diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py index b20ea6b409..05baf13b81 100644 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ b/bin/generate.py @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ def generate_use_case_library_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baseline story['detections'] = list(sto_det[story['name']]) if story['name'] in sto_res: + story['response_tasks'] = list(sto_res[story['name']]) story['searches'] = story['detections'] + story['response_tasks'] else: @@ -271,12 +272,13 @@ def generate_workbench_panels(response_tasks, stories, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PAT if 'search' in response_task: if 'inputs' in response_task: response_file_name = response_task['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower() + response_file_name_xml = response_file_name + "___response_task.xml" response_task['lowercase_name'] = response_file_name workbench_panel_objects.append(response_task) j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), trim_blocks=True) template = j2_env.get_template('panel.j2') - file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name + ".xml" + file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, file_path) response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace(">",">") response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace("<","<") @@ -434,7 +436,7 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks): if 'type' in response_task.keys(): task_name = str(response_task['type'] + ' - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task' ) else: - task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') + task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task') if not (story in sto_res): sto_res[story] = {task_name} else: diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 index 46184f1014..522b2b8ff3 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 +++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2 @@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ disabled = 0 {% if story.workbench_panels is defined %} panels = {{ story.workbench_panels | tojson }} {% else %} -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] {% endif %} {% endfor %} {% for response_task in response_tasks %} -[panel://workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}] +[panel://workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task] label = {{ response_task.name }} description = {{ response_task.description }} disabled = 0 diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 index 565b751d1a..c643a3ba41 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 +++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ search = {{ baseline.search }} action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = {{ response_task.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ response_task.name }} +action.escu.full_search_name = {{ response_task.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ response_task.name }} - Response Task description = {{ response_task.description }} action.escu.creation_date = {{ response_task.date }} action.escu.modification_date = {{ response_task.date }} diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 index 12242e4322..599fa344a7 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 +++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2 @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ {% for response_task in response_tasks %} {% if response_task.inputs|length == 1 %} -[workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}] +[workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task] label = Workbench - {{ response_task.name }} type = link fields = {{ response_task.inputs[0] }} display_location = field_menu {% if response_task.inputs[0] == "user" %} -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true {% else %} -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true {% endif %} link.target = blank link.method = get diff --git a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf index 9d0f63689b..59c6a702c6 100644 --- a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf +++ b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC +# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -85,12 +85,12 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. -narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\ +narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. [AWS User Monitoring] @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"] data_models = ["Network_Sessions"] providing_technologies = none @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"] data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ modification_date = 2019-10-02 id = 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"] +detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update"] data_models = ["Change"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ version = 3 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33 version = 1 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1190", "T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -415,12 +415,12 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running). +narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running). [Dynamic DNS] category = Malware @@ -431,12 +431,12 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"] providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists. -narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. +description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. +narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ] category = Malware @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -498,9 +498,9 @@ id = baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335 version = 2 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ version = 4 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -657,8 +657,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Updates"] providing_technologies = none @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -741,14 +741,13 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ -Although the group's motivation is unknown, its goal may be stealing patient information to sell on the black market. Another possible explanation is corporate espionage. \ Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\ This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised. @@ -761,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -784,7 +783,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -827,7 +826,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -843,7 +842,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -859,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"] mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -875,7 +874,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020.001", "T1200", "T1498", "T1542.005", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Authentication", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1059.003", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -908,7 +907,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -925,7 +924,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -946,7 +945,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"] data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"] providing_technologies = none @@ -962,7 +961,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -987,7 +986,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1007,7 +1006,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attac detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"] providing_technologies = none description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. @@ -1022,8 +1021,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. @@ -1038,8 +1037,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"] data_models = ["Authentication"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. @@ -1054,7 +1053,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1072,7 +1071,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1091,8 +1090,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update"] data_models = ["Authentication"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. @@ -1108,8 +1107,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed"] data_models = ["Change"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. @@ -1124,12 +1123,12 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"] data_models = ["Change"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\ +narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. [Suspicious Cloud User Activities] @@ -1141,8 +1140,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"] data_models = ["Change"] providing_technologies = none description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. @@ -1158,7 +1157,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1174,7 +1173,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1190,7 +1189,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"] data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1210,7 +1209,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1226,12 +1225,12 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ +narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application allow listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\ The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. @@ -1244,7 +1243,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1262,7 +1261,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1280,7 +1279,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1298,7 +1297,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1315,7 +1314,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1332,7 +1331,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1350,7 +1349,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1366,7 +1365,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1387,7 +1386,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1403,7 +1402,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1419,7 +1418,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1439,7 +1438,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1456,7 +1455,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1472,7 +1471,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1488,8 +1487,8 @@ version = 3 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. diff --git a/package/default/collections.conf b/package/default/collections.conf index 346e61a147..499ba5f4f2 100644 --- a/package/default/collections.conf +++ b/package/default/collections.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC +# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.xml deleted file mode 100644 index ff7ad317cd..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 46d2d923ff..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest=$dest$ by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_info.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_info.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 141520df51..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_info.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id, dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity.xml deleted file mode 100644 index e33c11f498..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name, values(Registry.dest) as dest, values(Registry.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.process_id=$process_id$ AND Registry.dest=$dest$ by Registry.registry_path, Registry.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | sort _time | table _time, process_id, dest, action, registry_key_name, registry_path - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_registry_activities.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_registry_activities.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 73bb5bee45..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_registry_activities.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.dest = "$dest$" by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`] - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.xml deleted file mode 100644 index f9e4e70b8a..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_object=$dest$ | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 4dcf2fd577..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_object=$user$ | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint.xml deleted file mode 100644 index eb3ee6c657..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel Updates.Updates | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$ - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 9269961083..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last, email, category, watchlist - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 30b224262c..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$ - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.xml deleted file mode 100644 index fabf2baa48..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - |tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.event_name="ListImages" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.http_user_agent Compute.user_type | rename "Compute.*" as * |stats values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent distinct_count(http_user_agent) as unique_ua_count by src_user, image_id, src, user_type | where unique_ua_count > 1 - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 5a042540fc..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields - _* - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 78154b2139..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ | fields - _* - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 1aa8d0f2a3..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$ | fields - _* - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 0c8c4e596d..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$ - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 612d227d1b..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - | from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$ - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml similarity index 100% rename from package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src.xml rename to package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_process_chain_analysis.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_process_chain_analysis.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 582373453a..0000000000 --- a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_process_chain_analysis.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - - - - `sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid} EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name | head 1 | fields - count - - - -
- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/es_investigations.conf b/package/default/es_investigations.conf index 37bf8d1552..d7fd5d4730 100644 --- a/package/default/es_investigations.conf +++ b/package/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -4,578 +4,578 @@ label = AWS Cross Account Activity description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining] label = AWS Cryptomining description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity] label = AWS Network ACL Activity description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_security_hub_alerts] label = AWS Security Hub Alerts description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities] label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring] label = AWS User Monitoring description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability] label = Apache Struts Vulnerability description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking] label = Asset Tracking description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_brand_monitoring] label = Brand Monitoring description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining] label = Cloud Cryptomining description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat] label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging] label = Collection and Staging description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control] label = Command and Control description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks] label = Common Phishing Frameworks description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain", "panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_domain_certificate_investigation___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation] label = Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_credential_dumping] label = Credential Dumping description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a] label = DHS Report TA18-074A description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks] label = DNS Amplification Attacks description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_hijacking] label = DNS Hijacking description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_exfiltration] label = Data Exfiltration description = The stealing of data by an adversary. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_data_protection] label = Data Protection description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_detect_zerologon_attack] label = Detect Zerologon Attack description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_disabling_security_tools] label = Disabling Security Tools description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns] label = Dynamic DNS -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists. +description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_] label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902] label = F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_gcp_cross_account_activity] label = GCP Cross Account Activity description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hidden_cobra_malware] label = Hidden Cobra Malware description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection] label = Host Redirection description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability] label = JBoss Vulnerability description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_scanning_activity] label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity] label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_role_activity] label = Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_lateral_movement] label = Lateral Movement description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell] label = Malicious PowerShell description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution] label = Monitor Backup Solution description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software] label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates] label = Monitor for Updates description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_netsh_abuse] label = Netsh Abuse description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_office_365_detections] label = Office 365 Detections description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_orangeworm_attack_group] label = Orangeworm Attack Group description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads] label = Phishing Payloads description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns] label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch] label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware] label = Ransomware description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware_cloud] label = Ransomware Cloud description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_router_and_infrastructure_security] label = Router and Infrastructure Security description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ryuk_ransomware] label = Ryuk Ransomware description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sql_injection] label = SQL Injection description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_samsam_ransomware] label = SamSam Ransomware description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities] label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability] label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409] label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sunburst_malware] label = Sunburst Malware description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_ec2_activities] label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities] label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_s3_activities] label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic] label = Suspicious AWS Traffic description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities] label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_instance_activities] label = Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities] label = Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_user_activities] label = Suspicious Cloud User Activities description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_command_line_executions] label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic] label = Suspicious DNS Traffic description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails] label = Suspicious Emails description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_gcp_storage_activities] label = Suspicious GCP Storage Activities description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_mshta_activity] label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity] label = Suspicious Okta Activity description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_wmi_use] label = Suspicious WMI Use description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities] label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes] label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_aws_ec2_modifications] label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes] label = Unusual Processes description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols] label = Use of Cleartext Protocols description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection] label = Web Fraud Detection description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350] label = Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_defense_evasion_tactics] label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse] label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation] label = Windows Log Manipulation description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques] label = Windows Persistence Techniques description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation] label = Windows Privilege Escalation description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse] label = Windows Service Abuse description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"] -[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task] label = AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). disabled = 0 @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task] label = AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. disabled = 0 @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task] label = AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. disabled = 0 @@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task] label = AWS Network ACL Details from ID description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID disabled = 0 @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task] label = AWS Network Interface details via resourceId description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. disabled = 0 @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task] label = AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. disabled = 0 @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host] +[panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task] label = All backup logs for host description = Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully. disabled = 0 @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip] +[panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] label = Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address disabled = 0 @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip] +[panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] label = GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address disabled = 0 @@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task] label = Get All AWS Activity From City description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. disabled = 0 @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task] label = Get All AWS Activity From Country description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. disabled = 0 @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task] label = Get All AWS Activity From IP Address description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. disabled = 0 @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task] label = Get All AWS Activity From Region description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. disabled = 0 @@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task] label = Get Backup Logs For Endpoint description = This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week. disabled = 0 @@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task] label = Get Certificate logs for a domain description = This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt" are widely used by attackers. disabled = 0 @@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task] label = Get DNS Server History for a host description = While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours. disabled = 0 @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task] label = Get DNS traffic ratio description = This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. disabled = 0 @@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task] label = Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field disabled = 0 @@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task] label = Get EC2 Launch Details description = This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance. disabled = 0 @@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task] label = Get Email Info description = This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours. disabled = 0 @@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task] label = Get Emails From Specific Sender description = This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours. disabled = 0 @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task] label = Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address description = This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network. disabled = 0 @@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task] label = Get History Of Email Sources description = This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source. disabled = 0 @@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task] label = Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host. disabled = 0 @@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task] label = Get Logon Rights Modifications For User description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account. disabled = 0 @@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task] label = Get Notable History description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation. disabled = 0 @@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors___response_task] label = Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors description = This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`. disabled = 0 @@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task] label = Get Parent Process Info description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest disabled = 0 @@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task] label = Get Process File Activity description = This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint disabled = 0 @@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task] label = Get Process Info description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address. disabled = 0 @@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task] label = Get Process Information For Port Activity description = This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host. disabled = 0 @@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task] label = Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic description = While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic. disabled = 0 @@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task] label = Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host description = This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest. disabled = 0 @@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id] +[panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task] label = Get Web Session Information via session id description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code. disabled = 0 @@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task] label = Investigate AWS User Activities by user field description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. disabled = 0 @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task] label = Investigate AWS activities via region name description = This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user disabled = 0 @@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task] label = Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations description = This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user. disabled = 0 @@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task] label = Investigate Network Traffic From src ip description = This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address. disabled = 0 @@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task] label = Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address description = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. disabled = 0 @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task] label = Investigate Okta Activity by app description = This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app disabled = 0 @@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task] label = Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts description = This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash. disabled = 0 @@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task] label = Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts description = This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory. disabled = 0 @@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task] label = Investigate Previous Unseen User description = This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days. disabled = 0 @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task] label = Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications description = This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. disabled = 0 @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task] label = Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the "payload" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest. disabled = 0 @@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task] label = Investigate User Activities In Okta description = This search returns all okta events by a specific user disabled = 0 @@ -1375,7 +1375,7 @@ tokens = {\ }\ -[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src] +[panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task] label = Investigate Web POSTs From src description = This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. disabled = 0 diff --git a/package/default/macros.conf b/package/default/macros.conf index 589ef96431..8f111eac34 100644 --- a/package/default/macros.conf +++ b/package/default/macros.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC +# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ description = This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with e definition = index=netops sourcetype="f5:bigip:rogue" description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent. -[filter_rare_process_whitelist] -definition = lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_whitelist_default process as process OUTPUTNEW whitelist | where whitelist="false" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_whitelist_local process as process OUTPUT whitelist | where whitelist="false" -description = This macro is intended to whitelist processes that have been definied as rare +[filter_rare_process_allow_list] +definition = lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list="false" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list="false" +description = This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare [google_gcp_pubnet_message] definition = sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" diff --git a/package/default/savedsearches.conf b/package/default/savedsearches.conf index 4fbf3457e7..c6d416b19e 100644 --- a/package/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/package/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC +# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Cloud Cryptomining"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_object = user action.risk.param._risk_object_type = user @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] @@ -2065,7 +2065,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` [ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Update previously seen users in CloudTrail` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28 @@ -2378,7 +2378,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 @@ -2422,7 +2422,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 @@ -2466,7 +2466,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07 @@ -2861,7 +2861,7 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Com action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the search to adjust the byte threshold or whitelist specific IP addresses, as necessary. +action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-01 action.escu.confidence = high @@ -2916,7 +2916,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traf schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -3438,8 +3438,8 @@ description = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of th action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_whitelist` searches two lookup files to whitelist your processes. These consist of `rare_process_whitelist_default.csv` and `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the whitelist, add them to `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the whitelist value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16 action.escu.confidence = high @@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user "(?.*)\\\\(?.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_whitelist`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user "(?.*)\\\\(?.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` [ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -4242,10 +4242,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime [ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. action.escu.how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ 1. \ @@ -4269,7 +4269,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domai action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -4408,10 +4408,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A [ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21 @@ -4430,7 +4430,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious AWS Logi schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new user AWS Console Login action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -4442,7 +4442,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter` [ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -4549,7 +4549,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Data Protection", " schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. action.notable.param.rule_title = Detection of DNS Tunnels action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -5576,10 +5576,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Proce [ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. Deprecated because duplicate. +description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. Deprecated because duplicate. +action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. action.escu.how_to_implement = none action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16 @@ -6501,7 +6501,7 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation" action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. -action.escu.known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be whitelisted. +action.escu.known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07 action.escu.confidence = high @@ -6641,15 +6641,15 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe AND (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter` [ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. +description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19 @@ -6668,7 +6668,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Malicious PowerShel schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -6689,7 +6689,7 @@ description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Deprecated because the detection need rework and would need to work base on powershell logs. +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. action.escu.known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19 @@ -6719,8 +6719,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 - +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 [ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -8040,10 +8039,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime [ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-07 @@ -8062,7 +8061,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src'] -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Desktop Network Traffic action.notable.param.security_domain = network action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -9099,7 +9098,7 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], " action.escu.data_models = ["UEBA"] action.escu.eli5 = This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and whitelist the URL if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22 action.escu.confidence = high @@ -11842,7 +11841,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail -description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] @@ -11853,11 +11852,11 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count [ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch] action.escu = 0 @@ -11886,7 +11885,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = support action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail -description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. +description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"] @@ -11897,11 +11896,11 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m schedule_window = auto action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. -action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. disabled = true is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins +search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail [ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures] action.escu = 0 @@ -11955,7 +11954,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FRO action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-08 @@ -11976,7 +11975,7 @@ search = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWS action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-30 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-30 @@ -11997,7 +11996,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time us action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-08 @@ -12018,7 +12017,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-22 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-22 @@ -12039,7 +12038,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07 @@ -12060,7 +12059,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time AR action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-26 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-26 @@ -12081,7 +12080,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |searc action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - All backup logs for host +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task description = Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 @@ -12102,7 +12101,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-13 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-13 @@ -12123,7 +12122,7 @@ search = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |sear action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-13 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-13 @@ -12144,7 +12143,7 @@ search = sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.reque action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19 @@ -12165,7 +12164,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19 @@ -12186,7 +12185,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19 @@ -12207,7 +12206,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19 @@ -12228,7 +12227,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task description = This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14 @@ -12249,7 +12248,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPU action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task description = This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt" are widely used by attackers. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-29 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-29 @@ -12270,7 +12269,7 @@ search = | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as la action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task description = While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09 @@ -12291,7 +12290,7 @@ search = | search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task description = This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09 @@ -12312,7 +12311,7 @@ search = | tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-12 @@ -12333,7 +12332,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup i action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task description = This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 @@ -12354,7 +12353,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Email Info +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task description = This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09 @@ -12375,7 +12374,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task description = This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09 @@ -12396,7 +12395,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task description = This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13 @@ -12417,7 +12416,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task description = This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-21 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-21 @@ -12438,7 +12437,7 @@ search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12 @@ -12459,7 +12458,7 @@ search = | search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27 @@ -12480,7 +12479,7 @@ search = | search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20 @@ -12501,7 +12500,7 @@ search = | search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task description = This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14 @@ -12522,7 +12521,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail. action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-28 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-28 @@ -12543,7 +12542,7 @@ search = | tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process File Activity +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task description = This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-06 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-06 @@ -12564,7 +12563,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Info +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 @@ -12585,7 +12584,7 @@ search = | tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task description = This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 @@ -12606,7 +12605,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task description = While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01 @@ -12627,7 +12626,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task description = This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23 @@ -12648,7 +12647,7 @@ search = sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventC action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08 @@ -12669,7 +12668,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=stream:http session_id = $session_id$ | stats valu action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12 @@ -12690,7 +12689,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdenti action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task description = This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-09 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-09 @@ -12711,7 +12710,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| renam action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task description = This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10 @@ -12732,7 +12731,7 @@ search = | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task description = This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-15 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-15 @@ -12753,7 +12752,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task description = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address. action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02 @@ -12774,7 +12773,7 @@ search = eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext. action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task description = This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02 @@ -12795,7 +12794,7 @@ search = eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.countr action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task description = This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10 @@ -12816,7 +12815,7 @@ search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackag action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task description = This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10 @@ -12837,7 +12836,7 @@ search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=use action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task description = This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days. action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10 @@ -12858,7 +12857,7 @@ search = | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task description = This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14 @@ -12879,7 +12878,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the "payload" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest. action.escu.creation_date = 2017-10-20 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-20 @@ -12900,7 +12899,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task description = This search returns all okta events by a specific user action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02 @@ -12921,7 +12920,7 @@ search = eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.coun action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task description = This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-06 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06 diff --git a/package/default/transforms.conf b/package/default/transforms.conf index c8a63c78d4..86dd4c6f0d 100644 --- a/package/default/transforms.conf +++ b/package/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC +# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ min_matches = 1 [domains] filename = domains.csv -# description = A list of domains that can be whitelisted +# description = A list of domains that can be ignored [dynamic_dns_providers_default] filename = dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv @@ -78,18 +78,18 @@ min_matches = 1 [legit_domains] filename = legit_domains.csv -# description = A list of legit domains to be used to whitelist possible phishing sites +# description = A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites -[lookup_rare_process_whitelist_default] -filename = rare_process_whitelist_default.csv +[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default] +filename = rare_process_allow_list_default.csv default_match = false case_sensitive_match = false -# description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by Splunk +# description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk match_type = WILDCARD(process) min_matches = 1 -[lookup_rare_process_whitelist_local] -filename = rare_process_whitelist_local.csv +[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local] +filename = rare_process_allow_list_local.csv default_match = false case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user @@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ filename = prohibited_softwares.csv [ransomware_extensions_lookup] filename = ransomware_extensions.csv default_match = false +case_sensitive_match = false # description = A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware min_matches = 1 diff --git a/package/default/use_case_library.conf b/package/default/use_case_library.conf index abd3111f45..81374c2b6f 100644 --- a/package/default/use_case_library.conf +++ b/package/default/use_case_library.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC +# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"] description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. @@ -63,9 +63,9 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"] description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. -narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\ +narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. [analytic_story://AWS User Monitoring] @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"] description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"] description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"] description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2. @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"] description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry. @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"] +searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"] description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = The stealing of data by an adversary. narrative = Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place. @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"] maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload. @@ -303,9 +303,9 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running). +narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running). [analytic_story://Dynamic DNS] category = Malware @@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"] -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists. -narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. +searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] +description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. +narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. [analytic_story://Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ] category = Malware @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/) @@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications. @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"] description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ version = 4 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\ The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"] description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint. @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\ It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule"] description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. @@ -539,11 +539,10 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ -Although the group's motivation is unknown, its goal may be stealing patient information to sell on the black market. Another possible explanation is corporate espionage. \ Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\ This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised. @@ -554,7 +553,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ @@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"] description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ @@ -610,7 +609,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. @@ -621,7 +620,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. @@ -632,7 +631,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. @@ -643,7 +642,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. @@ -655,7 +654,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. @@ -666,7 +665,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. @@ -678,7 +677,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ @@ -694,7 +693,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched. @@ -705,7 +704,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. narrative = This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\ \ @@ -725,7 +724,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\ Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\ @@ -739,7 +738,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule"] description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the Sunburst malware. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware. @@ -750,7 +749,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. @@ -761,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. @@ -772,7 +771,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ @@ -785,7 +784,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"] description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ @@ -799,7 +798,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. @@ -811,7 +810,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. @@ -822,9 +821,9 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\ +narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. [analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud User Activities] @@ -834,7 +833,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. @@ -846,7 +845,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. @@ -857,7 +856,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. @@ -868,7 +867,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"] description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ @@ -883,7 +882,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses. @@ -894,9 +893,9 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ +narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application allow listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\ The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code. @@ -907,7 +906,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta"] +searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"] description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ @@ -920,7 +919,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \ The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\ @@ -933,7 +932,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ @@ -946,7 +945,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. @@ -958,7 +957,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"] description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \ Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior. @@ -970,7 +969,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ @@ -983,7 +982,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. @@ -994,7 +993,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"] description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\ These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\ @@ -1010,7 +1009,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB). @@ -1021,7 +1020,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. @@ -1032,7 +1031,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ @@ -1047,7 +1046,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). @@ -1059,7 +1058,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. @@ -1070,7 +1069,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. @@ -1081,7 +1080,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. @@ -1700,7 +1699,7 @@ type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Update previously seen users in CloudTrail` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. +how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1710,7 +1709,7 @@ type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. +how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1720,7 +1719,7 @@ type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. +how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1730,7 +1729,7 @@ type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. +how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1840,7 +1839,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the search to adjust the byte threshold or whitelist specific IP addresses, as necessary. +known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule] @@ -1988,9 +1987,9 @@ type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_whitelist` searches two lookup files to whitelist your processes. These consist of `rare_process_whitelist_default.csv` and `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the whitelist, add them to `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the whitelist value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. +known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] @@ -2193,7 +2192,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. +explanation = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ 1. \ @@ -2239,7 +2238,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour +explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. @@ -2543,7 +2542,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. Deprecated because duplicate. +explanation = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. how_to_implement = none annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = unknown @@ -2786,7 +2785,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be whitelisted. +known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule] @@ -2823,7 +2822,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. +explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. @@ -2834,7 +2833,7 @@ type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Deprecated because the detection need rework and would need to work base on powershell logs. +how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3183,7 +3182,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. +explanation = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. @@ -3459,7 +3458,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and whitelist the URL if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. +known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. providing_technologies = [] [savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule] @@ -3848,7 +3847,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] ### RESPONSE TASKS ### -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3856,7 +3855,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3864,7 +3863,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3872,7 +3871,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. @@ -3880,7 +3879,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs @@ -3888,7 +3887,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs. @@ -3896,7 +3895,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - All backup logs for host] +[savedsearch://ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk. @@ -3904,7 +3903,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs. @@ -3912,7 +3911,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment] +[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ @@ -3922,7 +3921,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this phantom playbook, you must integrate Enterprise Security with Phantom. Configure this playbook in the correlation search `Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2` ,as an adaptive response action. @@ -3930,7 +3929,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = Import playbook into phantom @@ -3938,7 +3937,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip] +[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. @@ -3946,7 +3945,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3954,7 +3953,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3962,7 +3961,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3970,7 +3969,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -3978,7 +3977,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your backup logs. @@ -3986,7 +3985,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations @@ -3994,7 +3993,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic @@ -4002,7 +4001,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your network traffic @@ -4010,7 +4009,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. @@ -4018,7 +4017,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. @@ -4026,7 +4025,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Email Info] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications. @@ -4034,7 +4033,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. @@ -4042,7 +4041,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server. @@ -4050,7 +4049,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. @@ -4058,7 +4057,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs @@ -4066,7 +4065,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs @@ -4074,7 +4073,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Notable History] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary. @@ -4082,7 +4081,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. @@ -4090,7 +4089,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Parent Process Info] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. @@ -4098,7 +4097,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process File Activity] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. @@ -4106,7 +4105,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Info] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. @@ -4114,7 +4113,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel @@ -4122,7 +4121,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. @@ -4130,7 +4129,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. @@ -4138,7 +4137,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server. @@ -4146,7 +4145,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -4154,7 +4153,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -4162,7 +4161,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. @@ -4170,7 +4169,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model. @@ -4178,7 +4177,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs @@ -4186,7 +4185,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs @@ -4194,7 +4193,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. @@ -4202,7 +4201,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. @@ -4210,7 +4209,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. @@ -4218,7 +4217,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs. @@ -4226,7 +4225,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. @@ -4234,7 +4233,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs @@ -4242,7 +4241,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task] type = investigation explanation = none how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model. @@ -4653,8 +4652,8 @@ providing_technologies = none [savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail] type = support -explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. known_false_positives = not defined providing_technologies = none @@ -4667,8 +4666,8 @@ providing_technologies = none [savedsearch://ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail] type = support -explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. +explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. known_false_positives = not defined providing_technologies = none diff --git a/package/default/workflow_actions.conf b/package/default/workflow_actions.conf index ef4fec9b7c..eb7dad24fa 100644 --- a/package/default/workflow_actions.conf +++ b/package/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -1,227 +1,227 @@ -[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest] +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task] label = Workbench - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn] +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task] label = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN type = link fields = user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid] +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task] label = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId type = link fields = accessKeyId display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id] +[workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task] label = Workbench - AWS Network ACL Details from ID type = link fields = networkAclId display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid] +[workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task] label = Workbench - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId type = link fields = resourceId display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname] +[workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task] label = Workbench - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName type = link fields = bucketName display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host] +[workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task] label = Workbench - All backup logs for host type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip] +[workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] label = Workbench - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip type = link fields = src_ip display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip] +[workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task] label = Workbench - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip type = link fields = src_ip display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city] +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task] label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From City type = link fields = City display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country] +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task] label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From Country type = link fields = Country display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address] +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task] label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address type = link fields = src_ip display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region] +[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task] label = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From Region type = link fields = Region display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint] +[workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain] +[workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Certificate logs for a domain type = link fields = domain display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host] +[workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task] label = Workbench - Get DNS Server History for a host type = link fields = src_ip display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid] +[workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task] label = Workbench - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId type = link fields = instanceId display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details] +[workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task] label = Workbench - Get EC2 Launch Details type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_email_info] +[workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Email Info type = link fields = message_id display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_email_info&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender] +[workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Emails From Specific Sender type = link fields = src_user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address] +[workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task] label = Workbench - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address type = link fields = src_mac display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources] +[workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task] label = Workbench - Get History Of Email Sources type = link fields = src display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint] +[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user] +[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User type = link fields = user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_notable_history] +[workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Notable History type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_notable_history&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get @@ -230,131 +230,131 @@ link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic] +[workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id] +[workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task] label = Workbench - Get Web Session Information via session id type = link fields = session_id display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field] +[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field type = link fields = user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name] +[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate AWS activities via region name type = link fields = vendor_region display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations] +[workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations type = link fields = user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip] +[workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip type = link fields = src_ip display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address] +[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address type = link fields = user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app] +[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Okta Activity by app type = link fields = app display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts] +[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts] +[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user] +[workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Previous Unseen User type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications] +[workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications type = link fields = dest display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta] +[workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate User Activities In Okta type = link fields = user display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get -[workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src] +[workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task] label = Workbench - Investigate Web POSTs From src type = link fields = src display_location = field_menu -link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true link.target = blank link.method = get diff --git a/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv index 0717cbc6ba..1d54cd2b6a 100644 --- a/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv +++ b/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -1,5 +1,102 @@ mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups -T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no +T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no +T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no +T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no +T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no +T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no +T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no +T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no +T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no +T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no +T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no +T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no +T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no +T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no +T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no +T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no +T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no +T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver +T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no +T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no +T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no +T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no +T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no +T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no +T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no +T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no +T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no +T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no +T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no +T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no +T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no +T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no +T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no +T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no +T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no +T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no +T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no +T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no +T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no +T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no +T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no +T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no +T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no +T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no +T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no +T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no +T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no +T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no +T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no +T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no +T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no +T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no +T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no +T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no +T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no +T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no +T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no +T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no +T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no +T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no +T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no +T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no +T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no +T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider +T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no +T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1 +T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no +T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no +T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM +T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork +T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver +T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no +T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no +T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no +T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no +T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1 +T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver +T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17 +T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla +T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no +T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16 +T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla +T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no +T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1 +T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29 +T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no +T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no +T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles +T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no +T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no +T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28 +T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no +T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no +T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no +T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no +T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no +T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no @@ -7,7 +104,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation -T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer +T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no @@ -24,13 +121,13 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee -T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon +T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6 -T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group +T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group -T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom +T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28 T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork @@ -39,20 +136,20 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28 T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan -T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak +T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 -T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound -T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 -T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 +T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 +T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke -T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 +T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no @@ -64,14 +161,14 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338 T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12 -T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM -T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla +T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM +T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no -T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41 +T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no -T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505 +T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper -T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang +T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no T1569,System Services,Execution,no T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41 @@ -79,22 +176,22 @@ T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no -T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete -T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound +T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete +T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41 -T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 +T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no -T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda +T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7 T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no -T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal -T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8 -T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass -T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no +T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal +T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8 +T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass +T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38 @@ -104,18 +201,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no -T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon +T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505 -T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang +T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak -T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no +T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 -T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33 @@ -124,8 +221,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 -T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang -T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang +T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang +T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no @@ -142,60 +239,60 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28 T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no -T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats +T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no -T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 +T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no -T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no +T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider -T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no +T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4 -T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon +T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 +T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no -T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no +T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,Wizard Spider T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33 -T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass -T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver +T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass +T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no -T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group -T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 -T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no -T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390 +T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group +T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 +T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28 +T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no -T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang -T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom +T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang +T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no -T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 -T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 +T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 +T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic -T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift +T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no -T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel +T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37 -T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon -T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee +T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon +T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32 -T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no +T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32 @@ -204,7 +301,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32 T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 -T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 +T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41 T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28 @@ -213,22 +310,22 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night D T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 +T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke -T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 +T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell -T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 +T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla +T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group +T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla @@ -247,22 +344,22 @@ T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky -T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel +T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no -T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 -T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no +T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 +T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater -T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 +T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound -T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no +T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,no T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak +T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no @@ -277,7 +374,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group -T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no @@ -285,13 +382,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no -T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda +T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 +T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater @@ -316,12 +413,12 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no -T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no +T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28 T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no T1491,Defacement,Impact,no T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no -T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group +T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no @@ -330,38 +427,38 @@ T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group -T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan -T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no -T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla -T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM -T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29 +T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no -T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28 -T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom -T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28 -T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no +T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom +T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya -T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig -T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak +T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no -T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass +T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan +T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28 +T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1204,User Execution,Execution,no +T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig +T1204,User Execution,Execution,no T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no +T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no -T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird +T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER +T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no -T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no -T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32 T1153,Source,Execution,no -T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 +T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug +T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no @@ -369,28 +466,28 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7 T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37 T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28 -T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 +T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38 T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 -T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8 +T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 -T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 +T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 -T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 -T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group -T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 +T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 +T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group +T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla +T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no -T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel -T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak +T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel +T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 @@ -400,34 +497,34 @@ T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33| T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no -T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang +T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no -T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM +T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda -T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 -T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 +T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda +T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 +T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28 -T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass +T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 +T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no -T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 +T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no -T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee -T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla -T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee +T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla +T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no @@ -435,6 +532,6 @@ T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no -T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang +T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom