traffic.src_category", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/remote_desktop_network_traffic.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, \"-70m@m\"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model.", "known_false_positives": "A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "smb_traffic_spike_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "version": 3, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, \"%H\") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, \"%A\") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename \"IsOutlier(count)\" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search \"Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK\" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\\\nThis search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \\\n1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.src"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/smb_traffic_spike___mltk.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "version": 2, "date": "2020-07-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | `tor_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "TOR Traffic", "analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "NOBELIUM Group", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1071", "T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.app", "All_Traffic.action", "All_Traffic.src_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "tor_traffic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/tor_traffic.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", "id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", "version": 1, "date": "2017-10-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server.", "search": "`stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", "known_false_positives": "Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", "analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "cs_content_type", "endtime", "src_ip", "dest_ip", "url"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "unusually_long_content_type_length_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/network/unusually_long_content_type_length.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") AND (Web.url=\"*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*\" OR Web.url=\"*web-console*\" OR Web.url=\"*jmx-console*\" OR Web.url = \"*invoker*\") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1082"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-02", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices", "search": "`f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw=\"(hsqldb;|.*\\\\.\\\\.;.*)\" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;).", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254"], "tags": {"name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "asset_type": "Network", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Other", "role": ["Other"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2020-5902"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "f5_bigip_rogue", "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2020-5902", "cvss": 10.0, "summary": "In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method=\"GET\" OR Web.http_method=\"HEAD\") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url=\"*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*\" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model", "known_false_positives": "No known false positives for this detection.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.http_method", "Web.url", "Web.url_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", "id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search \"ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names\", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for.", "known_false_positives": "None at this time", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", "analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "tbd", "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low"}, "macros": [{"name": "brand_abuse_web", "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file"}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", "id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", "version": 3, "date": "2022-03-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")` | eval url=lower(url) | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, \"alter%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"between\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"create%20view\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"delete\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20database\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20index\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"drop%20table\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exists\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"exec\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"group%20by\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"having\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"insert%20into\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"inner%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"left%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"right%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"full%20join\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"distinct\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"select%20top\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"union\")) + mvcount(split(url, \"xp_cmdshell\")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", "analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "asset_type": "Database Server", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "message": "SQL injection attempt with url $url$ detected on $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "type": "Endpoint", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.dest_category", "Web.url_length", "Web.http_user_agent_length", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.url", "Web.http_user_agent"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/sql_injection_with_long_urls.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "Supernova Webshell", "id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-06", "author": "John Stoner, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model.", "known_false_positives": "There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-supernova-malware-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/"], "tags": {"name": "Supernova Webshell", "analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "asset_type": "Web Server", "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "confidence": 50, "context": [], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "tbd", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.dest", "Web.vendor_product", "Web.user", "Web.http_user_agent"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "supernova_webshell_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/experimental/web/supernova_webshell.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", "version": 3, "date": "2021-01-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`", "how_to_implement": "First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\\\nThis search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\\\n1. \\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\\\nDetailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details`", "known_false_positives": "Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1189/dyn_dns_site/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "A dns query $query$ from your infra connecting to suspicious domain in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.answer", "DNS.query", "host"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", "id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Johan Bjerke, Splunk", "type": "Hunting", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name(\"All_Traffic\")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)` | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format and should be mapped to the Network Traffic datamodels that are in use for this search.", "known_false_positives": "Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.", "references": ["https://www.govcert.ch/blog/zero-day-exploit-targeting-popular-java-library-log4j/"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/outbound_ldap/bro_conn.json"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An outbound LDAP connection from $src_ip$ in your infrastructure connecting to dest ip $dest_ip$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest_ip", "type": "IP Address", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.dest_ip", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src_ip"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/detect_outbound_ldap_traffic.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", "version": 4, "date": "2021-10-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Resolution"], "description": "This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.message_type IN(\"Pointer\",\"PTR\") by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(\"DNS\")` | eval tlds=split(query,\".\") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model.", "known_false_positives": "It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.", "references": [], "tags": {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/long_dns_queries/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"], "message": "A dns query $query$ with 2 time standard deviation of name len of the dns query in host $host$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "DNS.query"], "risk_score": 56, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-21", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = \"7z\" OR archive_hdr1 = \"PK\" OR archive_hdr2=\"Rar!\") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration.", "known_false_positives": "Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/"], "tags": {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/archive_http_post/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with possible archive bytes header 4form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "URL", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out", "archive_hdr1", "archive_hdr2", "form_data"], "risk_score": 25, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "low", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-22", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.", "search": "`stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN (\"*wermgr.exe*\",\"*svchost.exe*\", \"*name=\\\"proclist\\\"*\",\"*ipconfig*\", \"*name=\\\"sysinfo\\\"*\", \"*net view*\") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/trickbot-primer.html"], "tags": {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Command and Control"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1048.003/plain_exfil_data/stream_http_events.log"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "A http post $http_method$ sending packet with plain text of information $form_data$ in uri path $uri_path$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "type": "URL", "role": ["Attacker"]}, {"name": "form_data", "type": "Other", "role": ["Attacker"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "http_method", "http_user_agent", "uri_path", "url", "bytes_in", "bytes_out"], "risk_score": 63, "security_domain": "network", "risk_severity": "medium", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml", "source": "network"}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw=\"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)\\w+(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?\" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"], "tags": {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["action", "category", "dest", "dest_port", "http_content_type", "http_method", "http_referrer", "http_user_agent", "site", "src", "url", "url_domain", "user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt.yml", "source": "web"}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-13", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "type": "Anomaly", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic", "Web"], "description": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.", "search": "| from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 \"[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\\:|\\%3A|\\/|\\%2F)(?\\w+)(\\:\\/\\/|\\%3A\\%2F\\%2F)(\\$\\{.*?\\}(\\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\\.\\-\\_\\$]+)\" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`", "how_to_implement": "This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Splunk for Apache or Splunk for Nginx.", "known_false_positives": "If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.", "references": ["https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"], "tags": {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Application Log", "Stage:Execution"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_proxy_logs/log4j_proxy_logs.log", "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/log4j_network_logs/log4j_network_logs.log"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "message": "CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell triggered for host $dest$", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["action", "category", "dest", "dest_port", "http_content_type", "http_method", "http_referrer", "http_user_agent", "site", "src", "url", "url_domain", "user"], "risk_score": 15, "security_domain": "threat", "risk_severity": "low", "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "cvss": 9.3, "summary": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects."}], "splunk_app_enrichment": [], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/detections/web/log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.yml", "source": "web"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/lookups.json b/dist/api/lookups.json index 16920bc3e4..65a0f518d9 100644 --- a/dist/api/lookups.json +++ b/dist/api/lookups.json @@ -1,353 +1 @@ -{ - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection", - "description": "An MLTK model for detecting malicious commandlines", - "filename": "__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection.mlmodel", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", - "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", - "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", - "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls" - }, - { - "name": "attacker_tools", - "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", - "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "aws_service_accounts", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", - "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv" - }, - { - "name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", - "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv" - }, - { - "name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", - "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", - "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "cloud_instances_enough_data", - "description": "A lookup to determine if you have a sufficient amount of time has passed to collect cloud instance data for behavioral searches", - "collection": "cloud_instances_enough_data", - "fields_list": "_key, filter, enough_data", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(filter)" - }, - { - "name": "csc_lookup", - "description": "The CSC control numbers and names", - "filename": "csc_lookup.csv", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "discovered_dns_records", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", - "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "domains", - "description": "A list of domains that can be ignored", - "filename": "domains.csv" - }, - { - "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", - "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", - "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", - "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", - "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "escu_search_id_lookup", - "description": "A placeholder lookup file to hold information for ESCU Usage dashboard", - "filename": "escu_search_id.csv" - }, - { - "name": "images_to_repository", - "description": "Mapping images to repositories", - "filename": "images_to_repository.csv" - }, - { - "name": "is_net_windows_file", - "description": "A full baseline of executable files in \\Windows\\, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 11. Certain .net binaries may not have been captured due to different Windows SDK's or developer utilities not installed during baseline.", - "filename": "is_net_windows_file.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "is_nirsoft_software", - "description": "A subset of utilities provided by NirSoft that may be used by adversaries.", - "filename": "is_nirsoft_software.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup", - "description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", - "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)" - }, - { - "name": "is_windows_system_file", - "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", - "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "legit_domains", - "description": "A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites", - "filename": "legit_domains.csv" - }, - { - "name": "linux_tool_discovery_process", - "description": "A list of suspicious bash commonly used by attackers via scripts", - "filename": "linux_tool_discovery_process.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", - "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", - "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", - "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", - "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", - "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", - "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_default", - "description": "A list of processes that are not common", - "filename": "uncommon_processes_default.csv", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_local", - "description": "A list of processes that are not common", - "filename": "uncommon_processes_local.csv", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", - "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", - "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv" - }, - { - "name": "mandatory_step_for_job", - "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", - "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv" - }, - { - "name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", - "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", - "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of IPs that have access S3", - "filename": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", - "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", - "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", - "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", - "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", - "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", - "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", - "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", - "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", - "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", - "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", - "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", - "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", - "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", - "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", - "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", - "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", - "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", - "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", - "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", - "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", - "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", - "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", - "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", - "description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", - "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_processes", - "description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", - "filename": "prohibited_processes.csv" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_softwares", - "description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", - "filename": "prohibited_softwares.csv" - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", - "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", - "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", - "min_matches": 1, - "case_sensitive_match": "false" - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", - "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", - "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "s3_deletion_baseline", - "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", - "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv" - }, - { - "name": "security_group_activity_baseline", - "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", - "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv" - }, - { - "name": "security_services_lookup", - "description": "A list of services that deal with security", - "filename": "security_services.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_writes_lookup", - "description": "A list of suspicious file names", - "filename": "suspicious_files.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "match_type": "WILDCARD(file)", - "min_matches": 1 - }, - { - "name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", - "description": "A list of suspicious file names", - "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", - "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"lookups": [{"name": "__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection", "description": "An MLTK model for detecting malicious commandlines", "filename": "__mlspl_unusual_commandline_detection.mlmodel", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "description": "A collection that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS API calls per user", "collection": "api_call_by_user_baseline", "fields_list": "arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls"}, {"name": "attacker_tools", "description": "A list of tools used by attackers", "filename": "attacker_tools.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(attacker_tool_names)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "aws_service_accounts", "description": "A lookup file that will contain AWS Service accounts", "filename": "aws_service_accounts.csv"}, {"name": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections", "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of blocked outbound connections", "filename": "baseline_blocked_outbound_connections.csv"}, {"name": "brandMonitoring_lookup", "description": "A file that contains look-a-like domains for brands that you want to monitor", "filename": "brand_monitoring.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(domain)", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "cloud_instances_enough_data", "description": "A lookup to determine if you have a sufficient amount of time has passed to collect cloud instance data for behavioral searches", "collection": "cloud_instances_enough_data", "fields_list": "_key, filter, enough_data", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(filter)"}, {"name": "csc_lookup", "description": "The CSC control numbers and names", "filename": "csc_lookup.csv", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "discovered_dns_records", "description": "A placeholder for a list of discovered DNS records generated by the baseline discover_dns_records", "filename": "discovered_dns_records.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "domains", "description": "A list of domains that can be ignored", "filename": "domains.csv"}, {"name": "dynamic_dns_providers_default", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that should not be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "dynamic_dns_providers_local", "description": "A list of dynammic dns providers that can be modified", "filename": "dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(dynamic_dns_domains)", "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "escu_search_id_lookup", "description": "A placeholder lookup file to hold information for ESCU Usage dashboard", "filename": "escu_search_id.csv"}, {"name": "images_to_repository", "description": "Mapping images to repositories", "filename": "images_to_repository.csv"}, {"name": "is_net_windows_file", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in \\Windows\\, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 11. Certain .net binaries may not have been captured due to different Windows SDK's or developer utilities not installed during baseline.", "filename": "is_net_windows_file.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "is_nirsoft_software", "description": "A subset of utilities provided by NirSoft that may be used by adversaries.", "filename": "is_nirsoft_software.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup", "description": "A list of suspicious extensions for email attachments", "filename": "is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file_name)"}, {"name": "is_windows_system_file", "description": "A full baseline of executable files in Windows\\System32 and Windows\\Syswow64, including sub-directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.", "filename": "is_windows_system_file.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "legit_domains", "description": "A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites", "filename": "legit_domains.csv"}, {"name": "linux_tool_discovery_process", "description": "A list of suspicious bash commonly used by attackers via scripts", "filename": "linux_tool_discovery_process.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "local_file_inclusion_paths", "description": "A list of interesting files in a local file inclusion attack", "filename": "local_file_inclusion_paths.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(local_file_inclusion_paths)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_default.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local", "description": "A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user", "filename": "rare_process_allow_list_local.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_default", "description": "A list of processes that are not common", "filename": "uncommon_processes_default.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "lookup_uncommon_processes_local", "description": "A list of processes that are not common", "filename": "uncommon_processes_local.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(process)", "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "mandatory_job_for_workflow", "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory job for workflow", "filename": "mandatory_job_for_workflow.csv"}, {"name": "mandatory_step_for_job", "description": "A lookup file that will be used to define the mandatory step for job", "filename": "mandatory_step_for_job.csv"}, {"name": "network_acl_activity_baseline", "description": "A lookup file that will contain the baseline information for number of AWS Network ACL Activity", "filename": "network_acl_activity_baseline.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip", "description": "A placeholder for a list of IPs that have access S3", "filename": "previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles", "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS API calls for each user role", "filename": "previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity", "description": "A placeholder for a list of AWS accounts and assumed roles", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "description": "A table of users, commands, and the first and last time that they have been seen", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role", "fields_list": "_key, user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "description": "A table of previously seen users creating cloud instances", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "description": "A table of previously seen Cloud image IDs", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, image_id, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "description": "A place holder for a list of used cloud compute instance types", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, instance_type, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "description": "A table of users seen making instance modifications, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, user, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "description": "A table of source IPs, geographic locations, and the first and last time that they have that done cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources", "fields_list": "_key, src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "description": "A table of vendor_region values and the first and last time that they have been observed in cloud provisioning activities", "collection": "previously_seen_cloud_regions", "fields_list": "_key, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, vendor_region, enough_data"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments", "description": "A placeholder for a list of cmd line arugments that been seen before", "filename": "previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user", "description": "A place holder for a list of AWS EC2 modifications done by each user", "filename": "previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user.csv"}, {"name": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip", "description": "A place holder for a list of GCP storage access from remote IPs", "filename": "previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "description": "A placeholder for the list of Windows Services running", "collection": "previously_seen_running_windows_services", "fields_list": "_key, service, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}, {"name": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "description": "A table of users seen doing console logins, and the first and last time that the activity was observed", "collection": "previously_seen_users_console_logins", "fields_list": "_key, firstTime, lastTime, user, src, City, Region, Country"}, {"name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "description": "A list of processes that should not be launching cmd.exe", "filename": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv", "match_type": "WILDCARD(prohibited_applications)"}, {"name": "prohibited_processes", "description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", "filename": "prohibited_processes.csv"}, {"name": "prohibited_softwares", "description": "A list of processes that have been marked as prohibited", "filename": "prohibited_softwares.csv"}, {"name": "ransomware_extensions_lookup", "description": "A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware", "filename": "ransomware_extensions.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(Extensions)", "min_matches": 1, "case_sensitive_match": "false"}, {"name": "ransomware_notes_lookup", "description": "A list of file names that are ransomware note files", "filename": "ransomware_notes.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(ransomware_notes)", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "s3_deletion_baseline", "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS S3 deletions", "filename": "s3_deletion_baseline.csv"}, {"name": "security_group_activity_baseline", "description": "A placeholder for the baseline information for AWS security groups", "filename": "security_group_activity_baseline.csv"}, {"name": "security_services_lookup", "description": "A list of services that deal with security", "filename": "security_services.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(service)", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "suspicious_writes_lookup", "description": "A list of suspicious file names", "filename": "suspicious_files.csv", "default_match": "false", "match_type": "WILDCARD(file)", "min_matches": 1}, {"name": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "description": "A list of suspicious file names", "collection": "zoom_first_time_child_process", "fields_list": "_key, dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/macros.json b/dist/api/macros.json index c3da545c91..b0d408fb54 100644 --- a/dist/api/macros.json +++ b/dist/api/macros.json @@ -1,692 +1 @@ -{ - "macros": [ - { - "name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_config", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:config", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_description", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:description\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_ecr_users", - "definition": "userName IN (user)", - "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR." - }, - { - "name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_securityhub_finding", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "aws_securityhub_firehose", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:firehose\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "brand_abuse_dns", - "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" - }, - { - "name": "brand_abuse_email", - "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as src_user OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" - }, - { - "name": "brand_abuse_web", - "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file" - }, - { - "name": "circleci", - "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cisco_networks", - "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new commands from user roles" - }, - { - "name": "cloudtrail", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cloudwatch_eks", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch eks logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cloudwatch_vpc", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "dynamic_dns_providers", - "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", - "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user." - }, - { - "name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", - "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", - "description": "This is a description" - }, - { - "name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", - "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", - "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", - "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", - "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", - "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", - "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", - "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", - "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google" - }, - { - "name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", - "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", - "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook" - }, - { - "name": "exchange", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "f5_bigip_rogue", - "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", - "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", - "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare" - }, - { - "name": "github", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "github_known_users", - "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", - "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects." - }, - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubnet_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Google GCP. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_calendar", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_drive", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "gsuite_gmail", - "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "is_net_windows_file", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11." - }, - { - "name": "is_nirsoft_software", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", - "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based." - }, - { - "name": "is_windows_system_file", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory" - }, - { - "name": "kube_objects_events", - "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_azure", - "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "kubernetes_container_controller", - "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "linux_hosts", - "definition": "index=*", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "linux_shells", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "netbackup", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "network_acl_events", - "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", - "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs" - }, - { - "name": "notable", - "definition": "index=notable", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "o365_management_activity", - "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "okta", - "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "osquery", - "definition": "sourcetype=osquery:results", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "osquery_process", - "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", - "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", - "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier" - }, - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud api calls per user role" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_search_window_begin_offset", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_image_search_window_begin_offset", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the image is new or not" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance images" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance types" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_search_window_begin_offset", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the instance type is new or not" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_search_window_begin_offset", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud provisioning locations" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud regions" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions_search_window_begin_offset", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the region is new or not" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of Windows services" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window", - "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of zoom child processes" - }, - { - "name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes" - }, - { - "name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", - "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", - "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities" - }, - { - "name": "printservice", - "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "process_bitsadmin", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_certutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_cmd", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_copy", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_csc", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_curl", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_diskshadow", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_dllhost", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_dsquery", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dsquery.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_dxdiag", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_esentutl", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_fodhelper", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=fodhelper.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=FodHelper.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_gpupdate", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_hh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_installutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_msbuild", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_mshta", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_net", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_netsh", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_nltest", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=nltestrk.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_ntdsutil", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ntdsutil.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_ping", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_powershell", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_procdump", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_psexec", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_rclone", - "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name." - }, - { - "name": "process_reg", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_regasm", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_regsvcs", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_regsvr32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_route", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_runas", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_rundll32", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_schtasks", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_sdelete", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_setspn", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_verclsid", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_vssadmin", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=VSSADMIN.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_wbadmin", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=WBADMIN.EXE)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "process_wmic", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", - "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", - "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe" - }, - { - "name": "prohibited_softwares", - "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", - "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited" - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_extensions", - "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", - "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware" - }, - { - "name": "ransomware_notes", - "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", - "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note" - }, - { - "name": "remove_valid_domains", - "definition": "eval domain=trim(domain,\"*\") | search NOT[| inputlookup domains] NOT[ |inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domain_lookup] NOT[inputlookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup] | eval domain=\"*\"+domain+\"*\"", - "description": "This macro removes valid domains from the output" - }, - { - "name": "s3_accesslogs", - "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "security_content_ctime", - "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", - "description": "convert epoch time to string", - "arguments": [ - "field" - ] - }, - { - "name": "security_content_summariesonly", - "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", - "description": "search data model's summaries only" - }, - { - "name": "security_group_api_calls", - "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", - "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups" - }, - { - "name": "signals", - "definition": "index=signals", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "splunkd", - "definition": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "stream_dns", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "stream_http", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "stream_tcp", - "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_email_attachments", - "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions" - }, - { - "name": "suspicious_writes", - "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", - "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious" - }, - { - "name": "sysmon", - "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", - "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", - "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration" - }, - { - "name": "uncommon_processes", - "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", - "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon" - }, - { - "name": "windows_shells", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_security", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_system", - "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", - "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "wmi", - "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "zeek_rpc", - "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - }, - { - "name": "zeek_ssl", - "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"macros": [{"name": "aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_config", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:config", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_description", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:description\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_ecr_users", "definition": "userName IN (user)", "description": "specify the user allowed to push Images to AWS ECR."}, {"name": "aws_s3_accesslogs", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_securityhub_finding", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:finding\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "aws_securityhub_firehose", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:securityhub:firehose\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "brand_abuse_dns", "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file"}, {"name": "brand_abuse_email", "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as src_user OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file"}, {"name": "brand_abuse_web", "definition": "lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as urls OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file"}, {"name": "circleci", "definition": "sourcetype=circleci", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cisco_networks", "definition": "eventtype=cisco_ios", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new commands from user roles"}, {"name": "cloudtrail", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cloudwatch_eks", "definition": "sourcetype=\"aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch eks logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cloudwatch_vpc", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "dynamic_dns_providers", "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as query OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This macro limits the output of the query field to dynamic dns domains. It looks up the domains in a file provided by Splunk and one intended to be updated by the end user."}, {"name": "dynamic_dns_web_traffic", "definition": "lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_default dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_default | lookup update=true dynamic_dns_providers_local dynamic_dns_domains as url OUTPUTNEW isDynDNS_local| eval isDynDNS = coalesce(isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local)|fields - isDynDNS_default, isDynDNS_local| search isDynDNS=True", "description": "This is a description"}, {"name": "ec2_modification_api_calls", "definition": "(eventName=AssociateAddress OR eventName=AssociateIamInstanceProfile OR eventName=AttachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=AttachNetworkInterface OR eventName=AttachVolume OR eventName=BundleInstance OR eventName=DetachClassicLinkVpc OR eventName=DetachVolume OR eventName=ModifyInstanceAttribute OR eventName=ModifyInstancePlacement OR eventName=MonitorInstances OR eventName=RebootInstances OR eventName=ResetInstanceAttribute OR eventName=StartInstances OR eventName=StopInstances OR eventName=TerminateInstances OR eventName=UnmonitorInstances)", "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that have to do with modifying Amazon EC2 instances"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_0365", "definition": "(query=login* AND query=www*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Office 365"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_amazon", "definition": "(query=fls-na* AND query = www* AND query=images*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Amazon"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_aws", "definition": "(query=www* AND query=aws* AND query=console.aws* AND query=signin.aws* AND api-northeast-1.console.aws* AND query=fls-na* AND query=images-na*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as an AWS console"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_facebook", "definition": "(query=www* AND query = m* AND query=static*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as FaceBook"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_github", "definition": "(query=api* AND query = github*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as GitHub"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_google", "definition": "(query=accounts* AND query=ssl* AND query=www*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Google"}, {"name": "evilginx_phishlets_outlook", "definition": "(query=outlook* AND query=login* AND query=account*)", "description": "This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with evilginx masquerading as Outlook"}, {"name": "exchange", "definition": "sourcetype=\"MSWindows:IIS\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "f5_bigip_rogue", "definition": "index=netops sourcetype=\"f5:bigip:rogue\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "filter_rare_process_allow_list", "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list=\"false\"", "description": "This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare"}, {"name": "github", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:firehose:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "github_known_users", "definition": "user IN (user_names_here)", "description": "specify the user allowed to create PRs in Github projects."}, {"name": "google_gcp_pubnet_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Google GCP. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "google_gcp_pubsub_message", "definition": "sourcetype=\"google:gcp:pubsub:message\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_calendar", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:calendar:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_drive", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:drive:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "gsuite_gmail", "definition": "sourcetype=gsuite:gmail:bigquery", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "is_net_windows_file", "definition": "lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile | lookup update=true is_net_windows_file originalFileName as original_file_name OUTPUT netFile | search netFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are .net binaries on Windows Server 2016 and Windows 11."}, {"name": "is_nirsoft_software", "definition": "lookup update=true is_nirsoft_software filename as process_name OUTPUT nirsoftFile | search nirsoftFile=true", "description": "This macro is related to potentially identifiable software related to NirSoft. Remove or filter as needed based."}, {"name": "is_windows_system_file", "definition": "lookup update=true is_windows_system_file filename as process_name OUTPUT systemFile | search systemFile=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to process names that are in the Windows System directory"}, {"name": "kube_objects_events", "definition": "sourcetype=kube:objects:events", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_azure", "definition": "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data from Azure. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "kubernetes_container_controller", "definition": "sourcetype=kube:container:controller", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for Kubernetes data. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "linux_hosts", "definition": "index=*", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "linux_shells", "definition": "(Processes.process_name IN (\"sh\", \"ksh\", \"zsh\", \"bash\", \"dash\", \"rbash\", \"fish\", \"csh', \"tcsh', \"ion\", \"eshell\"))", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "netbackup", "definition": "sourcetype=\"netbackup_logs\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "network_acl_events", "definition": "(eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)", "description": "This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs"}, {"name": "notable", "definition": "index=notable", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "o365_management_activity", "definition": "sourcetype=o365:management:activity", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "okta", "definition": "eventtype=okta_log", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "osquery", "definition": "sourcetype=osquery:results", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "osquery_process", "definition": "eventtype=\"osquery-process\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score", "definition": "eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), \"`\", \"\") | makemv tokenizer=\"([\\w\\d\\-]+)\" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, \"^for$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^for$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, \"^netsh$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^netsh$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^readbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, \"^set$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^unrestricted$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, \"^winstations$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^winstations$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, \"^-value$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-value$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, \"^compression$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^compression$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, \"^server$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^server$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^set-mppreference$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, \"^terminal$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^terminal$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, \"^-name$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^-name$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, \"^catch$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^catch$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^get-wmiobject$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, \"^hklm$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^hklm$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^streamreader$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, \"^system32$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system32$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, \"^username$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^username$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webrequest$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, \"^count$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^count$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, \"^webclient$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^webclient$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^writeallbytes$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, \"^convert$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^convert$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, \"^create$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^create$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, \"^function$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^function$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, \"^net$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^net$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, \"^com$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^com$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, \"^http$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^http$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, \"^io$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^io$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, \"^system$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^system$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, \"^new-object$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^new-object$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, \"^if$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^if$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, \"^threading$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^threading$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, \"^mutex$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^mutex$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^cryptography$\"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, \"^computehash$\"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, \"^computehash$\"))), 0)", "description": "Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier"}, {"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud api calls per user role"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user_search_window_begin_offset", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_image_search_window_begin_offset", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the image is new or not"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance images"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud instance types"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types_search_window_begin_offset", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the instance type is new or not"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user_search_window_begin_offset", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the user is new or not"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud provisioning locations"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of cloud regions"}, {"name": "previously_seen_cloud_regions_search_window_begin_offset", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far into the past the window should be to determine if the region is new or not"}, {"name": "previously_seen_windows_services_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of Windows services"}, {"name": "previously_seen_windows_services_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new Windows services"}, {"name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window", "definition": "\"-90d@d\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how long to keep track of zoom child processes"}, {"name": "previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new zoom child processes"}, {"name": "previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window", "definition": "\"-70m@m\"", "description": "Use this macro to determine how far back you should be checking for new provisioning activities"}, {"name": "printservice", "definition": "source=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-printservice/operational\" OR sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "process_bitsadmin", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=bitsadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=bitsadmin.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_certutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=certutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CertUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_cmd", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_copy", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=copy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=copy.exe OR Processes.process_name=xcopy.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=xcopy.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_csc", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=csc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=csc.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_curl", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=curl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Curl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_diskshadow", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=diskshadow.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=diskshadow.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_dllhost", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_dsquery", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dsquery.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_dxdiag", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=dxdiag.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dxdiag.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_esentutl", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=esentutl.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=esentutl.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_fodhelper", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=fodhelper.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=FodHelper.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_gpupdate", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=GPUpdate.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_hh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=hh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_installutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=installutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=InstallUtil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_microsoftworkflowcompiler", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_msbuild", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_mshta", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=mshta.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_net", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net.exe\" OR Processes.process_name=\"net1.exe\" OR Processes.original_file_name=\"net1.exe\")", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_netsh", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=netsh.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=netsh.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_nltest", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=nltest.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=nltestrk.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_ntdsutil", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ntdsutil.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_ping", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=ping.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=ping.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_powershell", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqlps.exe OR Processes.process_name=sqltoolsps.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell_ise.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=pwsh.dll OR Processes.original_file_name=PowerShell.EXE OR Processes.original_file_name=powershell_ise.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_procdump", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=procdump.exe OR Processes.process_name=procdump64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=procdump)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_psexec", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name=psexec64.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_rclone", "definition": "(Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe OR Processes.process_name=rclone.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name."}, {"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_regasm", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regasm.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegAsm.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_regsvcs", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_regsvr32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=regsvr32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=REGSVR32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_route", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=route.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=route.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_runas", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=runas.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=runas.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_rundll32", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_schtasks", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_sdelete", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=sdelete.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sdelete.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_setspn", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_verclsid", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=verclsid.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=verclsid.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_vssadmin", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=VSSADMIN.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_wbadmin", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=WBADMIN.EXE)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "process_wmic", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=wmic.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=wmic.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "prohibited_apps_launching_cmd", "definition": "| inputlookup prohibited_apps_launching_cmd | rename prohibited_applications as parent_process_name | eval parent_process_name=\"*\" . parent_process_name | table parent_process_name", "description": "This macro outputs a list of process that should not be the parent process of cmd.exe"}, {"name": "prohibited_softwares", "definition": "lookup prohibited_softwares app as process_name OUTPUT is_prohibited | search is_prohibited=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to process_names that have been marked as prohibited"}, {"name": "ransomware_extensions", "definition": "lookup update=true ransomware_extensions_lookup Extensions AS file_extension OUTPUT Name | search Name !=False", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have extensions associated with ransomware"}, {"name": "ransomware_notes", "definition": "lookup ransomware_notes_lookup ransomware_notes as file_name OUTPUT status as \"Known Ransomware Notes\" | search \"Known Ransomware Notes\"=True", "description": "This macro limits the output to files that have been identified as a ransomware note"}, {"name": "remove_valid_domains", "definition": "eval domain=trim(domain,\"*\") | search NOT[| inputlookup domains] NOT[ |inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domain_lookup] NOT[inputlookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup] | eval domain=\"*\"+domain+\"*\"", "description": "This macro removes valid domains from the output"}, {"name": "s3_accesslogs", "definition": "sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype) for AWS cloudwatch vpc logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "security_content_ctime", "definition": "convert timeformat=\"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S\" ctime($field$)", "description": "convert epoch time to string", "arguments": ["field"]}, {"name": "security_content_summariesonly", "definition": "summariesonly=false allow_old_summaries=true", "description": "search data model's summaries only"}, {"name": "security_group_api_calls", "definition": "(eventName=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=CreateSecurityGroup OR eventName=DeleteSecurityGroup OR eventName=DescribeClusterSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeDBSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroupReferences OR eventName=DescribeSecurityGroups OR eventName=DescribeStaleSecurityGroups OR eventName=RevokeSecurityGroupIngress OR eventName=UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress)", "description": "This macro is a list of AWS event names associated with security groups"}, {"name": "signals", "definition": "index=signals", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "splunkd", "definition": "index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "stream_dns", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:dns", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "stream_http", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:http", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "stream_tcp", "definition": "sourcetype=stream:tcp", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "suspicious_email_attachments", "definition": "lookup update=true is_suspicious_file_extension_lookup file_name OUTPUT suspicious | search suspicious=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to email attachments that have suspicious extensions"}, {"name": "suspicious_writes", "definition": "lookup suspicious_writes_lookup file as file_name OUTPUT note as \"Reference\" | search \"Reference\" != False", "description": "This macro limites the output to file names that have been marked as suspicious"}, {"name": "sysmon", "definition": "sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "system_network_configuration_discovery_tools", "definition": "(process_name= \"arp.exe\" OR process_name= \"at.exe\" OR process_name= \"attrib.exe\" OR process_name= \"cscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"dsquery.exe\" OR process_name= \"hostname.exe\" OR process_name= \"ipconfig.exe\" OR process_name= \"mimikatz.exe\" OR process_name= \"nbstat.exe\" OR process_name= \"net.exe\" OR process_name= \"netsh.exe\" OR process_name= \"nslookup.exe\" OR process_name= \"ping.exe\" OR process_name= \"quser.exe\" OR process_name= \"qwinsta.exe\" OR process_name= \"reg.exe\" OR process_name= \"runas.exe\" OR process_name= \"sc.exe\" OR process_name= \"schtasks.exe\" OR process_name= \"ssh.exe\" OR process_name= \"systeminfo.exe\" OR process_name= \"taskkill.exe\" OR process_name= \"telnet.exe\" OR process_name= \"tracert.exe\" OR process_name=\"wscript.exe\" OR process_name= \"xcopy.exe\")", "description": "This macro is a list of process that can be used to discover the network configuration"}, {"name": "uncommon_processes", "definition": "lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_default process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_default,category_default,analytic_story_default,kill_chain_phase_default,mitre_attack_default | lookup update=true lookup_uncommon_processes_local process_name as process_name outputnew uncommon_local,category_local,analytic_story_local,kill_chain_phase_local,mitre_attack_local | eval uncommon = coalesce(uncommon_default, uncommon_local), analytic_story = coalesce(analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local), category=coalesce(category_default, category_local), kill_chain_phase=coalesce(kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local), mitre_attack=coalesce(mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local) | fields - analytic_story_default, analytic_story_local, category_default, category_local, kill_chain_phase_default, kill_chain_phase_local, mitre_attack_default, mitre_attack_local, uncommon_default, uncommon_local | search uncommon=true", "description": "This macro limits the output to processes that have been marked as uncommon"}, {"name": "windows_shells", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe)", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wineventlog_security", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_security", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wineventlog_system", "definition": "eventtype=wineventlog_system", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wineventlog_task_scheduler", "definition": "source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "wmi", "definition": "sourcetype=\"wineventlog:microsoft-windows-wmi-activity/operational\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "zeek_rpc", "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:rpc:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}, {"name": "zeek_ssl", "definition": "index=zeek sourcetype=\"zeek:ssl:json\"", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/response_tasks.json b/dist/api/response_tasks.json index 4802e70582..5a1f39bc9c 100644 --- a/dist/api/response_tasks.json +++ b/dist/api/response_tasks.json @@ -1,1944 +1 @@ -{ - "response_tasks": [ - { - "name": "All backup logs for host", - "id": "bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.", - "search": "| search `netbackup` dest=$dest$", - "how_to_implement": "The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Monitor Backup Solution" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "all_backup_logs_for_host" - }, - { - "name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", - "id": "a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-13", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", - "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "sourceIPs{}", - "user.username", - "requestURI", - "verb", - "userAgent", - "annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", - "id": "b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-08", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).", - "search": "`aws_securityhub_firehose` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Cloud Compute Instance", - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", - "findings{}.Resources{}.Id", - "instance", - "Remediation.Recommendation.Text", - "Title", - "ProductArn", - "Description", - "FirstObservedAt", - "RecordState" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", - "id": "703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "accessKeyId" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom", - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "userIdentity.accessKeyId", - "userIdentity.arn", - "sourceIPAddress", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "errorCode", - "errorMessage" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", - "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-04-30", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "user" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", - "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "AWS Security Hub Alerts", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "user", - "userIdentity.type", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.arn", - "aws_account_id", - "src", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "eventType" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", - "id": "2e11293f-c795-41bd-b470-fc87adc4e196", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-01-22", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID", - "search": "`aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*", - "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "networkAclId" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "id", - "account_id", - "vpc_id", - "network_acl_entries{}.*" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "aws_network_acl_details_from_id" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", - "id": "c55b0a17-8fca-4315-81e3-65ceaa176441", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.", - "search": "`aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp", - "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "resourceId" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "resourceId", - "ARN", - "relationships{}.resourceType", - "relationships{}.name", - "relationships{}.resourceId", - "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress", - "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid" - }, - { - "name": "AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", - "id": "2762d4ed-9266-465e-b966-1c10dc8d91f3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-26", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket.", - "search": "`aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList", - "how_to_implement": "To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "bucketName" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "resourceId", - "bucketName", - "resourceCreationTime", - "vendor_region", - "action", - "aws_account_id", - "supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", - "id": "c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-13", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", - "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", - "data.protoPayload.methodName", - "data.protoPayload.resourceName", - "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent", - "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", - "data.protoPayload.status.message", - "data.resource.labels.cluster_name", - "data.resource.type" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip" - }, - { - "name": "Get All AWS Activity From City", - "id": "0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "City" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.arn", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.type", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "errorCode" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_city" - }, - { - "name": "Get All AWS Activity From Country", - "id": "e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "Country" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.arn", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.type", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "errorCode" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_country" - }, - { - "name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", - "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.arn", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.type", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "errorCode" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address" - }, - { - "name": "Get All AWS Activity From Region", - "id": "5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "Region" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "sourceIPAddress", - "userIdentity.arn", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.type", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "errorCode" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_region" - }, - { - "name": "Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", - "id": "fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-14", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.", - "search": "`netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your backup logs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "COMPUTERNAME", - "MESSAGE" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_backup_logs_for_endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get Certificate logs for a domain", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-04-29", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by \"Let's Encrypt\" are widely used by attackers.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "domain" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Common Phishing Frameworks" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name", - "All_Certificates.dest", - "All_Certificates.src", - "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name", - "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain" - }, - { - "name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-11-09", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", - "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "DNS Hijacking", - "Data Protection", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Host Redirection", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "src_ip", - "dest_port", - "dest_ip" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host" - }, - { - "name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-11-09", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", - "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Data Protection", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Traffic.bytes_out", - "All_Traffic.bytes_in", - "All_Traffic.dest_port", - "All_Traffic.src", - "All_Traffic.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio" - }, - { - "name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", - "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-02-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", - "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", - "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "instanceId" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", - "AWS Security Hub Alerts" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "id", - "ip_address", - "tags", - "aws_account_id", - "placement", - "instance_type", - "key_name", - "launch_time", - "state", - "vpc_id", - "subnet_id" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid" - }, - { - "name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", - "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", - "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "AWS Security Hub Alerts" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "dest", - "userIdentity.arn", - "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", - "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", - "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", - "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", - "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details" - }, - { - "name": "Get Email Info", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-11-09", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.", - "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "message_id" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brand Monitoring", - "Suspicious Emails" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "message" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_email_info" - }, - { - "name": "Get Emails From Specific Sender", - "id": "5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-11-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.", - "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_user" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Brand Monitoring", - "Suspicious Emails", - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "src_user" - ], - "security_domain": "networks" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_emails_from_specific_sender" - }, - { - "name": "Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Sessions" - ], - "description": "This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_mac" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Asset Tracking" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Sessions.DHCP", - "All_Sessions.signature", - "All_Sessions.src_mac", - "All_Sessions.src_ip", - "All_Sessions.user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address" - }, - { - "name": "Get History Of Email Sources", - "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-02-21", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Email" - ], - "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", - "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "All_Email.dest", - "All_Email.recipient", - "All_Email.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources" - }, - { - "name": "Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", - "id": "03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505", - "version": 2, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as \"Account Modified\" | table _time, dest, \"Account Modified\", Access_Right, signature", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Account Monitoring and Controls" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "signature_id", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint" - }, - { - "name": "Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", - "id": "552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-27", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as \"Account Modified\" | table _time, dest, \"Account Modified\", Access_Right, signature", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "user" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Account Monitoring and Controls" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "signature_id", - "dest", - "user" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user" - }, - { - "name": "Get Notable History", - "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", - "version": 2, - "date": "2017-09-20", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", - "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", - "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cross Account Activity", - "AWS Cryptomining", - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "AWS User Monitoring", - "Account Monitoring and Controls", - "Apache Struts Vulnerability", - "Asset Tracking", - "Brand Monitoring", - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", - "Collection and Staging", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "DNS Amplification Attacks", - "Data Protection", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Host Redirection", - "JBoss Vulnerability", - "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor Backup Solution", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Monitor for Updates", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "Router and Infrastructure Security", - "SQL Injection", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", - "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", - "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious Emails", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", - "Unusual Processes", - "Use of Cleartext Protocols", - "Web Fraud Detection", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "Data Exfiltration", - "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "GCP Cross Account Activity", - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", - "Ransomware Cloud", - "Ryuk Ransomware", - "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", - "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", - "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history" - }, - { - "name": "Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", - "id": "80bac352-e089-46b9-a6a4-8a8467d4d8cf", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-14", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Email" - ], - "description": "This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`.", - "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "recipient", - "src_user", - "dest", - "sec" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors" - }, - { - "name": "Get Parent Process Info", - "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "parent_process_name", - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Phishing Payloads", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" - }, - { - "name": "Get Process File Activity", - "id": "6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-11-06", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest", - "process_name" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Filesystem.file_name", - "Filesystem.dest", - "Filesystem.process_name", - "Filesystem.file_path", - "Filesystem.action" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_process_file_activity" - }, - { - "name": "Get Process Info", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-04-01", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "process_name", - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Collection and Staging", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Data Protection", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_process_info" - }, - { - "name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", - "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-04-01", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest", - "dest_port" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Use of Cleartext Protocols", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Ports.process_id", - "Ports.src", - "Ports.dest_port" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity" - }, - { - "name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", - "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-04-01", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "Brand Monitoring", - "Data Protection", - "Dynamic DNS", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Command and Control" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Ports.process_id", - "Ports.src", - "Ports.dest_port" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic" - }, - { - "name": "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", - "id": "155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-23", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.", - "search": "`sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware", - "Suspicious WMI Use" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "user", - "Name", - "Operation", - "EventType", - "Type", - "Query", - "Consumer", - "Filter" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host" - }, - { - "name": "Get Web Session Information via session id", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-08", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code.", - "search": "`stream_http` session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status", - "how_to_implement": "This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "session_id" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Web Fraud Detection" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "session_id", - "http_user_agent", - "src_ip", - "status" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_web_session_information_via_session_id" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", - "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-02-09", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", - "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "vendor_region" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS Cryptomining", - "Cloud Cryptomining", - "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "vendor_region", - "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", - "eventName", - "user" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", - "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.", - "search": "`cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ", - "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "user" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "AWS User Monitoring", - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "user", - "userIdentity.type", - "userIdentity.userName", - "userIdentity.arn", - "aws_account_id", - "src", - "awsRegion", - "eventName", - "eventType" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", - "id": "097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-10", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.", - "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search user=$user$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "user" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.dest", - "Authentication.app", - "Authentication.action", - "Authentication.user" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", - "id": "9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-15", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "description": "This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.", - "search": "| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", - "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "src_ip" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Okta Activity by app", - "id": "420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-02", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app", - "search": "`okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "app" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "app", - "client.geographicalContext.country", - "client.geographicalContext.state", - "client.geographicalContext.city", - "user", - "displayMessage", - "src_ip", - "result", - "outcome.reason" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_app" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", - "id": "56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-02", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.", - "search": "`okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "app", - "client.geographicalContext.country", - "client.geographicalContext.state", - "client.geographicalContext.city", - "user", - "displayMessage", - "src_ip", - "result", - "outcome.reason" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", - "id": "ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-10", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "Logon_Type", - "AuthenticationPackageName", - "src_user", - "dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", - "id": "990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-10", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.", - "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user \"(?[^\\@]+)\" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user ", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "EventCode", - "user", - "dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Previous Unseen User", - "id": "ad114d5c-8079-4a84-a646-2fd00dfc07cc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-12-10", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days.", - "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d\") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.dest", - "Authentication.app", - "Authentication.action", - "Authentication.user" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_previous_unseen_user" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", - "id": "b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-14", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count", - "how_to_implement": "You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "SamSam Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature_id", - "Authentication.app", - "Authentication.src", - "Authentication.dest", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.src_nt_domain" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", - "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-10-20", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the \"payload\" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest.", - "search": "`stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field=\"cs_content_type\" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, \"application\"), \"True\", \"False\") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\" | fields \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url", - "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src_ip", - "dest_ip" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Apache Struts Vulnerability" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "src_ip", - "dest_ip", - "cs_content_type", - "url" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate User Activities In Okta", - "id": "24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-02", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [], - "description": "This search returns all okta events by a specific user", - "search": "`okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "user" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Okta Activity" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "client.geographicalContext.country", - "client.geographicalContext.state", - "client.geographicalContext.city", - "user", - "displayMessage", - "src_ip", - "result", - "outcome.reason" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_user_activities_in_okta" - }, - { - "name": "Investigate Web POSTs From src", - "id": "f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-06", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Web" - ], - "description": "This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. ", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")`| search http_method, \"POST\" | search src=$src$", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "src" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Apache Struts Vulnerability" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Web.url", - "Web.src", - "Web.http_user_agent", - "Web.http_method" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - }, - "lowercase_name": "investigate_web_posts_from_src" - }, - { - "name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", - "id": "fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-09", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", - "known_false_positives": "unknown", - "references": [ - "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html" - ], - "inputs": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "rundll32_lockworkstation" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"response_tasks": [{"name": "All backup logs for host", "id": "bc91a8cf-aaaa-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.", "search": "| search `netbackup` dest=$dest$", "how_to_implement": "The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "all_backup_logs_for_host"}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "id": "a636cca4-7434-4a15-a278-c70734938e39", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-13", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", "search": "`aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sourceIPs{}", "user.username", "requestURI", "verb", "userAgent", "annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip"}, {"name": "AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "id": "b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).", "search": "`aws_securityhub_firehose` \"findings{}.Resources{}.Type\"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Compute Instance", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "findings{}.Resources{}.Type", "findings{}.Resources{}.Id", "instance", "Remediation.Recommendation.Text", "Title", "ProductArn", "Description", "FirstObservedAt", "RecordState"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest"}, {"name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "id": "703b65a4-a0ae-4171-965d-45507506c64f", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.", "search": "`cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["accessKeyId"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom", "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS"], "required_fields": ["_time", "userIdentity.accessKeyId", "userIdentity.arn", "sourceIPAddress", "awsRegion", "eventName", "errorCode", "errorMessage"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid"}, {"name": "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd72", "version": 2, "date": "2019-04-30", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.", "search": "`cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["user"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user", "userIdentity.type", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.arn", "aws_account_id", "src", "awsRegion", "eventName", "eventType"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"}, {"name": "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "id": "2e11293f-c795-41bd-b470-fc87adc4e196", "version": 1, "date": "2017-01-22", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID", "search": "`aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["networkAclId"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "id", "account_id", "vpc_id", "network_acl_entries{}.*"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "aws_network_acl_details_from_id"}, {"name": "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "id": "c55b0a17-8fca-4315-81e3-65ceaa176441", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.", "search": "`aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["resourceId"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "resourceId", "ARN", "relationships{}.resourceType", "relationships{}.name", "relationships{}.resourceId", "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress", "configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid"}, {"name": "AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "id": "2762d4ed-9266-465e-b966-1c10dc8d91f3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-26", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket.", "search": "`aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList", "how_to_implement": "To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["bucketName"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "resourceId", "bucketName", "resourceCreationTime", "vendor_region", "action", "aws_account_id", "supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname"}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "id": "c00e7626-92cc-4e06-9a51-b6db0a50bd1f", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-13", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address", "search": "`google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type", "how_to_implement": "You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp", "data.protoPayload.methodName", "data.protoPayload.resourceName", "data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent", "data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail", "data.protoPayload.status.message", "data.resource.labels.cluster_name", "data.resource.type"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip"}, {"name": "Get All AWS Activity From City", "id": "0abeeb40-1255-4b68-91d1-7a7eb410c4b8", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["City"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.type", "awsRegion", "eventName", "errorCode"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_city"}, {"name": "Get All AWS Activity From Country", "id": "e763cdb9-00da-41e0-9bda-444debc9501a", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["Country"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.type", "awsRegion", "eventName", "errorCode"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_country"}, {"name": "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "id": "446ec87a-85c6-40d4-b060-bea4498281d6", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.type", "awsRegion", "eventName", "errorCode"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"}, {"name": "Get All AWS Activity From Region", "id": "5b794bef-1743-4f6f-804a-43915a2702ff", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.", "search": "`cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["Region"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "sourceIPAddress", "userIdentity.arn", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.type", "awsRegion", "eventName", "errorCode"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_all_aws_activity_from_region"}, {"name": "Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "id": "fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d44", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.", "search": "`netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your backup logs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "COMPUTERNAME", "MESSAGE"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_backup_logs_for_endpoint"}, {"name": "Get Certificate logs for a domain", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-2240-e756cc06fd73", "version": 2, "date": "2019-04-29", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by \"Let's Encrypt\" are widely used by attackers.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["domain"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Common Phishing Frameworks"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name", "All_Certificates.dest", "All_Certificates.src", "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name", "All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain"}, {"name": "Get DNS Server History for a host", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd72", "version": 1, "date": "2017-11-09", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.", "search": "| search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "DNS Hijacking", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip", "dest_port", "dest_ip"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"}, {"name": "Get DNS traffic ratio", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd73", "version": 1, "date": "2017-11-09", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. ", "search": "| tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as \"bytes_out\" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as \"bytes_in\" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting your network traffic", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Traffic.bytes_out", "All_Traffic.bytes_in", "All_Traffic.dest_port", "All_Traffic.src", "All_Traffic.dest"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_dns_traffic_ratio"}, {"name": "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "id": "de4aed1d-f13a-4d2f-a97a-73c60e2e6b56", "version": 1, "date": "2018-02-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field", "search": "`aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value,\" = \"), ip_address=if((ip_address == \"null\"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as \"Account ID\", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as \"IP Address\", key_name as \"Key Pair\", launch_time as \"Launch Time\", placement as \"Availability Zone\", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, \"tags.Name\" as Name, vpc_id as VPC", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["instanceId"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "id", "ip_address", "tags", "aws_account_id", "placement", "instance_type", "key_name", "launch_time", "state", "vpc_id", "subnet_id"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"}, {"name": "Get EC2 Launch Details", "id": "0e40fe83-3edb-4d86-8206-8fed36529ca6", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.", "search": "`cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName", "how_to_implement": "In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "dest", "userIdentity.arn", "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress", "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId", "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture", "responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_ec2_launch_details"}, {"name": "Get Email Info", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd75", "version": 1, "date": "2017-11-09", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.", "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["message_id"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "message"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_email_info"}, {"name": "Get Emails From Specific Sender", "id": "5df39b3f-447d-4869-b673-8f45ad4616fe", "version": 1, "date": "2017-11-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.", "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_user"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails", "Web Fraud Detection"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_user"], "security_domain": "networks"}, "lowercase_name": "get_emails_from_specific_sender"}, {"name": "Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd33", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Network_Sessions"], "description": "This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_mac"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Sessions.DHCP", "All_Sessions.signature", "All_Sessions.src_mac", "All_Sessions.src_ip", "All_Sessions.user"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address"}, {"name": "Get History Of Email Sources", "id": "ddc7af28-c34d-4392-af93-7f29a4e8806c", "version": 1, "date": "2019-02-21", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.", "search": "|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "All_Email.dest", "All_Email.recipient", "All_Email.src"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_history_of_email_sources"}, {"name": "Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "id": "03bffe94-ec7a-4cbe-b677-6af40d1c4505", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as \"Account Modified\" | table _time, dest, \"Account Modified\", Access_Right, signature", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "dest", "user"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint"}, {"name": "Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "id": "552bc86c-f72c-4d44-b3f2-06ede13af7bb", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-27", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as \"Account Modified\" | table _time, dest, \"Account Modified\", Access_Right, signature", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["user"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "signature_id", "dest", "user"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user"}, {"name": "Get Notable History", "id": "3d6c3213-5fff-4a1e-b57d-b24c262171e7", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.", "search": "| search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description", "how_to_implement": "If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity", "AWS Cryptomining", "AWS Network ACL Activity", "AWS User Monitoring", "Account Monitoring and Controls", "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "Asset Tracking", "Brand Monitoring", "Cloud Cryptomining", "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Collection and Staging", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DNS Amplification Attacks", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Dynamic DNS", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Host Redirection", "JBoss Vulnerability", "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor Backup Solution", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Monitor for Updates", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Router and Infrastructure Security", "SQL Injection", "SamSam Ransomware", "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious Emails", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "Unusual Processes", "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "Web Fraud Detection", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "Data Exfiltration", "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "GCP Cross Account Activity", "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "Ransomware Cloud", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_notable_history"}, {"name": "Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "id": "80bac352-e089-46b9-a6a4-8a8467d4d8cf", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Email"], "description": "This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`.", "search": "| from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "recipient", "src_user", "dest", "sec"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors"}, {"name": "Get Parent Process Info", "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["parent_process_name", "dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"}, {"name": "Get Process File Activity", "id": "6a9ad4d9-6ef2-4b85-953f-a37ab256acd5", "version": 2, "date": "2019-11-06", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | search dest=$dest$ | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest", "process_name"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Filesystem.file_name", "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.process_name", "Filesystem.file_path", "Filesystem.action"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_process_file_activity"}, {"name": "Get Process Info", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd71", "version": 2, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["process_name", "dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Collection and Staging", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Data Protection", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_process_info"}, {"name": "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "id": "9925d08f-561e-4faa-8912-e3888a842341", "version": 2, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest", "dest_port"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Ports.process_id", "Ports.src", "Ports.dest_port"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_process_information_for_port_activity"}, {"name": "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "id": "910e6512-edc9-4f93-ba24-5b786f47a672", "version": 2, "date": "2019-04-01", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Brand Monitoring", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest", "Processes.parent_process", "Ports.process_id", "Ports.src", "Ports.dest_port"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic"}, {"name": "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "id": "155e0571-7db6-42f2-aa62-9a3a4cf35c94", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.", "search": "`sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "user", "Name", "Operation", "EventType", "Type", "Query", "Consumer", "Filter"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host"}, {"name": "Get Web Session Information via session id", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-1120-e756cc06fd89", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code.", "search": "`stream_http` session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status", "how_to_implement": "This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["session_id"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "session_id", "http_user_agent", "src_ip", "status"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "get_web_session_information_via_session_id"}, {"name": "Investigate AWS activities via region name", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd11", "version": 1, "date": "2018-02-09", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user", "search": "`cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["vendor_region"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "vendor_region", "requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId", "eventName", "user"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name"}, {"name": "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd76", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.", "search": "`cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType ", "how_to_implement": "You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["user"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "user", "userIdentity.type", "userIdentity.userName", "userIdentity.arn", "aws_account_id", "src", "awsRegion", "eventName", "eventType"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field"}, {"name": "Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "id": "097e8030-8662-4254-a735-bf0bdda696e3", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.", "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search user=$user$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["user"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.dest", "Authentication.app", "Authentication.action", "Authentication.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations"}, {"name": "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "id": "9df9ca9c-a02b-4f48-9eba-0bac55179050", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-15", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Network_Traffic"], "description": "This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.", "search": "| from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip"}, {"name": "Investigate Okta Activity by app", "id": "420eb1b8-2992-45d1-80cf-0b1b2759524d", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app", "search": "`okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["app"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "app", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city", "user", "displayMessage", "src_ip", "result", "outcome.reason"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_app"}, {"name": "Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "id": "56aae066-d619-477c-93e3-3fb83b2d23c3", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.", "search": "`okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "app", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city", "user", "displayMessage", "src_ip", "result", "outcome.reason"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address"}, {"name": "Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "id": "ed3fff45-cba6-4990-983f-6fac72bee659", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "Logon_Type", "AuthenticationPackageName", "src_user", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts"}, {"name": "Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "id": "990007ad-d798-4b29-ab2f-f0034144c937", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.", "search": "`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user \"(?[^\\@]+)\" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user ", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "EventCode", "user", "dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts"}, {"name": "Investigate Previous Unseen User", "id": "ad114d5c-8079-4a84-a646-2fd00dfc07cc", "version": 1, "date": "2019-12-10", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days.", "search": "| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), \"-30d\") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.dest", "Authentication.app", "Authentication.action", "Authentication.user"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_previous_unseen_user"}, {"name": "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "id": "b6618e8e-be04-40a0-a0b9-f0bd4b6c81bc", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-14", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count", "how_to_implement": "You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "SamSam Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature_id", "Authentication.app", "Authentication.src", "Authentication.dest", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.src_nt_domain"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications"}, {"name": "Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "id": "bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd89", "version": 1, "date": "2017-10-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the \"payload\" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest.", "search": "`stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field=\"cs_content_type\" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, \"application\"), \"True\", \"False\") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\" | fields \"Suspicious Content-Type Found\", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url", "how_to_implement": "This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src_ip", "dest_ip"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "src_ip", "dest_ip", "cs_content_type", "url"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header"}, {"name": "Investigate User Activities In Okta", "id": "24ff145d-4d16-420a-b047-480f2a51c403", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": [], "description": "This search returns all okta events by a specific user", "search": "`okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting Okta logs", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["user"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "client.geographicalContext.country", "client.geographicalContext.state", "client.geographicalContext.city", "user", "displayMessage", "src_ip", "result", "outcome.reason"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_user_activities_in_okta"}, {"name": "Investigate Web POSTs From src", "id": "f5c39fac-205c-4e07-9004-8fd61ea3431a", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-06", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Web"], "description": "This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. ", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Web\")`| search http_method, \"POST\" | search src=$src$", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["src"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Web.url", "Web.src", "Web.http_user_agent", "Web.http_method"], "security_domain": "network"}, "lowercase_name": "investigate_web_posts_from_src"}, {"name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", "id": "fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-09", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= \"*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*\" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.", "known_false_positives": "unknown", "references": ["https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html"], "inputs": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "rundll32_lockworkstation"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/api/stories.json b/dist/api/stories.json index 9f63bb8c5a..aceac5e445 100644 --- a/dist/api/stories.json +++ b/dist/api/stories.json @@ -1,26514 +1 @@ -{ - "stories": [ - { - "name": "IcedID", - "id": "1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-29", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.", - "narrative": "IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains \"license.dat\" which is the actual core icedid bot.", - "references": [ - "https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", - "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "IcedID", - "analytic_story": "IcedID", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Dust Storm", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", - "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", - "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", - "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", - "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", - "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", - "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Active Directory Discovery", - "id": "8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-20", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.", - "narrative": "Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\\\nOnce an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Active Directory Discovery", - "analytic_story": "Active Directory Discovery", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1201", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1049", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", - "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", - "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", - "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", - "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", - "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", - "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", - "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", - "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", - "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", - "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", - "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", - "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco" - }, - { - "name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "id": "38b8cf16-8461-11ec-ade1-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-02", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.", - "narrative": "Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", - "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", - "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "analytic_story": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics", - "Account Compromise", - "Lateral Movement", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", - "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", - "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", - "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", - "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", - "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", - "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco" - }, - { - "name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad", - "version": 3, - "date": "2021-12-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.", - "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\\\nIndications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\\\nAn adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\\\nIf there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \\\n It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", - "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "analytic_story": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Night Dragon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", - "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", - "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", - "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", - "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", - "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", - "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" - ], - "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "id": "3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-07", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.", - "narrative": "In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\\\nPassword Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\\\nSpecifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "analytic_story": "Active Directory Password Spraying", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Chimera", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco" - }, - { - "name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", - "id": "2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-06", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.", - "narrative": "In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \\\nThe exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\\\nThe second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\\\nFirst, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\\\nLooking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of \"who,\" in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\\\nGathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nhen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIn the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", - "analytic_story": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", - "category": [ - "Vulnerability" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", - "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Asset Tracking", - "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.", - "narrative": "This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.", - "references": [ - "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Asset Tracking", - "analytic_story": "Asset Tracking", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Sessions" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Count of assets by category" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", - "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-04", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", - "narrative": "Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nHerein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", - "references": [ - "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", - "analytic_story": "AWS Cross Account Activity", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1550", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", - "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", - "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", - "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", - "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", - "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-08", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.", - "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\\\nHowever, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. ", - "references": [ - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", - "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", - "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", - "analytic_story": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-05-21", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.", - "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", - "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "analytic_story": "AWS Network ACL Activity", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", - "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", - "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-04", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS", - "narrative": "AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.", - "references": [ - "https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", - "analytic_story": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "AWS User Monitoring", - "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.", - "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \\\nFortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", - "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS User Monitoring", - "analytic_story": "AWS User Monitoring", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", - "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", - "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", - "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", - "id": "817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-27", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.", - "narrative": "A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing \"\\\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", - "analytic_story": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Shannon Davis" - }, - { - "name": "BITS Jobs", - "id": "dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-26", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", - "narrative": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "BITS Jobs", - "analytic_story": "BITS Jobs", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Brand Monitoring", - "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-12-19", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.", - "narrative": "While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\\\nYou can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\\\nNotable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.", - "references": [ - "https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", - "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Brand Monitoring", - "analytic_story": "Brand Monitoring", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [ - "Email", - "Network_Resolution", - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", - "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", - "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Caddy Wiper", - "id": "435a156a-8ef1-4184-bd52-22328fb65d3a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "Caddy Wiper is a destructive payload that detects if its running on a Domain Controller and executes killswitch if detected. If not in a DC it destroys Users and subsequent mapped drives. This wiper also destroys drive partitions inculding boot partitions.", - "narrative": "Caddy Wiper is destructive malware operation found by ESET multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload destroys user files, avoids executing on Dnomain Controllers and destroys boot and drive partitions.", - "references": [ - "https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1503436420886712321", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Caddy Wiper", - "analytic_story": "Caddy Wiper", - "category": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Malware", - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Cryptomining", - "id": "3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-10-02", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", - "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Cryptomining", - "analytic_story": "Cloud Cryptomining", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Change" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "id": "cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-26", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.", - "narrative": "This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.", - "references": [ - "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "analytic_story": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TEMP.Veles" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", - "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Cobalt Strike", - "id": "bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-16", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.", - "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\\\nSplunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\\\n`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\\\nPipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\\\nWith that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\\\n- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\\\n- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", - "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", - "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", - "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", - "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Cobalt Strike", - "analytic_story": "Cobalt Strike", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", - "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", - "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", - "id": "bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-01-09", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.", - "narrative": "Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\\\nThis Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\\\nSearches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.", - "references": [ - "https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", - "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", - "analytic_story": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", - "ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", - "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Jose Hernandez" - }, - { - "name": "Collection and Staging", - "id": "8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-03", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ", - "narrative": "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\\\n Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \\\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Collection and Staging", - "analytic_story": "Collection and Staging", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", - "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", - "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Command and Control", - "id": "943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-06-01", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.", - "narrative": "Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\\\nBecause this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", - "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Command and Control", - "analytic_story": "Command and Control", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1095", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "FIN6", - "HAFNIUM", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Resolution", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", - "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", - "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", - "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", - "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", - "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", - "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", - "id": "aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.", - "narrative": "Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", - "analytic_story": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1525", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", - "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Credential Dumping", - "id": "854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a", - "version": 3, - "date": "2020-02-04", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.", - "narrative": "Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\\\nOnce attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", - "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Credential Dumping", - "analytic_story": "Credential Dumping", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", - "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", - "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", - "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", - "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", - "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", - "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", - "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", - "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", - "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", - "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", - "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", - "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Data Destruction", - "id": "4ae5c0d1-cebd-47d1-bfce-71bf096e38aa", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and encrypting files.", - "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", - "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Data Destruction", - "analytic_story": "Data Destruction", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", - "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Data Exfiltration", - "id": "66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-21", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "description": "The stealing of data by an adversary.", - "narrative": "Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Data Exfiltration", - "analytic_story": "Data Exfiltration", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "Chimera", - "Magic Hound" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1041", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Chimera", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", - "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", - "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", - "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Shannon Davis" - }, - { - "name": "Data Protection", - "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-14", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.", - "narrative": "Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.", - "references": [ - "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", - "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", - "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Data Protection", - "analytic_story": "Data Protection", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Change_Analysis", - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", - "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", - "id": "0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.", - "narrative": "An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", - "analytic_story": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Leviathan", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Cryptomining", - "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", - "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Cryptomining", - "analytic_story": "AWS Cryptomining", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", - "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", - "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", - "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", - "id": "3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-03-16", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.", - "narrative": "Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", - "analytic_story": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", - "id": "9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-04-29", - "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", - "description": "Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. ", - "narrative": "As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", - "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", - "analytic_story": "Common Phishing Frameworks", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN6", - "Magic Hound", - "OilRig", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control", - "Delivery" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Splunk Research Team" - }, - { - "name": "Host Redirection", - "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-14", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.", - "narrative": "Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Host Redirection", - "analytic_story": "Host Redirection", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Exfiltration" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Command & Control" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", - "id": "8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.", - "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", - "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor Backup Solution", - "id": "abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.", - "narrative": "Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.", - "references": [ - "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor Backup Solution", - "analytic_story": "Monitor Backup Solution", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Compliance", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", - "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", - "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "id": "8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. ", - "narrative": "It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\\\nIt is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. ", - "references": [ - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "analytic_story": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Compliance", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", - "id": "6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-01-08", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.", - "narrative": "Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.", - "references": [ - "https://meltdownattack.com/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", - "analytic_story": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", - "category": [ - "Vulnerability" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [ - "Vulnerabilities" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-02-09", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.", - "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", - "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", - "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", - "id": "73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-04-09", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.", - "narrative": "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \\\n Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", - "analytic_story": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Web Fraud Detection", - "id": "18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-10-08", - "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.", - "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\\\nThese crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\\\nWhen developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\\\nThe account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\\\nThe anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\\\nAnother search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", - "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Web Fraud Detection", - "analytic_story": "Web Fraud Detection", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Fraud Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", - "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", - "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Jim Apger" - }, - { - "name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "id": "5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-18", - "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", - "description": "Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.", - "narrative": "This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", - "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", - "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", - "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "analytic_story": "Detect Zerologon Attack", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1210", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Dev Sec Ops", - "id": "0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-18", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "description": "This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.", - "narrative": "DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.", - "references": [ - "https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Dev Sec Ops", - "analytic_story": "Dev Sec Ops", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1554", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1199", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Sandworm Team", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1195", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "FIN7", - "HAFNIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Turla", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1567", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1212", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", - "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", - "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", - "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", - "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", - "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", - "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", - "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", - "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", - "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", - "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", - "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", - "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", - "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", - "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss" - }, - { - "name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "id": "0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.", - "narrative": "The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \\\nThere is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \\\nOne joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\\\nSuspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well.", - "references": [ - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "analytic_story": "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", - "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", - "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Disabling Security Tools", - "id": "fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-02-04", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.", - "narrative": "Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", - "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Disabling Security Tools", - "analytic_story": "Disabling Security Tools", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1553", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", - "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", - "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", - "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", - "id": "a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2016-09-13", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.", - "narrative": "The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\\\nThe search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.", - "references": [ - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", - "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", - "analytic_story": "DNS Amplification Attacks", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "DNS Hijacking", - "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-04", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.", - "narrative": "Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\\\nThe gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \\\nOn January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \\\n1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\\\n1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\\\n1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\\\n1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \\\nIn DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", - "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", - "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", - "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DNS Hijacking", - "analytic_story": "DNS Hijacking", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Discover DNS records" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", - "id": "0244fdee-61be-11ec-900e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-20", - "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities.", - "narrative": "On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation.", - "references": [ - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", - "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", - "analytic_story": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", - "category": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "Chimera", - "Indrik Spider", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco" - }, - { - "name": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "id": "e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-25", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.", - "narrative": "Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "analytic_story": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Double Zero Destructor", - "id": "f56e8c00-3224-4955-9a6e-924ec7da1df7", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-25", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "Double Zero Destructor is a destructive payload that enumerates Domain Controllers and executes killswitch if detected. Overwrites files with Zero blocks or using MS Windows API calls such as NtFileOpen, NtFSControlFile. This payload also deletes registry hives HKCU,HKLM, HKU, HKLM BCD.", - "narrative": "Double zero destructor enumerates domain controllers, delete registry hives and overwrites files using zero blocks and API calls.", - "references": [ - "https://cert.gov.ua/article/38088", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Double Zero Destructor", - "analytic_story": "Double Zero Destructor", - "category": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Malware", - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Dynamic DNS", - "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-09-06", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.", - "narrative": "Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", - "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", - "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", - "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Dynamic DNS", - "analytic_story": "Dynamic DNS", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Resolution", - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-01-27", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.", - "narrative": "The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \\\nAccording to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. ", - "references": [ - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", - "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", - "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "analytic_story": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1072", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-1314" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Email", - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", - "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "id": "7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-02", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.", - "narrative": "A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)", - "references": [ - "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", - "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", - "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "analytic_story": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Shannon Davis" - }, - { - "name": "FIN7", - "id": "df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.", - "narrative": "FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", - "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "FIN7", - "analytic_story": "FIN7", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", - "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "Higaisa" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", - "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", - "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", - "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", - "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", - "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", - "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", - "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", - "id": "0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-01", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", - "narrative": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nIn between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", - "references": [ - "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", - "analytic_story": "GCP Cross Account Activity", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", - "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", - "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", - "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "HAFNIUM Group", - "id": "beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.", - "narrative": "On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\\\nWhile the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\\\nThe following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", - "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "HAFNIUM Group", - "analytic_story": "HAFNIUM Group", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", - "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", - "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Hermetic Wiper", - "id": "b7511c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-02", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"Hermetic Wiper\". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more.", - "narrative": "Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction.", - "references": [ - "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Hermetic Wiper", - "analytic_story": "Hermetic Wiper", - "category": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Malware", - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", - "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "id": "baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-22", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.", - "narrative": "North Korea's government-sponsored \"cyber army\" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as \"Hidden Cobra,\" has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\\\nThese state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie \"The Interview\" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\\\nIn June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed \"Joanap,\" is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, \"Brambul,\" is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\\\nAmong other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, \"adnim$,\" which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.", - "references": [ - "https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", - "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "analytic_story": "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Exfiltration", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Resolution", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", - "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", - "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Information Sabotage", - "id": "b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.", - "narrative": "Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.", - "references": [ - "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Information Sabotage", - "analytic_story": "Information Sabotage", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud", - "Splunk Behavioral Analytics" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "id": "b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", - "narrative": "Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "analytic_story": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", - "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", - "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "JBoss Vulnerability", - "id": "1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-14", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.", - "narrative": "This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\\\nIt is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin\\\n1. Responsible party\\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\\\nGathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nIf you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIf a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \\\nIt can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", - "references": [ - "http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "JBoss Vulnerability", - "analytic_story": "JBoss Vulnerability", - "category": [ - "Vulnerability" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", - "id": "a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-15", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.", - "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", - "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1526", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", - "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", - "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", - "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", - "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", - "id": "c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", - "description": "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.", - "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", - "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", - "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "id": "e40d13e5-d38b-457e-af2a-e8e6a2f2b516", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", - "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", - "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", - "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", - "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "analytic_story": "Linux Persistence Techniques", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", - "id": "d310ccfe-5477-11ec-ad05-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-03", - "author": "Rod Soto", - "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin.", - "narrative": "These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", - "analytic_story": "Linux Post-Exploitation", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "no", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "id": "b9879c24-670a-44c0-895e-98cdb7d0e848", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.", - "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "analytic_story": "Linux Privilege Escalation", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "Leafminer", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1098", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Living Off The Land", - "id": "6f7982e2-900b-11ec-a54a-acde48001122", - "version": 2, - "date": "2022-03-16", - "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage analytics that allow you to identify the presence of an adversary leveraging native applications within your environment.", - "narrative": "Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applications already installed on the target operating system to achieve their objective. Native utilities provide the adversary with reduced chances of detection by antivirus software or EDR tools. This allows the adversary to blend in with native process behavior.", - "references": [ - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Living Off The Land", - "analytic_story": "Living Off The Land", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics", - "Unauthorized Software", - "Lateral Movement", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Leviathan", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "HAFNIUM", - "Mustang Panda", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", - "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", - "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", - "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", - "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", - "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", - "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", - "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", - "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Lou Stella" - }, - { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "id": "b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-12-11", - "author": "Jose Hernandez", - "description": "Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.", - "narrative": "In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called [\"A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land\"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.", - "references": [ - "https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", - "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", - "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "analytic_story": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Application Security", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Execution", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic", - "Risk", - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", - "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", - "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", - "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", - "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", - "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "no", - "author_name": "Jose Hernandez" - }, - { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell", - "id": "2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc", - "version": 5, - "date": "2017-08-23", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Attackers are finding stealthy ways \"live off the land,\" leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.", - "narrative": "The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin \\\n1. Responsible party \\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \\\nDetermining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \\\nGathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \\\nOften, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \\\nIn the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \\\nMost recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.", - "references": [ - "https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Malicious PowerShell", - "analytic_story": "Malicious PowerShell", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1140", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Leviathan", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", - "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", - "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", - "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", - "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", - "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "id": "f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-26", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.", - "narrative": "Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\\\nThe following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\\\nThere will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "analytic_story": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", - "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Meterpreter", - "id": "d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-08", - "author": "Michael Hart", - "description": "Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.", - "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\\\nMeterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.", - "references": [ - "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", - "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", - "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Meterpreter", - "analytic_story": "Meterpreter", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1033", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery", - "Execution" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "no", - "author_name": "Michael Hart" - }, - { - "name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "id": "4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-08", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.", - "narrative": "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \\\n1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", - "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "analytic_story": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Monitor for Updates", - "id": "9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.", - "narrative": "It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\\\nSearches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\\\nMicrosoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed.", - "references": [ - "https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Monitor for Updates", - "analytic_story": "Monitor for Updates", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Compliance", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [ - "Updates" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures", - "ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Netsh Abuse", - "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-01-05", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.", - "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\\\nTo get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", - "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", - "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Netsh Abuse", - "analytic_story": "Netsh Abuse", - "category": [ - "Abuse" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", - "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Network Discovery", - "id": "af228995-f182-49d7-90b3-2a732944f00f", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-02-14", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more.", - "narrative": "Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Network Discovery", - "analytic_story": "Network Discovery", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "NOBELIUM Group", - "id": "758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-12-14", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.", - "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", - "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "NOBELIUM Group", - "analytic_story": "NOBELIUM Group", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1018", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer", - "Naikon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Elderwood", - "Frankenstein", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "SilverTerrier" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Command And Control", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic", - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", - "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", - "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", - "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss" - }, - { - "name": "Office 365 Detections", - "id": "1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-12-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "description": "This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.", - "narrative": "More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.", - "references": [ - "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Office 365 Detections", - "analytic_story": "Office 365 Detections", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1136", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1556", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN5", - "Fox Kitten", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Magic Hound", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky", - "Silent Librarian" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN4", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Leafminer" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", - "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", - "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss" - }, - { - "name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-01-22", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.", - "narrative": "In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\\\nAwareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\\\nHealthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\\\nThis Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.", - "references": [ - "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", - "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "analytic_story": "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", - "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", - "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", - "id": "97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-31", - "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "description": "PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.", - "narrative": "In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.", - "references": [ - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", - "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", - "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", - "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", - "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", - "analytic_story": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1187", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkHydrus", - "Dragonfly 2.0" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", - "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "id": "988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-01-22", - "author": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense", - "description": "Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.", - "narrative": "This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\\\niDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, \"Orz,\" which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as \"temp.Periscope\" and \"Leviathan\"). The file is executed using Wscript.\\\nThe MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run]'help'='c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\rundll32.exe c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\\\programdata\\\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\\\nThis Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\\\nIf behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\\\n\\\n1. www.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. about.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. db.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. news.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. update.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\\\n\\\n1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\\\n1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\\\n1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\\\n1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\\\n1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c", - "references": [ - "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", - "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "analytic_story": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", - "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "iDefense", - "author_name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team" - }, - { - "name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "id": "fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-07-01", - "author": "Splunk Threat Research Team", - "description": "The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.", - "narrative": "This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \\\nThe prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \\\n1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \\\n1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \\\n1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \\\nIn the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", - "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", - "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "analytic_story": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", - "category": [ - "Vulnerability" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", - "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", - "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", - "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", - "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", - "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "no", - "author_name": "Splunk Threat Research Team" - }, - { - "name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "id": "6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-11", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.", - "narrative": "A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.", - "references": [ - "http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "analytic_story": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Resolution", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", - "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", - "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", - "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", - "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "ProxyShell", - "id": "413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-08-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "description": "ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.", - "narrative": "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.", - "references": [ - "https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", - "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", - "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", - "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "ProxyShell", - "analytic_story": "ProxyShell", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics", - "Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", - "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Ransomware", - "id": "cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-02-04", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.", - "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.", - "references": [ - "https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", - "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "CopyKittens", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Gallmaker", - "HAFNIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sowbug", - "Turla", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1560", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Evilnum", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "Chimera", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Poseidon Group", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "Deep Panda", - "GALLIUM", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "Rancor", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "CostaRicto", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Volatile Cedar" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "FIN4", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Orangeworm", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "SilverTerrier", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Command And Control", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Exfiltration", - "Impact", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Reconnaissance", - "Resource Development" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", - "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", - "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", - "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", - "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", - "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", - "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", - "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", - "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", - "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", - "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", - "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", - "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", - "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", - "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", - "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", - "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", - "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", - "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", - "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", - "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", - "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", - "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", - "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", - "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", - "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "id": "0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-06", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.", - "narrative": "BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", - "references": [ - "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "BlackMatter Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", - "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", - "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", - "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", - "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Clop Ransomware", - "id": "5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-17", - "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", - "narrative": "Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", - "references": [ - "https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", - "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", - "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Clop Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "Clop Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", - "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", - "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Ransomware Cloud", - "id": "f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-10-27", - "author": "Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.", - "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.", - "references": [ - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", - "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ransomware Cloud", - "analytic_story": "Ransomware Cloud", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", - "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1197", - "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Leviathan", - "Patchwork" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Exfiltration", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", - "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", - "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", - "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", - "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", - "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", - "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Revil Ransomware", - "id": "817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-06-04", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", - "narrative": "Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", - "references": [ - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Revil Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "Revil Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", - "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", - "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", - "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", - "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Ryuk Ransomware", - "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-11-06", - "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.", - "narrative": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Ryuk Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "Ryuk Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1482", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "Chimera", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", - "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", - "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", - "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Jose Hernandez" - }, - { - "name": "SamSam Ransomware", - "id": "c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-12-13", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.", - "narrative": "The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\\\nAlthough categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a \"spray-and-pray\" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\\\nSamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\\\nIn a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\\\nAccording to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.", - "references": [ - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", - "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", - "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SamSam Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "SamSam Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1486", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "APT41", - "FIN7", - "Indrik Spider", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1082", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Sowbug", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic", - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", - "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", - "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", - "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", - "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", - "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", - "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Remcos", - "id": "2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-09-23", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..", - "narrative": "Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.", - "references": [ - "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", - "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.&text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns." - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Remcos", - "analytic_story": "Remcos", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", - "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Higaisa", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "Evilnum", - "FIN6", - "Leafminer", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT3", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "Ajax Security Team", - "FIN6", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA505", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1113", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN7", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1592", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", - "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", - "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", - "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", - "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", - "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", - "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", - "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.", - "narrative": "Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\\\nThis Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", - "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", - "analytic_story": "Router and Infrastructure Security", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1200", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "DarkVishnya" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cleaver" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1542", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Sidewinder", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Exfiltration", - "Impact", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Authentication", - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "id": "9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-11-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.", - "narrative": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. \\\nThere are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \\\nTypically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \\\nNote that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \\\nParallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "analytic_story": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Silver Sparrow", - "id": "cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-24", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.", - "narrative": "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party Caffiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", - "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Silver Sparrow", - "analytic_story": "Silver Sparrow", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1074", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection", - "Command And Control", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Spearphishing Attachments", - "id": "57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-04-29", - "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", - "description": "Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.", - "narrative": "Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \\\nAs most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely \"automate\" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \\\nWhile any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \\\nFollowing is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\\\n1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\\\n1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\\\n1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Spearphishing Attachments", - "analytic_story": "Spearphishing Attachments", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", - "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", - "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", - "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", - "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", - "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Splunk Research Team" - }, - { - "name": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", - "id": "5354df00-dce2-48ac-9a64-8adb48006828", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-28", - "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", - "description": "Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product.", - "narrative": "This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0301.html", - "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3422" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", - "analytic_story": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Application Security", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1498", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", - "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", - "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Lou Stella" - }, - { - "name": "SQL Injection", - "id": "4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-19", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.", - "narrative": "It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.", - "references": [ - "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", - "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "SQL Injection", - "analytic_story": "SQL Injection", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Web" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2019-05-01", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ", - "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.", - "references": [ - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", - "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", - "id": "66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-07-24", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", - "narrative": "As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\\\nAmazon's \"shared responsibility\" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\\\nAmong things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. ", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", - "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", - "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-07", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).", - "narrative": "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\\\n Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.", - "references": [ - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", - "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", - "id": "6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-06-04", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ", - "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\\\nThis Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.", - "references": [ - "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1535", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "id": "8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-25", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", - "narrative": "Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1537", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Change" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", - "id": "51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-08-20", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", - "narrative": "Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Change" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", - "id": "1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-09-04", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.", - "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.", - "references": [ - "https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", - "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT33" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1580", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204", - "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Change" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", - "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", - "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", - "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "id": "f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-02-03", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.", - "narrative": "The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", - "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Deep Panda", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "Inception", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TEMP.Veles", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", - "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", - "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "id": "a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-11", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", - "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \\\nHH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \\\nDuring investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \\\nUpon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT41", - "Dark Caracal", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Silence" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "id": "3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-18", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.", - "narrative": "Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.", - "references": [ - "http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", - "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", - "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT33", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Lazarus Group", - "OilRig", - "Thrip", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN7", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1048", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1071", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Magic Hound", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1189", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "Windigo", - "Windshift" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Exfiltration", - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", - "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", - "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Emails", - "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-01-27", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.", - "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\\\nOnce a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \\\n1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\\\n1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\\\n1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Emails", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Emails", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Email", - "UEBA" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Delivery" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", - "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", - "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", - "id": "4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-08-05", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", - "narrative": "Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.", - "references": [ - "https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", - "category": [ - "Cloud Security" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1530", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Fox Kitten" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Collection" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Shannon Davis" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "id": "1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc", - "version": 2, - "date": "2021-01-20", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", - "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution \\\n1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", - "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", - "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments" - ], - "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", - "id": "9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-02", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.", - "narrative": "Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \\\nWhile SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \\\nWith people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", - "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", - "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Okta Activity", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN4", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "Leviathan", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "Suckfly", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", - "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", - "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", - "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", - "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "id": "2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-11", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", - "narrative": " Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", - "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", - "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "id": "b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-29", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.", - "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with \"SquiblyDoo\" using the \"scrobj.dll\" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cobalt Group", - "Deep Panda", - "Inception", - "Leviathan", - "TA551", - "WIRTE" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", - "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "id": "80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-02-03", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.", - "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Cleaver", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "HAFNIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Whitefly" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", - "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", - "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-31", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.", - "narrative": "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called \"registry\" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\\\n The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry.", - "references": [ - "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Lazarus Group", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TEMP.Veles" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious WMI Use", - "id": "c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-10-23", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.", - "narrative": "WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.", - "references": [ - "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious WMI Use", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious WMI Use", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT33", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN8", - "Leviathan", - "Mustang Panda", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1220", - "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Cobalt Group", - "Higaisa" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", - "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", - "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", - "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", - "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", - "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", - "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", - "id": "aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-04-13", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.", - "narrative": "Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\\\nCurrent detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", - "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", - "analytic_story": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", - "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Trickbot", - "id": "16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-04-20", - "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.", - "narrative": "trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.", - "references": [ - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", - "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Trickbot", - "analytic_story": "Trickbot", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN6", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "MuddyWater", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sandworm Team", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "FIN7", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Sidewinder", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "HAFNIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Andariel", - "HAFNIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", - "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", - "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", - "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", - "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", - "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", - "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", - "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", - "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "author_name": "Rod Soto" - }, - { - "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "id": "270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-12", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.", - "narrative": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", - "id": "be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-01-21", - "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.", - "narrative": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\\\nThe inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution\\\n1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", - "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", - "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", - "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", - "analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Frankenstein" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Haag" - }, - { - "name": "Unusual Processes", - "id": "f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-02-04", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.", - "narrative": "Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\\\nThis Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\\\nIn the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.", - "references": [ - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", - "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", - "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Unusual Processes", - "analytic_story": "Unusual Processes", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1016", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "CopyKittens", - "Gamaredon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "MuddyWater", - "Sandworm Team", - "TA505", - "TA551" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "CostaRicto", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1190", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Initial Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackTech", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Fox Kitten", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Night Dragon", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "Volatile Cedar", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Initial Access", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Reconnaissance", - "Resource Development" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", - "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", - "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", - "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", - "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", - "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", - "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", - "id": "826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21", - "version": 1, - "date": "2017-09-15", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.", - "narrative": "Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.", - "references": [ - "https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", - "analytic_story": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", - "category": [ - "Best Practices" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Traffic" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "WhisperGate", - "id": "0150e6e5-3171-442e-83f8-1ccd8599569b", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-01-19", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"WhisperGate\". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more.", - "narrative": "WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques.", - "references": [ - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", - "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "WhisperGate", - "analytic_story": "WhisperGate", - "category": [ - "Data Destruction", - "Malware", - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Indrik Spider", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "OilRig", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Whitefly", - "Windigo" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Ke3chang", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Orangeworm", - "Sandworm Team", - "Threat Group-1314", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1047", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Deep Panda", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Sandworm Team", - "Stealth Falcon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Darkhotel" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN4", - "FIN7", - "Frankenstein", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Windshift" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Mustang Panda", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Resource Development" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT1", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Cleaver", - "Cobalt Group", - "CopyKittens", - "CostaRicto", - "DarkHydrus", - "DarkVishnya", - "Dragonfly", - "FIN10", - "FIN5", - "FIN6", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gorgon Group", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Leafminer", - "Magic Hound", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Patchwork", - "PittyTiger", - "Sandworm Team", - "Silence", - "Silent Librarian", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Thrip", - "Turla", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT37", - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1561", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Resource Development" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", - "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", - "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", - "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", - "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "id": "56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-05-31", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ", - "narrative": "Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "analytic_story": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Lazarus Group", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1027", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "BlackOasis", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dust Storm", - "Elderwood", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Group5", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leafminer", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Night Dragon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT38", - "Carbanak", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Operation Wocao", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Cobalt Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Sharpshooter", - "Silence", - "Turla" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Putter Panda", - "TA505", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1218", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Impact", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation", - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", - "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", - "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", - "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", - "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", - "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", - "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", - "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", - "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", - "id": "f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-03-04", - "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", - "description": "Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.", - "narrative": "Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", - "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", - "analytic_story": "Windows Discovery Techniques", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Behavioral Analytics", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "TA505" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Chimera", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Michael Hart" - }, - { - "name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", - "id": "36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-07-28", - "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", - "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.", - "narrative": "When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).", - "references": [ - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", - "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", - "analytic_story": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1203", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT12", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT41", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Elderwood", - "Frankenstein", - "HAFNIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Patchwork", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "TA459", - "The White Company", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "admin@338" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Network_Resolution" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Shannon Davis" - }, - { - "name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "id": "30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-01-26", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.", - "narrative": "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \\\n Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \\\n Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to \"hide extensions for known file types.\" In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\\\nChanging the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\\\nRun the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations.", - "references": [ - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "analytic_story": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "GALLIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", - "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Log Manipulation", - "id": "b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835", - "version": 2, - "date": "2017-09-12", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.", - "narrative": "Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\\\nThe Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).", - "references": [ - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", - "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Log Manipulation", - "analytic_story": "Windows Log Manipulation", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Security Monitoring", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Chimera", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN5", - "FIN8", - "Indrik Spider", - "Operation Wocao" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Impact" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", - "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "id": "30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2018-05-31", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", - "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.", - "references": [ - "http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", - "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "analytic_story": "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Lazarus Group", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Cobalt Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "CostaRicto", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Machete", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Silence", - "Stealth Falcon", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", - "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", - "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", - "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", - "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", - "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", - "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", - "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", - "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", - "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", - "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", - "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", - "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", - "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", - "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", - "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "id": "644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5", - "version": 2, - "date": "2020-02-04", - "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", - "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.", - "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "analytic_story": "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "category": [ - "Adversary Tactics" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT12", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT30", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "DarkHydrus", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "FIN4", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "Gallmaker", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Inception", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Machete", - "Magic Hound", - "Mofang", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "RTM", - "Rancor", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA459", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "The White Company", - "Tonto Team", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "FIN7", - "Operation Wocao", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Rocke" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "Cobalt Group" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BlackTech", - "Chimera", - "GALLIUM", - "Higaisa", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "Patchwork", - "Sidewinder", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Deep Panda", - "Fox Kitten" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TEMP.Veles" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Blue Mockingbird", - "FIN6" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "FIN8" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1068", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "Cobalt Group", - "FIN6", - "FIN8", - "PLATINUM", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Turla", - "Whitefly", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", - "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", - "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", - "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", - "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", - "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", - "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "David Dorsey" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Registry Abuse", - "id": "78df1df1-25f1-4387-90f9-c4ea31ce6b75", - "version": 1, - "date": "2022-03-17", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", - "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, collection of data, a tool for recon, credential dumping and payload impact. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows registry are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", - "narrative": "Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows features that can tweak or manipulate Windows policies and low-level configuration settings. Because of this capability, most malware, adversaries or threat actors abuse this hierarchical database to do their malicious intent on a targeted host or network environment. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify registry in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Registry Abuse", - "analytic_story": "Windows Registry Abuse", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT3", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Axiom", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "OilRig", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1021", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Lateral Movement" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1552", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Kimsuky" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1112", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN8", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Honeybee", - "Kimsuky", - "Operation Wocao", - "Patchwork", - "Silence", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "Lazarus Group", - "Mustang Panda", - "Rocke", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1564", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "APT37", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Evilnum", - "Honeybee", - "MuddyWater", - "Patchwork", - "Threat Group-3390" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1490", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1127", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1491", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "FIN7" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT18", - "APT19", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Cobalt Group", - "Dark Caracal", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "FIN10", - "FIN6", - "FIN7", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Higaisa", - "Honeybee", - "Inception", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Putter Panda", - "RTM", - "Rocke", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Windshift", - "Wizard Spider", - "ZIRCONIUM" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "TEMP.Veles" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1485", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT38", - "Lazarus Group", - "Sandworm Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Impact", - "Lateral Movement", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Delivery", - "Exploitation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", - "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", - "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", - "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", - "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", - "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", - "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", - "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", - "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", - "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", - "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", - "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", - "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", - "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - }, - { - "name": "Windows Service Abuse", - "id": "6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2", - "version": 3, - "date": "2017-11-02", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", - "narrative": "The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", - "references": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", - "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Windows Service Abuse", - "analytic_story": "Windows Service Abuse", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1574", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569", - "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Chimera", - "FIN6", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Operation Wocao", - "Silence", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion", - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", - "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", - "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", - "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", - "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Rico Valdez" - }, - { - "name": "XMRig", - "id": "06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-07", - "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.", - "narrative": "XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", - "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", - "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "XMRig", - "analytic_story": "XMRig", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT1", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Chimera", - "Darkhotel", - "FIN7", - "Ferocious Kitten", - "Fox Kitten", - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Machete", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Naikon", - "PROMETHIUM", - "Patchwork", - "Poseidon Group", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "Sowbug", - "TEMP.Veles", - "Transparent Tribe", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Whitefly", - "admin@338", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1036", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT32", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "PLATINUM", - "TA551", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1595", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1531", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "FIN6", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "MuddyWater", - "Night Dragon", - "Putter Panda", - "Rocke", - "TeamTNT", - "Turla", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1562", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1105", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT-C-36", - "APT18", - "APT28", - "APT29", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT33", - "APT37", - "APT38", - "APT39", - "APT41", - "Ajax Security Team", - "Andariel", - "BRONZE BUTLER", - "BackdoorDiplomacy", - "Chimera", - "Cobalt Group", - "Darkhotel", - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Elderwood", - "Evilnum", - "FIN7", - "FIN8", - "Fox Kitten", - "Frankenstein", - "GALLIUM", - "Gamaredon Group", - "Gorgon Group", - "HAFNIUM", - "IndigoZebra", - "Indrik Spider", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "Leviathan", - "Magic Hound", - "Molerats", - "MuddyWater", - "Mustang Panda", - "Nomadic Octopus", - "OilRig", - "Operation Wocao", - "PLATINUM", - "Patchwork", - "Rancor", - "Rocke", - "Sandworm Team", - "Sharpshooter", - "Sidewinder", - "Silence", - "TA505", - "TA551", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tonto Team", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Turla", - "Volatile Cedar", - "WIRTE", - "Whitefly", - "Windshift", - "ZIRCONIUM", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1087", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Discovery" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT29" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1489", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Impact" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Indrik Spider", - "Lazarus Group", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1222", - "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Defense Evasion" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1053", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Execution", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT19", - "APT3", - "APT32", - "APT38", - "APT41", - "Blue Mockingbird", - "Carbanak", - "Cobalt Group", - "DarkVishnya", - "FIN7", - "Honeybee", - "Ke3chang", - "Kimsuky", - "Lazarus Group", - "PROMETHIUM", - "TeamTNT", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Tropic Trooper", - "Wizard Spider" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1543", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Command And Control", - "Credential Access", - "Defense Evasion", - "Discovery", - "Execution", - "Impact", - "Persistence", - "Privilege Escalation", - "Reconnaissance" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives", - "Command & Control", - "Exploitation", - "Installation" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", - "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", - "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", - "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", - "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", - "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", - "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", - "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", - "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", - "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", - "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", - "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", - "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", - "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [], - "baseline_names": [], - "author_company": "Rod Soto Splunk", - "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"stories": [{"name": "IcedID", "id": "1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-29", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.", "narrative": "IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains \"license.dat\" which is the actual core icedid bot.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "tags": {"name": "IcedID", "analytic_story": "IcedID", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Dust Storm", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Windigo", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Active Directory Discovery", "id": "8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-20", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.", "narrative": "Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\\\nOnce an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "tags": {"name": "Active Directory Discovery", "analytic_story": "Active Directory Discovery", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco"}, {"name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "id": "38b8cf16-8461-11ec-ade1-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-02", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.", "narrative": "Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"], "tags": {"name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "analytic_story": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco"}, {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad", "version": 3, "date": "2021-12-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.", "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\\\nIndications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\\\nAn adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\\\nIf there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \\\n It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"], "tags": {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "analytic_story": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT32", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Kimsuky", "Night Dragon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", "id": "3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-07", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.", "narrative": "In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\\\nPassword Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\\\nSpecifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"], "tags": {"name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", "analytic_story": "Active Directory Password Spraying", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco"}, {"name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "id": "2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-06", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.", "narrative": "In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \\\nThe exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\\\nThe second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\\\nFirst, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\\\nLooking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of \"who,\" in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\\\nGathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nhen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIn the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "references": ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"], "tags": {"name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "analytic_story": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Asset Tracking", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"], "tags": {"name": "Asset Tracking", "analytic_story": "Asset Tracking", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Network_Sessions"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "narrative": "Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nHerein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "analytic_story": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-08", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.", "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\\\nHowever, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. ", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"], "tags": {"name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "analytic_story": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4", "version": 2, "date": "2018-05-21", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.", "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "analytic_story": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS", "narrative": "AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "analytic_story": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "AWS User Monitoring", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.", "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \\\nFortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "tags": {"name": "AWS User Monitoring", "analytic_story": "AWS User Monitoring", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "id": "817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-27", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.", "narrative": "A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing \"\\\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "tags": {"name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "analytic_story": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis"}, {"name": "BITS Jobs", "id": "dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", "narrative": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"], "tags": {"name": "BITS Jobs", "analytic_story": "BITS Jobs", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Brand Monitoring", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78", "version": 1, "date": "2017-12-19", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.", "narrative": "While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\\\nYou can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\\\nNotable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.", "references": ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"], "tags": {"name": "Brand Monitoring", "analytic_story": "Brand Monitoring", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Caddy Wiper", "id": "435a156a-8ef1-4184-bd52-22328fb65d3a", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "Caddy Wiper is a destructive payload that detects if its running on a Domain Controller and executes killswitch if detected. If not in a DC it destroys Users and subsequent mapped drives. This wiper also destroys drive partitions inculding boot partitions.", "narrative": "Caddy Wiper is destructive malware operation found by ESET multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload destroys user files, avoids executing on Dnomain Controllers and destroys boot and drive partitions.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1503436420886712321", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine/"], "tags": {"name": "Caddy Wiper", "analytic_story": "Caddy Wiper", "category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Cloud Cryptomining", "id": "3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a", "version": 1, "date": "2019-10-02", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Cryptomining", "analytic_story": "Cloud Cryptomining", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "id": "cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-26", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.", "narrative": "This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.", "references": ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "tags": {"name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "analytic_story": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike", "id": "bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-16", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\\\nSplunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\\\n`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\\\nPipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\\\nWith that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\\\n- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\\\n- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\\\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.", "references": ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"], "tags": {"name": "Cobalt Strike", "analytic_story": "Cobalt Strike", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "id": "bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390", "version": 1, "date": "2019-01-09", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.", "narrative": "Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\\\nThis Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\\\nSearches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.", "references": ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"], "tags": {"name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "analytic_story": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez"}, {"name": "Collection and Staging", "id": "8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ", "narrative": "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\\\n Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \\\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"], "tags": {"name": "Collection and Staging", "analytic_story": "Collection and Staging", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Command and Control", "id": "943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8", "version": 1, "date": "2018-06-01", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.", "narrative": "Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\\\nBecause this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"], "tags": {"name": "Command and Control", "analytic_story": "Command and Control", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "id": "aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.", "narrative": "Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "tags": {"name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "analytic_story": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1525", "mitre_attack_technique": "Implant Internal Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Credential Dumping", "id": "854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a", "version": 3, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.", "narrative": "Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\\\nOnce attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\\\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "tags": {"name": "Credential Dumping", "analytic_story": "Credential Dumping", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Data Destruction", "id": "4ae5c0d1-cebd-47d1-bfce-71bf096e38aa", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and encrypting files.", "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware"], "tags": {"name": "Data Destruction", "analytic_story": "Data Destruction", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Data Exfiltration", "id": "66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-21", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "The stealing of data by an adversary.", "narrative": "Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"], "tags": {"name": "Data Exfiltration", "analytic_story": "Data Exfiltration", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1041", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Chimera", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis"}, {"name": "Data Protection", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.", "narrative": "Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"], "tags": {"name": "Data Protection", "analytic_story": "Data Protection", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "id": "0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.", "narrative": "An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"], "tags": {"name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "analytic_story": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "AWS Cryptomining", "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \\\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \\\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \\\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Cryptomining", "analytic_story": "AWS Cryptomining", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "id": "3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f", "version": 1, "date": "2018-03-16", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.", "narrative": "Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "analytic_story": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", "id": "9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-29", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "description": "Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. ", "narrative": "As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.", "references": ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"], "tags": {"name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", "analytic_story": "Common Phishing Frameworks", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Ajax Security Team", "Dark Caracal", "FIN6", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Splunk Research Team"}, {"name": "Host Redirection", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.", "narrative": "Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"], "tags": {"name": "Host Redirection", "analytic_story": "Host Redirection", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command & Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "id": "8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.", "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Monitor Backup Solution", "id": "abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.", "narrative": "Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"], "tags": {"name": "Monitor Backup Solution", "analytic_story": "Monitor Backup Solution", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "id": "8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. ", "narrative": "It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\\\nIt is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. ", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "tags": {"name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "analytic_story": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TEMP.Veles", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Reconnaissance"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "id": "6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2", "version": 1, "date": "2018-01-08", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.", "narrative": "Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.", "references": ["https://meltdownattack.com/"], "tags": {"name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "analytic_story": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Vulnerabilities"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-02-09", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.", "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "id": "73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0", "version": 1, "date": "2018-04-09", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.", "narrative": "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \\\n Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "analytic_story": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Web Fraud Detection", "id": "18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7", "version": 1, "date": "2018-10-08", "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.", "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\\\nThese crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\\\nWhen developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\\\nThe account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\\\nThe anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\\\nAnother search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script.", "references": ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"], "tags": {"name": "Web Fraud Detection", "analytic_story": "Web Fraud Detection", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Fraud Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jim Apger"}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "id": "5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-18", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.", "narrative": "This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"], "tags": {"name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "analytic_story": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Dev Sec Ops", "id": "0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-18", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "description": "This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.", "narrative": "DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "tags": {"name": "Dev Sec Ops", "analytic_story": "Dev Sec Ops", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1554", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Client Software Binary", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1199", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195", "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Leviathan", "Turla", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access", "Persistence"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss"}, {"name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "id": "0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.", "narrative": "The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \\\nThere is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \\\nOne joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\\\nSuspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"], "tags": {"name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "analytic_story": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Disabling Security Tools", "id": "fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.", "narrative": "Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Disabling Security Tools", "analytic_story": "Disabling Security Tools", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "id": "a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3", "version": 1, "date": "2016-09-13", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "narrative": "The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\\\nThe search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"], "tags": {"name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "analytic_story": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "DNS Hijacking", "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.", "narrative": "Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\\\nThe gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \\\nOn January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \\\n1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\\\n1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\\\n1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\\\n1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \\\nIn DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "tags": {"name": "DNS Hijacking", "analytic_story": "DNS Hijacking", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "id": "0244fdee-61be-11ec-900e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-20", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities.", "narrative": "On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation.", "references": ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html"], "tags": {"name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "analytic_story": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "category": ["Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "Chimera", "Indrik Spider", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco"}, {"name": "Domain Trust Discovery", "id": "e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-25", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.", "narrative": "Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"], "tags": {"name": "Domain Trust Discovery", "analytic_story": "Domain Trust Discovery", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Double Zero Destructor", "id": "f56e8c00-3224-4955-9a6e-924ec7da1df7", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-25", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "Double Zero Destructor is a destructive payload that enumerates Domain Controllers and executes killswitch if detected. Overwrites files with Zero blocks or using MS Windows API calls such as NtFileOpen, NtFSControlFile. This payload also deletes registry hives HKCU,HKLM, HKU, HKLM BCD.", "narrative": "Double zero destructor enumerates domain controllers, delete registry hives and overwrites files using zero blocks and API calls.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/38088", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html"], "tags": {"name": "Double Zero Destructor", "analytic_story": "Double Zero Destructor", "category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Dynamic DNS", "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221", "version": 2, "date": "2018-09-06", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.", "narrative": "Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "tags": {"name": "Dynamic DNS", "analytic_story": "Dynamic DNS", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52", "version": 1, "date": "2020-01-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.", "narrative": "The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \\\nAccording to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. ", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"], "tags": {"name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "analytic_story": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1072", "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Silence", "Threat Group-1314"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "id": "7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-02", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.", "narrative": "A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"], "tags": {"name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "analytic_story": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis"}, {"name": "FIN7", "id": "df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.", "narrative": "FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"], "tags": {"name": "FIN7", "analytic_story": "FIN7", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1220", "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "Higaisa"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "id": "0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-01", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "narrative": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\\\nIn between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"], "tags": {"name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "analytic_story": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "HAFNIUM Group", "id": "beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.", "narrative": "On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\\\nWhile the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\\\nThe following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "tags": {"name": "HAFNIUM Group", "analytic_story": "HAFNIUM Group", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Hermetic Wiper", "id": "b7511c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-02", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"Hermetic Wiper\". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more.", "narrative": "Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction.", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"], "tags": {"name": "Hermetic Wiper", "analytic_story": "Hermetic Wiper", "category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "id": "baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.", "narrative": "North Korea's government-sponsored \"cyber army\" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as \"Hidden Cobra,\" has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\\\nThese state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie \"The Interview\" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\\\nIn June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed \"Joanap,\" is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, \"Brambul,\" is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\\\nAmong other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, \"adnim$,\" which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "analytic_story": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Exfiltration", "Lateral Movement"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Information Sabotage", "id": "b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.", "narrative": "Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.", "references": ["https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/"], "tags": {"name": "Information Sabotage", "analytic_story": "Information Sabotage", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "id": "b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", "narrative": "Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"], "tags": {"name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "analytic_story": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "JBoss Vulnerability", "id": "1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-14", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\\\nIt is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\\\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\\\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin\\\n1. Responsible party\\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\\\nGathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\\\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\\\nIf you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\\\nIf a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\\\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \\\nIt can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "references": ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"], "tags": {"name": "JBoss Vulnerability", "analytic_story": "JBoss Vulnerability", "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "id": "a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-15", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.", "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "id": "c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "description": "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.", "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "tags": {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "analytic_story": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", "id": "e40d13e5-d38b-457e-af2a-e8e6a2f2b516", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", "analytic_story": "Linux Persistence Techniques", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", "id": "d310ccfe-5477-11ec-ad05-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-03", "author": "Rod Soto", "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin.", "narrative": "These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", "analytic_story": "Linux Post-Exploitation", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", "id": "b9879c24-670a-44c0-895e-98cdb7d0e848", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.", "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "tags": {"name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", "analytic_story": "Linux Privilege Escalation", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "Leafminer", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Linux)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Living Off The Land", "id": "6f7982e2-900b-11ec-a54a-acde48001122", "version": 2, "date": "2022-03-16", "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", "description": "Leverage analytics that allow you to identify the presence of an adversary leveraging native applications within your environment.", "narrative": "Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applications already installed on the target operating system to achieve their objective. Native utilities provide the adversary with reduced chances of detection by antivirus software or EDR tools. This allows the adversary to blend in with native process behavior.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "tags": {"name": "Living Off The Land", "analytic_story": "Living Off The Land", "category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Unauthorized Software", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Mustang Panda", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dark Caracal", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Lou Stella"}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "id": "b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52", "version": 1, "date": "2021-12-11", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "description": "Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.", "narrative": "In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called [\"A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land\"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.", "references": ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"], "tags": {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "analytic_story": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Risk", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez"}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell", "id": "2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc", "version": 5, "date": "2017-08-23", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Attackers are finding stealthy ways \"live off the land,\" leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.", "narrative": "The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \\\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \\\n1. Country of origin \\\n1. Responsible party \\\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \\\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \\\nDetermining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \\\nGathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \\\nOften, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \\\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \\\nIn the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \\\nMost recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.", "references": ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "tags": {"name": "Malicious PowerShell", "analytic_story": "Malicious PowerShell", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "TEMP.Veles", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Leviathan", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "id": "f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-26", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.", "narrative": "Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\\\nThe following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\\\nThere will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "tags": {"name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "analytic_story": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Meterpreter", "id": "d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-08", "author": "Michael Hart", "description": "Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\\\nMeterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\\\nWhile investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"], "tags": {"name": "Meterpreter", "analytic_story": "Meterpreter", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Michael Hart"}, {"name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "id": "4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-08", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.", "narrative": "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \\\n1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"], "tags": {"name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "analytic_story": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Monitor for Updates", "id": "9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.", "narrative": "It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\\\nSearches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\\\nMicrosoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed.", "references": ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"], "tags": {"name": "Monitor for Updates", "analytic_story": "Monitor for Updates", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Updates"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures", "ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Netsh Abuse", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65", "version": 1, "date": "2017-01-05", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.", "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\\\nTo get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"], "tags": {"name": "Netsh Abuse", "analytic_story": "Netsh Abuse", "category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Network Discovery", "id": "af228995-f182-49d7-90b3-2a732944f00f", "version": 1, "date": "2022-02-14", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more.", "narrative": "Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"], "tags": {"name": "Network Discovery", "analytic_story": "Network Discovery", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "NOBELIUM Group", "id": "758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2", "version": 2, "date": "2020-12-14", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.", "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"], "tags": {"name": "NOBELIUM Group", "analytic_story": "NOBELIUM Group", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Naikon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Elderwood", "Frankenstein", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"], "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss"}, {"name": "Office 365 Detections", "id": "1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9", "version": 1, "date": "2020-12-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "description": "This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.", "narrative": "More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Office 365 Detections", "analytic_story": "Office 365 Detections", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss"}, {"name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52", "version": 2, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.", "narrative": "In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\\\nAwareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\\\nHealthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\\\nThis Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.", "references": ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"], "tags": {"name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "analytic_story": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "id": "97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-31", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.", "narrative": "In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"], "tags": {"name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "analytic_story": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1187", "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkHydrus", "Dragonfly 2.0"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "id": "988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E", "version": 1, "date": "2020-01-22", "author": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense", "description": "Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.", "narrative": "This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\\\niDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, \"Orz,\" which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as \"temp.Periscope\" and \"Leviathan\"). The file is executed using Wscript.\\\nThe MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run]'help'='c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\rundll32.exe c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\\\programdata\\\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\\\nThis Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\\\nIf behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\\\n\\\n1. www.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. about.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. db.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. news.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. update.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\\\n1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. candlelightparty[.]org\\\n1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\\\n\\\n1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\\\n1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\\\n1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\\\n1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\\\n1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c", "references": ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"], "tags": {"name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "analytic_story": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "iDefense", "author_name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}, {"name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "id": "fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-07-01", "author": "Splunk Threat Research Team", "description": "The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.", "narrative": "This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \\\nThe prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \\\n1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \\\n1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \\\n1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \\\nIn the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "tags": {"name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "analytic_story": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Splunk Threat Research Team"}, {"name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "id": "6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-11", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.", "narrative": "A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.", "references": ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"], "tags": {"name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "analytic_story": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "ProxyShell", "id": "413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-08-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "description": "ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.", "narrative": "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.", "references": ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "ProxyShell", "analytic_story": "ProxyShell", "category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Initial Access", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Ransomware", "id": "cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756", "version": 1, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.", "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"], "tags": {"name": "Ransomware", "analytic_story": "Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Operation Wocao", "Sowbug", "Turla", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "TEMP.Veles", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "CostaRicto", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Exfiltration", "Impact", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Resource Development"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "id": "0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-06", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.", "narrative": "BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"], "tags": {"name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "analytic_story": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware", "id": "5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-17", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "narrative": "Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "references": ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"], "tags": {"name": "Clop Ransomware", "analytic_story": "Clop Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created With Suspicious Service Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Ransomware Cloud", "id": "f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2", "version": 1, "date": "2020-10-27", "author": "Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.", "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "tags": {"name": "Ransomware Cloud", "analytic_story": "Ransomware Cloud", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Exfiltration", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Revil Ransomware", "id": "817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-06-04", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "narrative": "Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "tags": {"name": "Revil Ransomware", "analytic_story": "Revil Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Ryuk Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2020-11-06", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "narrative": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"], "tags": {"name": "Ryuk Ransomware", "analytic_story": "Ryuk Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Chimera", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez"}, {"name": "SamSam Ransomware", "id": "c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604", "version": 1, "date": "2018-12-13", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "narrative": "The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\\\nAlthough categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a \"spray-and-pray\" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\\\nSamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\\\nIn a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\\\nAccording to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\\\nThis Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"], "tags": {"name": "SamSam Ransomware", "analytic_story": "SamSam Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TEMP.Veles", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "FIN7", "Indrik Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Reconnaissance"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", "ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Remcos", "id": "2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c", "version": 1, "date": "2021-09-23", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..", "narrative": "Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.&text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."], "tags": {"name": "Remcos", "analytic_story": "Remcos", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.", "narrative": "Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\\\nThis Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"], "tags": {"name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "analytic_story": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cleaver"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Honeybee", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Exfiltration", "Impact", "Initial Access", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Authentication", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "id": "9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-11-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.", "narrative": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. \\\nThere are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe. \\\nTypically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method. \\\nNote that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded. \\\nParallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "tags": {"name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "analytic_story": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Silver Sparrow", "id": "cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-24", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.", "narrative": "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party Caffiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"], "tags": {"name": "Silver Sparrow", "analytic_story": "Silver Sparrow", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1074", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Command And Control", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Spearphishing Attachments", "id": "57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27", "version": 1, "date": "2019-04-29", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "description": "Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.", "narrative": "Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \\\nAs most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely \"automate\" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \\\nWhile any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \\\nFollowing is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\\\n1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\\\n1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\\\n1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\\\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"], "tags": {"name": "Spearphishing Attachments", "analytic_story": "Spearphishing Attachments", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Splunk Research Team"}, {"name": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", "id": "5354df00-dce2-48ac-9a64-8adb48006828", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-28", "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", "description": "Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product.", "narrative": "This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements/svd-2022-0301.html", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3422"], "tags": {"name": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", "analytic_story": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Lou Stella"}, {"name": "SQL Injection", "id": "4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-19", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.", "narrative": "It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\\\nThis Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.", "references": ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"], "tags": {"name": "SQL Injection", "analytic_story": "SQL Injection", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3", "version": 1, "date": "2019-05-01", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ", "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "id": "66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6", "version": 2, "date": "2018-07-24", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", "narrative": "As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\\\nAmazon's \"shared responsibility\" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\\\nAmong things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. ", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-07", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).", "narrative": "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \\\nAmazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\\\n Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\\\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "analytic_story": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "id": "6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c", "version": 1, "date": "2020-06-04", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ", "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\\\nThis Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "id": "8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-25", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "narrative": "Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "id": "51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86", "version": 1, "date": "2018-08-20", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "narrative": "Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\\\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "id": "1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39", "version": 1, "date": "2020-09-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.", "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\\\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT33"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "id": "f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-03", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.", "narrative": "The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA459", "TA505", "TEMP.Veles", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "id": "a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \\\nHH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \\\nDuring investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \\\nUpon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dark Caracal", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Silence"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "id": "3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-18", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.", "narrative": "Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.", "references": ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "analytic_story": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Suspicious Emails", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "version": 1, "date": "2020-01-27", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.", "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\\\nOnce a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \\\n1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\\\n1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\\\n1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Emails", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Emails", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Email", "UEBA"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "id": "4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-08-05", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", "narrative": "Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage Object", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis"}, {"name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "id": "1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc", "version": 2, "date": "2021-01-20", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution \\\n1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "analytic_story": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"], "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "id": "9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.", "narrative": "Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \\\nWhile SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \\\nWith people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Leviathan", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "id": "2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-11", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": " Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "id": "b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-29", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with \"SquiblyDoo\" using the \"scrobj.dll\" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "id": "80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694", "version": 1, "date": "2021-02-03", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.", "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Whitefly"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-31", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.", "narrative": "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\\\n The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called \"registry\" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\\\n The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Suspicious WMI Use", "id": "c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5", "version": 2, "date": "2018-10-23", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.", "narrative": "WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.", "references": ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious WMI Use", "analytic_story": "Suspicious WMI Use", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "Leviathan", "Mustang Panda", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1220", "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "Higaisa"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "id": "aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258", "version": 1, "date": "2020-04-13", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.", "narrative": "Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\\\nCurrent detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.", "references": ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"], "tags": {"name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "analytic_story": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Trickbot", "id": "16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e", "version": 1, "date": "2021-04-20", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.", "narrative": "trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "tags": {"name": "Trickbot", "analytic_story": "Trickbot", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN7", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sidewinder", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto"}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "id": "270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-12", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"], "tags": {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "id": "be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "version": 1, "date": "2021-01-21", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.", "narrative": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\\\nThe inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\\\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\\\nTriage\\\nValidate execution\\\n1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\\\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\\\nSituational Awareness\\\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\\\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\\\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\\\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\\\nRetrieval of script code\\\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"], "tags": {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "analytic_story": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Frankenstein"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag"}, {"name": "Unusual Processes", "id": "f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.", "narrative": "Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\\\nThis Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\\\nIn the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"], "tags": {"name": "Unusual Processes", "analytic_story": "Unusual Processes", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TEMP.Veles", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "CostaRicto", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Night Dragon", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "Volatile Cedar", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Resource Development"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "id": "826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21", "version": 1, "date": "2017-09-15", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.", "narrative": "Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.", "references": ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"], "tags": {"name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "analytic_story": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "WhisperGate", "id": "0150e6e5-3171-442e-83f8-1ccd8599569b", "version": 1, "date": "2022-01-19", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"WhisperGate\". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more.", "narrative": "WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3"], "tags": {"name": "WhisperGate", "analytic_story": "WhisperGate", "category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Frankenstein", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "CostaRicto", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TEMP.Veles", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Resource Development"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "id": "56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064", "version": 1, "date": "2018-05-31", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ", "narrative": "Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "analytic_story": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dust Storm", "Elderwood", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Night Dragon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Operation Wocao", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Sharpshooter", "Silence", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", "id": "f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122", "version": 1, "date": "2021-03-04", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "description": "Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.", "narrative": "Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise. Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives. This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", "analytic_story": "Windows Discovery Techniques", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Hart"}, {"name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "id": "36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "version": 1, "date": "2020-07-28", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.", "narrative": "When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"], "tags": {"name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "analytic_story": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Elderwood", "Frankenstein", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis"}, {"name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "id": "30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d", "version": 1, "date": "2018-01-26", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.", "narrative": "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \\\n Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \\\n Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to \"hide extensions for known file types.\" In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\\\nChanging the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\\\nRun the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"], "tags": {"name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "analytic_story": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Windows Log Manipulation", "id": "b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835", "version": 2, "date": "2017-09-12", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.", "narrative": "Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\\\nThe Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Log Manipulation", "analytic_story": "Windows Log Manipulation", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal on Host", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Operation Wocao"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "id": "30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9", "version": 2, "date": "2018-05-31", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.", "references": ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "analytic_story": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "CostaRicto", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Machete", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "id": "644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5", "version": 2, "date": "2020-02-04", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.", "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "analytic_story": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Frankenstein", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN7", "Operation Wocao", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "PLATINUM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey"}, {"name": "Windows Registry Abuse", "id": "78df1df1-25f1-4387-90f9-c4ea31ce6b75", "version": 1, "date": "2022-03-17", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, collection of data, a tool for recon, credential dumping and payload impact. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows registry are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "narrative": "Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows features that can tweak or manipulate Windows policies and low-level configuration settings. Because of this capability, most malware, adversaries or threat actors abuse this hierarchical database to do their malicious intent on a targeted host or network environment. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify registry in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Registry Abuse", "analytic_story": "Windows Registry Abuse", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TEMP.Veles", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Honeybee", "Kimsuky", "Operation Wocao", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Lazarus Group", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Evilnum", "Honeybee", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "FIN10", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Honeybee", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TEMP.Veles"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}, {"name": "Windows Service Abuse", "id": "6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2", "version": 3, "date": "2017-11-02", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "narrative": "The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"], "tags": {"name": "Windows Service Abuse", "analytic_story": "Windows Service Abuse", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Operation Wocao", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez"}, {"name": "XMRig", "id": "06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-07", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.", "narrative": "XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.", "references": ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "tags": {"name": "XMRig", "analytic_story": "XMRig", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Machete", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TEMP.Veles", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "TA551", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BRONZE BUTLER", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "MuddyWater", "Night Dragon", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly 2.0", "Elderwood", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Frankenstein", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Operation Wocao", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sharpshooter", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN7", "Honeybee", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command & Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]} \ No newline at end of file From 0424c7a3552b256ada0be1ac3b52126c5a05593b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: P4T12ICK Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 10:12:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] minified json api --- .../adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv | 138 +++-- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json | 49 +- .../baselines_ref.json | 49 +- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json | 21 +- .../deployments_ref.json | 21 +- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json | 171 +----- .../detections_ref.json | 169 +----- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json | 12 +- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json | 12 +- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json | 10 +- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json | 10 +- .../response_tasks.json | 70 +-- .../response_tasks_ref.json | 70 +-- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json | 509 +----------------- .../obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories_ref.json | 505 +---------------- 15 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 1739 deletions(-) diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv index df1ebbaae9..2719dde5e6 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/data/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -30,14 +30,14 @@ T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390 T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT32 T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no -T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Turla +T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Turla T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505 T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao -T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452 +T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29 T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452 -T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452 +T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29 +T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29 T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork -T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver +T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,TeamTNT|APT29|Lazarus Group|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Kimsuky T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Leviathan @@ -124,14 +124,14 @@ T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16 T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no -T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|UNC2452|APT1 +T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,Transparent Tribe|Magic Hound|APT29|APT1 T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29 T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no -T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28 +T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,IndigoZebra|TeamTNT|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|Transparent Tribe|Leviathan|Magic Hound|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28 T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no @@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee -T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon +T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT37|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6 T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group -T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29|UNC2452 +T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT28|APT29 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom @@ -175,17 +175,17 @@ T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Trop T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29 T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Leviathan|CostaRicto|APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,Tonto Team|APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28 -T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider +T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 -T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 +T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Chimera|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Indrik Spider|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT28|APT33 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Nomadic Octopus|Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound -T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 +T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Kimsuky|HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|APT32 T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Naikon|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,Dragonfly 2.0 @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12 T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|Indrik Spider|APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Tonto Team|Magic Hound|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Rancor|Patchwork|APT32|APT19|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT37|Leviathan|TA459|APT29|APT28|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,FIN7|Transparent Tribe|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no -T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 +T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper @@ -213,16 +213,16 @@ T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spide T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no T1569,System Services,Execution,no T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41 -T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Transparent Tribe|APT29|UNC2452 +T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,Transparent Tribe|APT29 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,FIN7|ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no T1059.006,Python,Execution,Tonto Team|APT37|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,OilRig|APT38|Transparent Tribe|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41 -T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 +T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Sandworm Team|Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|FIN8|APT28|APT37|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no -T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda +T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Nomadic Octopus|TeamTNT|APT38|Tonto Team|Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT28|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT32|menuPass|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7 @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,OilRig|Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frank T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,APT29|Ajax Security Team|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal -T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound +T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Transparent Tribe|FIN7|APT3|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Cobalt Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Elderwood|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT38|Andariel|Ferocious Kitten|IndigoZebra|Transparent Tribe|Nomadic Octopus|Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Gorgon Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Cobalt Group|Rancor|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|APT29|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Patchwork|menuPass|Elderwood|PLATINUM T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 @@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505 T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no -T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak +T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,APT38 -T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390 -T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|APT29|Threat Group-3390 +T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Indrik Spider|APT29|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33 @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 -T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang +T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,Leviathan|menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky -T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28 +T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|APT1|FIN4|Ke3chang|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28 T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN8|APT28 T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no -T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats +T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Leviathan|Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28 @@ -297,36 +297,36 @@ T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistenc T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4 -T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon +T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Tonto Team|Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 +T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,TeamTNT T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no -T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao -T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider +T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|Operation Wocao +T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,FIN7|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33 T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,APT28|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass -T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver +T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|FIN8|PLATINUM|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|APT29|Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28 -T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390 +T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,FIN7|Fox Kitten|GCMAN T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,TeamTNT|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Sandworm Team|APT28|Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang -T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom +T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Kimsuky|FIN7|Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no -T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 -T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 +T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT28|Ferocious Kitten|FIN7|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|Naikon|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 +T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT41|Naikon|ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,Ferocious Kitten|BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no -T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel +T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT29|GALLIUM|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,Andariel|Leviathan|TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37 @@ -334,21 +334,21 @@ T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Kimsuky|TeamTNT|ZIRCONI T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT32 T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider -T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke +T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,TeamTNT|APT29|Operation Wocao|Rocke T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32 -T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 +T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,TeamTNT|Kimsuky|Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|MuddyWater|APT3 T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32 -T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 +T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT38|APT29|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 -T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 +T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Patchwork|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|Threat Group-3390|APT28|FIN10|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|menuPass|APT41 -T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452 +T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28 T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29 T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1 -T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452 +T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 +T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN8|Mustang Panda|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Naikon|Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Turla|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel @@ -393,12 +393,12 @@ T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Inception|Kimsuky T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Dark Caracal|OilRig|Lazarus Group T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater -T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 +T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT38|HAFNIUM|TA551|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no -T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound -T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452 +T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT28|APT29|Magic Hound +T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|APT38|PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,TeamTNT|Rocke @@ -427,9 +427,8 @@ T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,BackdoorDiplomacy|APT38|APT29|APT28|Tonto Team|S T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,Sandworm Team T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT38|Rocke -T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 +T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT37|APT38|Naikon|CostaRicto|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Rancor|OilRig|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater @@ -464,7 +463,7 @@ T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Indrik Spider|Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,FIN7|Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera|UNC2452 +T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,FIN8|APT29|Chimera T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no @@ -481,7 +480,7 @@ T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT29|Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|AP T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no T1204,User Execution,Execution,no T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,APT28|Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla -T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom +T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,BackdoorDiplomacy|menuPass|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Tonto Team|FIN7|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no @@ -489,18 +488,15 @@ T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Mustang Panda|MuddyWate T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no -T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil +T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no T1185,Browser Session Hijacking,Collection,no -T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER +T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird -T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no T1136,Create Account,Persistence,Sandworm Team|Indrik Spider T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Tonto Team|APT38|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32 -T1153,Source,Execution,no -T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 +T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,TeamTNT|Leviathan|APT28|APT29|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Ke3chang|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no @@ -515,9 +511,8 @@ T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|Mu T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Honeybee|FIN8 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT38|APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla -T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no T1106,Native API,Execution,APT38|Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group -T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Nomadic Octopus|IndigoZebra|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Tonto Team|HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Turla|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|PLATINUM|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|APT32|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,TeamTNT|FIN8|Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Sandworm Team|APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group @@ -525,47 +520,40 @@ T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,BackdoorDiplomacy|HAFNI T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla -T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452 -T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29 +T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Sowbug|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|APT38|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel -T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak +T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,FIN7|Leviathan|APT29|Silent Librarian|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|FIN5|OilRig|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,TeamTNT|Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452 -T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3 +T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29 +T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|TA505|APT3 T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Tonto Team|ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 -T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no -T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no -T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT37|Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|APT19|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang -T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang +T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39 T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no -T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|Andariel|BackdoorDiplomacy|Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda +T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Sandworm Team|FIN7|Indrik Spider|Naikon|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Naikon|CostaRicto|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 -T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|FIN7|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Leviathan|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang -T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28 +T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|APT28 T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,APT28|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke -T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT28|Nomadic Octopus|OilRig|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0 T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT38|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,APT28|Threat Group-3390 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa -T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 -T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group +T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|BackdoorDiplomacy|Transparent Tribe|APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|menuPass|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT19|BlackOasis|Leviathan|FIN8|MuddyWater|FIN7|Elderwood|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee -T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla +T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Naikon|APT29|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,TeamTNT|ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,TeamTNT|Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla @@ -574,6 +562,6 @@ T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,FIN7|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no -T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang +T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN7|APT41|APT38|Andariel|APT29|Windigo|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,Tonto Team|APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json index 8b965014c4..aa656a9850 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines.json @@ -1,48 +1 @@ -{ - "baselines": [ - { - "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", - "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-28", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"baselines": [{"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json index 8b965014c4..aa656a9850 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/baselines_ref.json @@ -1,48 +1 @@ -{ - "baselines": [ - { - "name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", - "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", - "version": 1, - "date": "2020-05-28", - "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", - "type": "Baseline", - "datamodel": [ - "Authentication" - ], - "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", - "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", - "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", - "known_false_positives": "none", - "references": [], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities" - ], - "deployments": [ - "Daily Cache Updates" - ], - "detections": [ - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", - "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", - "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", - "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Authentication.signature", - "Authentication.user", - "Authentication.src" - ], - "security_domain": "network" - } - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"baselines": [{"name": "Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "id": "66ff71c2-7e01-47dd-a041-906688c9d322", "version": 1, "date": "2020-05-28", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "type": "Baseline", "datamodel": ["Authentication"], "description": "This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.", "search": "| tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins", "how_to_implement": "You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.", "known_false_positives": "none", "references": [], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "deployments": ["Daily Cache Updates"], "detections": ["Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Authentication.signature", "Authentication.user", "Authentication.src"], "security_domain": "network"}}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json index 10436f6129..2b0b692fbd 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments.json @@ -1,20 +1 @@ -{ - "deployments": [ - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", - "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "Baseline" - } - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"deployments": [{"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"type": "Baseline"}}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json index 10436f6129..2b0b692fbd 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/deployments_ref.json @@ -1,20 +1 @@ -{ - "deployments": [ - { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", - "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "Baseline" - } - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"deployments": [{"name": "ESCU Default Configuration Baseline", "id": "0f7ee854-1aad-4bef-89c5-5c402b488510", "date": "2021-12-21", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type baseline.", "scheduling": {"cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", "earliest_time": "-70m@m", "latest_time": "-10m@m", "schedule_window": "auto"}, "tags": {"type": "Baseline"}}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json index 5adee9338e..f8d4d6206f 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections.json @@ -1,170 +1 @@ -{ - "detections": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_reg", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", - "source": "detection" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json index bc621949e6..f8d4d6206f 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/detections_ref.json @@ -1,168 +1 @@ -{ - "detections": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Soft Cell", - "Threat Group-3390", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly" - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "process_reg", - "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", - "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/" - }, - { - "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", - "source": "detection" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"detections": [{"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "version": 6, "date": "2021-09-16", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "type": "TTP", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", "known_false_positives": "None identified.", "references": ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets"], "tags": {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "asset_type": "Endpoint", "automated_detection_testing": "passed", "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "dataset": ["https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", "mitre_attack_id": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "type": "User", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "dest", "type": "Hostname", "role": ["Victim"]}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Parent Process"]}, {"name": "process_name", "type": "Process", "role": ["Child Process"]}], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.dest", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.parent_process", "Processes.original_file_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.process", "Processes.process_id", "Processes.parent_process_path", "Processes.process_path", "Processes.parent_process_id"], "risk_score": 90, "security_domain": "endpoint", "risk_severity": "high", "supported_tas": ["Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon"], "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}]}, "macros": [{"name": "process_reg", "definition": "(Processes.process_name=reg.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=reg.exe)", "description": "Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/"}, {"name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", "definition": "search *", "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives."}], "lookups": [], "cve_enrichment": [], "splunk_app_enrichment": [{"name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709"}], "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", "source": "detection"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json index 9f243c1ad0..a54156db35 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups.json @@ -1,11 +1 @@ -{ - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", - "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", - "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json index 9f243c1ad0..a54156db35 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/lookups_ref.json @@ -1,11 +1 @@ -{ - "lookups": [ - { - "name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", - "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", - "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", - "default_match": "false", - "min_matches": 1 - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"lookups": [{"name": "previously_seen_aws_regions", "description": "A place holder for a list of used AWS regions", "filename": "previously_seen_aws_regions.csv", "default_match": "false", "min_matches": 1}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json index 853fae7698..c198e1e46a 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros.json @@ -1,9 +1 @@ -{ - "macros": [ - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"macros": [{"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json index 853fae7698..c198e1e46a 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/macros_ref.json @@ -1,9 +1 @@ -{ - "macros": [ - { - "name": "powershell", - "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", - "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent." - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"macros": [{"name": "powershell", "definition": "(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\")", "description": "customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent."}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json index 88eb2c5012..78631ceb29 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks.json @@ -1,69 +1 @@ -{ - "response_tasks": [ - { - "name": "Get Parent Process Info", - "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "parent_process_name", - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "Command and Control", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Phishing Payloads", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"response_tasks": [{"name": "Get Parent Process Info", "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["parent_process_name", "dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks_ref.json index 88eb2c5012..78631ceb29 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/response_tasks_ref.json @@ -1,69 +1 @@ -{ - "response_tasks": [ - { - "name": "Get Parent Process Info", - "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "parent_process_name", - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "Command and Control", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Phishing Payloads", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"response_tasks": [{"name": "Get Parent Process Info", "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", "version": 2, "date": "2019-02-28", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "type": "Investigation", "datamodel": ["Endpoint"], "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", "known_false_positives": "", "references": [], "inputs": ["parent_process_name", "dest"], "tags": {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "Command and Control", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Phishing Payloads", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Windows Log Manipulation", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Service Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Phantom"], "required_fields": ["_time", "Processes.user", "Processes.parent_process_name", "Processes.process_name", "Processes.dest"], "security_domain": "endpoint"}, "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json index bd9a3822e7..27fafbee37 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories.json @@ -1,508 +1 @@ -{ - "stories": [ - { - "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", - "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", - "detections": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "GALLIUM", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Threat Group-3390", - "Wizard Spider", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly", - "Tonto Team" - ] - } - ] - }, - "deprecated": false, - "experimental": false, - "deployment": { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", - "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "notable": { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%", - "nes_fields": [ - "user", - "dest" - ] - }, - "rba": { - "enabled": "true" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "TTP" - } - }, - "annotations": { - "mitre_attack": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "impact": 90, - "confidence": 100 - }, - "risk": [ - { - "risk_object_type": "user", - "risk_object_field": "user", - "risk_score": 90 - }, - { - "risk_object_type": "system", - "risk_object_field": "dest", - "risk_score": 90 - }, - { - "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", - "threat_object_type": "process" - }, - { - "threat_object_field": "process_name", - "threat_object_type": "process" - } - ], - "playbooks": [ - { - "name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain", - "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-02-04", - "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", - "type": "Response", - "description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.", - "how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.", - "playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain", - "references": [], - "app_list": [ - "Carbon Black Response", - "LDAP", - "Palo Alto Networks Firewall", - "WildFire", - "Cylance" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "detections": [ - "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" - ], - "platform_tags": [ - "Ransomware", - "Response" - ], - "playbook_fields": [ - "ComputerName", - "Username" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk SOAR" - ], - "detection_objects": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "lowercase_name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe", - "path": "detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" - } - ] - } - } - ], - "baselines": [], - "mappings": { - "mitre_attack": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ] - }, - "test": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", - "tests": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", - "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", - "earliest_time": "-24h", - "latest_time": "now", - "attack_data": [ - { - "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", - "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", - "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", - "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" - } - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", - "source": "detection" - } - ], - "investigations": [ - { - "name": "Get Parent Process Info", - "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "parent_process_name", - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "Command and Control", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Phishing Payloads", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" - } - ] - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"stories": [{"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}]} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories_ref.json b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories_ref.json index faef64b1e5..27fafbee37 100644 --- a/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories_ref.json +++ b/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/obj_to_json_adapter_data/stories_ref.json @@ -1,504 +1 @@ -{ - "stories": [ - { - "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", - "version": 1, - "date": "2021-05-12", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", - "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", - "references": [ - "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", - "category": [ - "Malware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Soft Cell", - "Threat Group-3390", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly" - ] - } - ], - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "datamodels": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ] - }, - "detection_names": [ - "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule" - ], - "investigation_names": [ - "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task" - ], - "baseline_names": [ - "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched" - ], - "author_company": "Splunk", - "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", - "detections": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", - "version": 6, - "date": "2021-09-16", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", - "type": "TTP", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` OR `process_cmd` Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`", - "how_to_implement": "To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.", - "known_false_positives": "None identified.", - "references": [ - "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets" - ], - "tags": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "asset_type": "Endpoint", - "automated_detection_testing": "passed", - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "confidence": 100, - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "dataset": [ - "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log" - ], - "impact": 90, - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "message": "An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to export the registry keys.", - "mitre_attack_id": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Enterprise", - "Splunk Enterprise Security", - "Splunk Cloud" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.dest", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.parent_process", - "Processes.original_file_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.process", - "Processes.process_id", - "Processes.parent_process_path", - "Processes.process_path", - "Processes.parent_process_id" - ], - "risk_score": 90, - "security_domain": "endpoint", - "risk_severity": "high", - "supported_tas": [ - "Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon" - ], - "mitre_attack_enrichments": [ - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", - "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "Dragonfly 2.0", - "Ke3chang", - "Night Dragon", - "Soft Cell", - "Threat Group-3390", - "menuPass" - ] - }, - { - "mitre_attack_id": "T1003", - "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", - "mitre_attack_tactics": [ - "Credential Access" - ], - "mitre_attack_groups": [ - "APT28", - "APT32", - "APT39", - "Axiom", - "Frankenstein", - "Leviathan", - "Poseidon Group", - "Sowbug", - "Suckfly" - ] - } - ] - }, - "deprecated": false, - "experimental": false, - "deployment": { - "name": "ESCU Default Configuration TTP", - "id": "b81cd059-a3e8-4c03-96ca-e168c50ff70b", - "date": "2021-12-21", - "author": "Patrick Bareiss", - "description": "This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.", - "scheduling": { - "cron_schedule": "0 * * * *", - "earliest_time": "-70m@m", - "latest_time": "-10m@m", - "schedule_window": "auto" - }, - "notable": { - "rule_description": "%description%", - "rule_title": "%name%", - "nes_fields": [ - "user", - "dest" - ] - }, - "rba": { - "enabled": "true" - }, - "tags": { - "type": "TTP" - } - }, - "annotations": { - "mitre_attack": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ], - "analytic_story": [ - "Credential Dumping", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "observable": [ - { - "name": "user", - "type": "User", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "dest", - "type": "Hostname", - "role": [ - "Victim" - ] - }, - { - "name": "parent_process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Parent Process" - ] - }, - { - "name": "process_name", - "type": "Process", - "role": [ - "Child Process" - ] - } - ], - "context": [ - "Source:Endpoint", - "Stage:Credential Access" - ], - "impact": 90, - "confidence": 100 - }, - "risk": [ - { - "risk_object_type": "user", - "risk_object_field": "user", - "risk_score": 90 - }, - { - "risk_object_type": "system", - "risk_object_field": "dest", - "risk_score": 90 - }, - { - "threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", - "threat_object_type": "process" - }, - { - "threat_object_field": "process_name", - "threat_object_type": "process" - } - ], - "playbooks": [ - { - "name": "Ransomware Investigate and Contain", - "id": "fc0edc96-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3783fd63", - "version": 1, - "date": "2018-02-04", - "author": "Philip Royer, Splunk", - "type": "Response", - "description": "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints.", - "how_to_implement": "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response.", - "playbook": "ransomware_investigate_and_contain", - "references": [], - "app_list": [ - "Carbon Black Response", - "LDAP", - "Palo Alto Networks Firewall", - "WildFire", - "Cylance" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Ransomware" - ], - "detections": [ - "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe" - ], - "platform_tags": [ - "Ransomware", - "Response" - ], - "playbook_fields": [ - "ComputerName", - "Username" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk SOAR" - ], - "detection_objects": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "lowercase_name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe", - "path": "detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml" - } - ] - } - } - ], - "baselines": [], - "mappings": { - "mitre_attack": [ - "T1003.002", - "T1003" - ], - "kill_chain_phases": [ - "Actions on Objectives" - ], - "cis20": [ - "CIS 3", - "CIS 5", - "CIS 16" - ], - "nist": [ - "DE.CM" - ] - }, - "test": { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe Unit Test", - "tests": [ - { - "name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", - "file": "endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml", - "pass_condition": "| stats count | where count > 0", - "earliest_time": "-24h", - "latest_time": "now", - "attack_data": [ - { - "file_name": "windows-sysmon.log", - "data": "https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log", - "source": "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", - "sourcetype": "xmlwineventlog" - } - ] - } - ] - }, - "macros": [ - { - "name": "attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter", - "definition": "search *", - "description": "Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives." - } - ], - "lookups": [], - "cve_enrichment": [], - "splunk_app_enrichment": [ - { - "name": "Splunk Add-on for Sysmon", - "url": "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709" - } - ], - "file_path": "/Users/pbareib/Documents/Projects/security_content/bin/contentctl_project/contentctl_infrastructure/tests/adapter/../builder/test_data/detection/valid.yml", - "source": "detection" - } - ], - "investigations": [ - { - "name": "Get Parent Process Info", - "id": "fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41bf9", - "version": 2, - "date": "2019-02-28", - "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", - "type": "Investigation", - "datamodel": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "description": "This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest", - "search": "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Processes\")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`", - "how_to_implement": "You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the \"process\" field in the Endpoint data model.", - "known_false_positives": "", - "references": [], - "inputs": [ - "parent_process_name", - "dest" - ], - "tags": { - "analytic_story": [ - "Collection and Staging", - "Command and Control", - "DHS Report TA18-074A", - "Disabling Security Tools", - "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", - "Hidden Cobra Malware", - "Lateral Movement", - "Malicious PowerShell", - "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", - "Netsh Abuse", - "Orangeworm Attack Group", - "Phishing Payloads", - "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", - "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", - "Ransomware", - "SamSam Ransomware", - "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", - "Suspicious DNS Traffic", - "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", - "Suspicious WMI Use", - "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", - "Unusual Processes", - "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", - "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", - "Windows Log Manipulation", - "Windows Persistence Techniques", - "Windows Privilege Escalation", - "Windows Service Abuse", - "DarkSide Ransomware" - ], - "product": [ - "Splunk Phantom" - ], - "required_fields": [ - "_time", - "Processes.user", - "Processes.parent_process_name", - "Processes.process_name", - "Processes.dest" - ], - "security_domain": "endpoint" - }, - "lowercase_name": "get_parent_process_info" - } - ] - } - ] -} \ No newline at end of file +{"stories": [{"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "version": 1, "date": "2021-05-12", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"], "tags": {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "analytic_story": "DarkSide Ransomware", "category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly 2.0", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Night Dragon", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Frankenstein", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"], "baseline_names": ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched"], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel"}]} \ No newline at end of file