From 1a16ff5f293491154be63466784b040422fc4fa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: research-bot Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 18:12:48 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] remove falcon data --- detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml | 2 +- ...indows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml | 7 +------ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml index c055850294..1d636ec76c 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path.yml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*", "\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\temp\\*" , "*\\PerfLogs\\*","*\\windows\\tasks\\*", "*:\\programdata\\*") by - Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest + Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`' how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml index 27d9a6ccb8..532d2d864b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windo data_source: - Sysmon EventID 1 - Windows Event Log Security 4688 -- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 +- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where ((`process_reg` Processes.process IN ("*save*", "*export*")) OR (`process_regedit` Processes.process IN ("*/E *", "*-E *"))) AND Processes.process IN ("*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE*", "*HKLM*") AND Processes.process IN ("*SAM*", "*System*", "*Security*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline_filter`' how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. known_false_positives: It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed. @@ -65,8 +65,3 @@ tests: - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog -- name: True Positive Test - CrowdStrike - attack_data: - - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/crowdstrike_falcon.log - source: crowdstrike - sourcetype: crowdstrike:events:sensor From bd608b061fe138b453e79b0790849fe4334a6c8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bhavin Patel Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 18:24:23 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Update windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml --- .../windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml index 532d2d864b..d8050741e3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline.yml @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windo data_source: - Sysmon EventID 1 - Windows Event Log Security 4688 -- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 +- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where ((`process_reg` Processes.process IN ("*save*", "*export*")) OR (`process_regedit` Processes.process IN ("*/E *", "*-E *"))) AND Processes.process IN ("*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE*", "*HKLM*") AND Processes.process IN ("*SAM*", "*System*", "*Security*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_sensitive_registry_hive_dump_via_commandline_filter`' how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. known_false_positives: It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.